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i 
Proposed Abstract 
The Davis Tax Committee released their First Interim Report on Estate Duty on 13 July 
2015 which contained certain recommendations concerning the way trusts should be taxed 
which were to act as a deterrent against aggressive estate planning. This report also 
contained suggested changes to current estate duty legislation. Changes to these 
recommendations, yet to be published in a second report, were discussed in a webinar by 
Judge Dennis Davis in December 2015 and the 2016 Budget Review contained additional 
suggestions with regard to the taxation of trusts.  
This study constructs case studies to compare the effect of the various recommendations 
on total taxation and capital preservation in a scenario where assets are held in a South 
African trust over a period of time, with a scenario where such assets are kept in a South 
African tax resident’s personal estate. The case studies focus only on high-net-worth trusts 
and personal estates. The possible double taxation which may occur as a result of levying 
both estate duty and capital gains tax on death is also briefly considered. 
The case study results show the punitive effects of the proposed repeal of the s 4(q) estate 
duty deduction for inter-spousal bequests on the personal estate scenarios and show how 
several of the new proposals could result in effective capital tax rates in excess of the 
deemed maximum capital tax benchmark of 15%. This may result in more aggressive 
estate planning strategies being employed should such proposals be enacted. The report 
also concludes that the double taxation effect of both estate duty and capital gains tax 
levied on death is likely to be small on average, although individual high-net-worth estates 
may be subject to such double taxation in certain cases. 
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1 
1 Background 
The Davis Tax Committee (‘DTC’) released their First Interim Report on Estate Duty 
(‘First Report’) on 13 July 2015 which contained potentially far-reaching 
recommendations concerning the way trusts should be taxed which were to act as a 
deterrent against aggressive estate planning1. The Report suggested, among other 
recommendations, that both the attribution principles contained in s 7 of the Income Tax 
Act No 58 of 1962 (‘Income Tax Act’) and the conduit principle, a common law principle 
codified for taxation purposes in s 25B of the Act, should be repealed insofar as they apply 
to South African resident trust arrangements.  
These recommendations were met with wide-spread criticism and concern from various 
professional bodies2. On 10 December 2015, Judge Dennis Davis, who heads up the DTC, 
announced in a webinar presented by the South African Institute of Tax Practitioners 
(‘SAIT’)3 that most of the controversial recommendations made in the First Report with 
regard to the taxation of trusts will be removed and replaced with additional 
recommendations regarding changes to the Estate Duty Act No 45 of 1955 (‘Estate Duty 
Act’) to act as an alternative means of curbing aggressive estate planning. These new 
recommendations will be contained in a Second Report on Estate Duty (‘Second Report’) 
which was expected to be released by the end of January 2016 but which, by the hand-in 
date of this research report (31 March 2016), has not yet been released.  
Certain of the recommendations alluded to by Judge Davis were however briefly 
mentioned in the South African National Treasury’s Budget Review of 2016 under a short 
paragraph with the heading ‘Tax treatment of trusts’ 4 which became available on 24 
February 2016 during Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan’s 2016 Budget Speech. Due to 
the vague wording of the abovementioned short paragraph it remains, however, unclear 
exactly how the proposed legislative changes with regard to interest-free loans made to 
trusts will be achieved and which ‘further measures’ with regard to discretionary trusts 
will also be considered (as stated in the final sentence of said paragraph). 
This research report initially set out to analyse the effects of the recommendations made in 
the DTC’s First Report on certain trust and inheritance structures used by South African 
residents and how that would compare to a situation where assets are kept in a personal 
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estate, given the recommendations made in the report regarding the limitation or repeal of 
the s 4(q) estate duty deduction (inter-spousal bequests)5 and the increased s 4A estate 
duty abatement amount6. Such a comparison could show whether the DTC’s First Report’s 
recommendations, taken as a whole, would have been able to act as a deterrent against 
estate planning. 
Having been given a glimpse of what the new recommendations contained in the DTC’s 
soon-to-be-released Second Report on Estate Duty may be, the problem statement of this 
research report was modified to include a comparison between the recommendations of 
the First Report and the expected recommendations to be contained in the Second Report 
in order for the research to remain topical and relevant.  
Since the Second Report has not been released by the finalisation date of this research 
report, certain assumptions as to the detail of the new recommendations to be contained in 
the Second Report had to be made in order to make such a comparison. The contents of 
the 2016 Budget Review with regard to the tax treatment of trusts will also be considered. 
1.1 The Davis Tax Committee’s First Interim Report on Estate Duty 
The DTC’s First Report consisted of a review of all aspects of wealth taxes in South 
Africa which included estate duty, capital gains tax (‘CGT’) on death, donations tax and 
the way that trusts are taxed. In the introductory chapter of the First Report the DTC also 
explained why it is important to understand how taxes on wealth could contribute to 
reducing the growing wealth inequality in South Africa and why it is important to look at 
additional ways of taxing wealth in order to assist in achieving this7. 
Apart from smaller adjustments suggested to the current estate duty and donations tax 
legislation, potentially the most far-reaching recommendations made by the Committee in 
this report were with regard to the way trusts should be taxed. 
As mentioned above, the First Report suggested that both the attribution principles 
contained in s 7 of the Income Tax Act and the conduit principle, a common law principle 
codified for taxation purposes in s 25B of the Act, should be repealed insofar as they apply 
to South African resident trust arrangements. These suggestions were not to be applied to 
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non-resident trust arrangements and special trusts as defined in s 1 of the Income Tax Act 
(it was suggested, however, that the definition of special trusts be revisited) 8.   
The effect of these recommended changes on the taxation of South African resident trusts 
would, broadly speaking, have been as follows: 
 Repeal of s 7 – attribution principle: Income earned as a consequence of a donation, 
settlement or other disposition made by an individual (the donor) to a discretionary 
trust9 which, under the current attribution rules of s 710 as applied to such trusts and 
if that donor was still alive, would have resulted in such income being taxable in 
the hands of the donor at the personal marginal tax rate of up to, but typically less 
than, 41% would now have been taxed in the trust at the flat 41% tax rate applicable 
to trusts11.  
 Repeal of s 25B – conduit principle: Even if no donation, settlement or other 
disposition was made by any individual to a discretionary trust (in other words, even 
if the attribution rules contained in s 7 do not apply), all amounts received in the 
trust and distributed by the trustees to beneficiaries12 in the same tax year as it was 
received in the trust which, under the current conduit principle contained in s 25B, 
would result in such amounts being taxable in the hands of the beneficiaries at the 
personal marginal tax rate of up to, but typically less than, 41% would now be taxed 
in the trust at the flat 41% tax rate applicable to trusts regardless of whether 
distributed to beneficiaries or not13. 
With regard to foreign trusts, the First Report suggested that all distributions from such 
trusts be taxed as income in the hands of the resident beneficiaries, regardless of whether 
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9 In a discretionary trust, the beneficiaries do not have a vested right in either the trust income or 
trust capital. A beneficiary will only obtain a vested right to trust income or trust capital upon the 
trustees exercising their discretion to vest such income or capital in that beneficiary (De Koker & 
Williams 2015:para 12.19). 
10 The relevant sub-sections with regard to the attribution rules that currently apply to South 
African resident trusts are s 7(3) to (6) and in particular s 7(5) which will typically apply to 
discretionary trusts (De Koker & Williams 2015:para 12.27).  
11 Even though not specifically included in the DTC’s list of recommendations it is assumed that 
the Committee’s intention is that the attribution rules with regard to capital gains contained in para 
68 to 73 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act insofar as it applies to South African 
resident trusts should also be repealed (in particular para 70 as it applies to discretionary trusts). 
This assumption is based on the brief mention made of these paragraphs on page 38 of the Report. 
12 That is, the beneficiaries acquired a vested right in such amounts in consequence of the exercise 
by the trustees of a discretion vested in them in terms of the trust deed. The tax consequences 
applicable to such beneficiaries of South African resident trusts are currently determined by s 
25B(2) of the Income Tax Act. 
13 Even though not specifically included in the DTC’s list of recommendations it is assumed that 
the Committee’s intention is that the conduit principle with regard to capital gains contained in para 
80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act insofar as it applies to South African resident 
trusts should also be repealed.  
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the nature of the income so distributed relates to dividends or capital gains received in the 
foreign trust14. The DTC was also of the view in the First Report that there was no need to 
consider a further offshore amnesty programme for South African taxpayers who still have 
assets abroad that remain in contravention of both the Income Tax Act and the Exchange 
Control Regulations of the Reserve Bank15. 
The reason for the recommendations with regard to the income tax regime of trusts was 
purportedly to create a ‘substantial deterrent against estate planning’ using trusts16 and to 
‘discourage offshore trust formation’17 which the Committee felt would have resulted in 
trust structures being abandoned in favour of holding assets in individuals’ personal 
estates which would in turn be dutiable in the event of their death. It should be noted that 
South Africa is one of the few countries in the world that imposes both estate duty and 
CGT on the assets of a person on death18 and a combined estate duty and CGT effect will 
therefore occur at the time of a person’s death. The Committee was therefore seeking a 
combination of increased estate duty and CGT collections with their recommendations19.   
Alternatively, if taxpayers wanted to continue to pursue the postponement of estate duty 
through the use of trusts, they would have remained at liberty to do so but as the eventual 
sale of trust assets would be subject to the higher tax rate in the trust, the Committee 
seemed satisfied that the estate duty loss would have been compensated for should their 
recommendations be implemented20. 
The quantifiable outcome sought with the recommendations made by the DTC seemed to 
be an increase in estate duty collections (which presumably includes an increase in CGT 
collections on death) from the then estimated 0.13% of total tax collections (actual 
percentage achieved was 0.15%)21 to a level that is more in line with what is achieved in 
other countries that levy wealth, estate, inheritance or gift taxes22. The First Report 
referred to a suggested targeted tax contribution by wealth taxes of around 1% to 1.5% of 
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tax revenues which was suggested by the Katz Committee in their Third Interim Report23. 
This range of contribution percentages seems higher than what most countries cited in the 
Report achieved in 2013 (the Report refers to OECD Revenue Statistics of 2013 in this 
regard). The percentages contained in the list cited in the Report range from 0.4% 
achieved in the United States and in Germany to a combined 1.5% in France (which 
includes 0.5% relating to net wealth tax collections and 1% to inheritance and gift taxes)24. 
If the Committee will still be proposing a 1% to 1.5% target for wealth taxes collected as a 
percentage of total tax revenues, then a 7- to 10-fold increase in estate duty (up from the 
latest actual 0.15%) would potentially have been sought as a result of the implementation 
of the original suggested changes to estate duty legislation (notably the withdrawal or 
limitation of the inter-spousal exemptions25 and roll-overs) and to the taxation of trusts.  
It can be assumed that the recommendations contained in the Second Report will aim to 
achieve a similar increase in estate duty collections but through different mechanisms and 
legislative changes (as will be discussed in the following sub-chapter). 
The First Report stated prior to its recommendations with regard to tax legislation changes 
relating to trusts that ‘Given the various forms of trust arrangements, it is impossible to 
prescribe universal anti-avoidance provisions to stem the loss.’26. The Report then 
continued to list ‘simple yet fundamental amendments to the current legislation’27 which, 
by the Committee’s own admission, would have had ‘diverse and far-reaching 
implications’28.  
From the above excerpt, however, the DTC did not seem to have gone through an analysis 
of the effect of their recommendations on specific or typical trust and inheritance 
structures to demonstrate how the recommendations will result in the increase sought in 
estate duty and CGT collections on death.   
Applying the recommendations made by the First Report to a simple trust and inheritance 
structure and comparing the overall tax effect on such structure (of CGT, estate duty and 
income tax) during the existence of the structure to a situation where the assets concerned 
were held in a founder’s personal estate instead may provide valuable insight into whether 
the perceived losses in estate duty collections could indeed have been stemmed by the 
implementation of the Report’s recommendations. Such a study may also provide an 
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opportunity to investigate whether any unintended consequences, that may be punitive in 
nature, could have arisen for certain structures. 
1.2 The Davis Tax Committee’s expected Second Report on Estate Duty  
In a webinar presented by the SAIT on 10 December 2015, Judge Dennis Davis, who 
heads up the DTC conceded that some of the recommendations made in the First Report 
were perhaps not as carefully considered as they should have been29. He mentioned that 
the recommendations in the First Report regarding the taxation of South African trusts in 
particular will be abandoned and that the conduit principle (s 25B of the Income Tax Act) 
and the attribution principle (s 7) will therefore remain unchanged. He further mentioned 
that the recommendation with regard to foreign trusts was also incorrect and that 
distributions will continue to be taxed according to the nature of the income received in 
the foreign trust if distributed to residents (as currently governed by s 25B(2A) and para 
80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act).  
These and other recommendations will be contained in a Second Report on Estate Duty 
which was expected to be released by the end of January 2016 but which remained 
outstanding as at the hand-in date of this research report (31 March 2016). The remaining 
and new recommendations that were alluded to related to certain changes to the Estate 
Duty Act and will include the following: 
 A repeal of the s 4(q) deduction, which means that there will be no deduction from 
the net estate value of any bequests to the surviving spouse which currently has 
the effect of reducing the net estate value of the first-dying spouse to Rnil in many 
instances and a roll-over of the unused portion of the first-dying spouse’s 
abatement to the second spouse’s estate. This recommendation was also contained 
in the First Report30. It seems also as if the unused portion of this abatement will 
now no longer be portable to the last-dying spouse’s estate. 
 Together with the above recommendation, the primary abatement contained in s 
4A of the Estate Duty Act will be increased from R3,5 million to R15 million per 
estate which should prevent undue hardship to be imposed on the surviving 
spouse. This is a significant increase from the recommendation of a R6 million 
abatement per taxpayer contained in the First Report31. 
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 The rate of estate duty which currently stands at a flat 20% will be replaced with a 
staggered rate where the estate duty rate will remain at 20% for dutiable estate 
values up to a certain amount (which amount remains to be defined) after which 
the rate will increase to 25% for the portion of the dutiable estate exceeding such 
amount.  
 The wording of para 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, which 
deals with capital gains distributed to trust beneficiaries, will be refined in order to 
correct some of the deficiencies in the wording of this paragraph which currently 
results in most distributions from capital gains received in the same tax year as 
when such gains arose, to be excluded from a beneficiary’s aggregate capital gain 
or loss. 
 Section 3(3)(d) of the Estate Duty Act, which serves as an anti-avoidance clause 
for estate duty purposes, will be modified to deem trust assets as property of a 
deceased trust settlor, and therefore subject to estate duty, if the deceased had a 
large interest free loan due to him or her by such trust on his or her death. 
Currently this section deems property of which the deceased was immediately 
prior to his or her death competent to dispose for his or her own benefit or for that 
of his or her estate to be property of the deceased and therefore subject to estate 
duty. The argument with regard to large outstanding loan accounts due to the 
deceased by a trust seems to be that the deceased was in fact able to control the 
trust by virtue of having the ability to call up such a large loan at any time. The 
exact mechanism of this proposal and how control will be determined have not yet 
been finalised and was not described in detail during the abovementioned webinar 
(see also the next sub-chapter regarding proposals contained in the 2016 Budget 
Review in this regard). 
Given the complete about-turn by the Committee with regard to the First Report’s 
recommendations in relation to the taxation of both resident and foreign trusts, the original 
object of this research report, which was to test the effect of these recommendations on 
various trust and inheritance structures, has now become a moot point as no substantial 
changes to trust taxation legislation would need to be considered any longer. 
It seems therefore as if the DTC will change the manner in which they seek to discourage 
the use of trusts and inheritance structures for the avoidance of estate duty: from 
recommending the excessive taxation of trusts (as a result of the First Report’s proposed 
repeal of the conduit principle) to substantially increasing the estate duty abatement which 
should lessen the need for the creation of trust and inheritance structures purely for estate 
duty savings purposes (as alluded to in Judge Davis’s webinar).  
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Further amendments to the anti-avoidance clause of the Estate Duty Act – s 3(3)(d) – will 
aim to further discourage the use of trusts combined with large or ever-increasing loan 
accounts due to the founder and trust beneficiaries as a result of transfers made to the 
trusts or unpaid distributions made by the trustees of the trust to these individuals over the 
years. 
Since the Second Report was not released prior to the 2016 Budget Speech on 24 February 
2016, the only further information that is available to date is the short paragraph regarding 
‘Tax treatment of trusts’ contained in the 2016 Budget Review32 which will be discussed 
below. 
1.3 The 2016 Budget Review 
1.3.1 Tax treatment of trusts 
The only mention made of the DTC’s work on Estate Duty in the 2016 Budget Review is 
in a short paragraph entitled ‘Tax treatment of trusts’33. No mention was made of the 
possible increase of the estate duty abatement to R15 million per estate nor of the possible 
staggered rate of estate duty discussed by Judge Davis in the December 2015 webinar34. 
The heading of the paragraph in the Budget Review suggests that the focus of the 
suggested legislative changes may still be on trusts and the aim seems to be, firstly, to 
include trust assets in the estate of the founder (who is also assumed to be the funder of the 
trust’s assets) at the time of his or her death if assets have been transferred to the trust via 
a loan at any time and secondly, to trigger the payment of donations tax at the time that 
assets are transferred to a trust via an interest-free loan. This proposed treatment is likely 
to apply to any other funders of the trust who have sold assets on loan account to the trust 
other than the founder. 
What is puzzling is the statement made in this paragraph that it is possible for a founder to 
transfer wealth from his or her own estate to a trust without being taxed where, for 
instance, a founder sells assets to a trust in exchange for the granting of an interest-free 
loan as payment. Although it is true that no donations tax will be triggered in such a 
situation as such a transaction constitutes a sale of said asset for a market-related price, 
capital gains tax or CGT will certainly still be applicable and therefore such transactions 
have not been tax-free since the advent of CGT on 1 October 2001. Furthermore, the 
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outstanding loan amount of the founder will be subject to estate duty at the time of his or 
her death. This loan value may of course be substantially less than the value of the assets 
in the trust that have been allowed to grow over time.  
The proposal that seems to be made in this paragraph of the 2016 Budget Review is for the 
sale of assets to a trust in exchange for an interest-free loan as payment to be treated as a 
donation on which donations tax of 20% will be payable (an amount that would now be 
due in addition to the CGT payable on the disposal of such assets). It is unclear whether it 
is also intended that the attribution rules of s 7 of the Income Tax Act will apply as a result 
of such a transaction being categorised as a donation.  
If this is the case, then income generated by such transferred assets going forward may be 
taxed in the hands of the founder (or other funders) during his or her lifetime if the trust is 
a discretionary trust and distributions to beneficiaries have not occurred due to these being 
subject to certain conditions having to be met35 or distributions are made to minor 
children36 (distributions made to beneficiaries who are majors will be taxed in the hands of 
such beneficiaries). This will mean that so-called income-splitting opportunities may be 
reduced for some trusts. Currently, the practice of distributing income and gains to several 
beneficiaries to whom a lower marginal tax rate applies (for instance, minor children) can 
result in the overall income tax due on such distributions being lower than if all income 
and gains fell in the hands of a single beneficiary to whom a higher or the maximum 
marginal tax rate applies (for instance, the founder). If this is the intended working of the 
suggested changes in the 2016 Budget Review then higher income tax amounts may be 
collected with regard to trust distributions in certain trusts for certain periods during the 
existence of such trusts (notably those with beneficiaries who are still minors but only 
until such time as when they become majors).   
It seems that, in addition to charging additional donations tax on such transactions when 
they occur, that the trust assets so transferred will be deemed to form part of the founder’s 
personal estate at the time of his or her death. It is unclear whether the assets will still be 
included in the founder’s estate if a loan is obtained at a reasonable interest rate (most 
probably the official rate of interest37) instead of an interest-free loan as the wording used 
in this particular sentence only mentions ‘transferred through a loan to a trust’ and does 
not specify an ‘interest-free’ loan as was discussed in the rest of the paragraph. Judge 
Davis seemed to have indicated in the December 2015 webinar38 that the size of the loan 
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relative to the value of the assets in the trust would also be a consideration in order to 
determine if the founder did in fact have de facto control over the trust or not and, if so, 
whether it could be said that the founder was competent to dispose of such assets for his or 
her own benefit or for that of his or her estate immediately prior to his or her death. If that 
could be said to be the case then s 3(3)(d) of the Estate Duty Act may be applied to deem 
the trust assets to be those of the deceased founder’s estate for estate duty purposes. 
No clarity is however provided in this regard and the final sentence of this paragraph 
seems furthermore to allude to additional measures to be implemented which aim will be 
to penalise the use of discretionary trusts. 
1.3.2 New amnesty programme announced 
Despite the DTC’s recommendation in the First Report that no further offshore amnesty 
programme should be considered for taxpayers with undisclosed assets abroad and who 
remain in contravention of both the Income Tax Act and the Exchange Control 
Regulations of the Reserve Bank39, a special voluntary disclosure programme was 
announced in the 2016 Budget Speech which will run from October 2016 to March 2017 
to allow non-compliant taxpayers to voluntarily disclose offshore assets and income40. 
The previous amnesty programme in 2004 resulted in assets in excess of R68,6 billion that 
were identified and brought into the South African tax system and exchange control levies 
collected of R2,9 billion41. Given the new global standard for the automatic exchange of 
information between tax authorities which will provide SARS with additional information 
from 2017 onwards42, non-compliant taxpayers will be motivated to make use of this 
special programme which could therefore see even higher amounts of revenue being 
generated as a result of participation in this programme. 
1.3.3 Increased capital gains inclusion rate 
The major development with regard to the effective tax rate of trusts and individuals 
(particularly capital asset-rich persons) which was revealed in the 2016 Budget is of 
course the increase of the capital gains inclusion rate for individuals, companies and trusts 
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effective for years of assessment beginning on or after 1 March 201643. This inclusion rate 
was increased from 33.3% to 40% for individuals and although an increased annual capital 
gains exclusion (from R30,000 to R40,000) now applies to individuals, the current capital 
gains exclusion of R300,000 for individuals in the year of death was again left unchanged. 
This means that, regardless of which estate duty changes may or may not be made in the 
future, capital gains tax on death has increased on two fronts (a rate increase as well as an 
inflationary increase as a result of not adjusting the annual exclusion upwards for several 
years now44).  
The inclusion rate of capital gains for companies and trusts increased from 66.6% to 80% 
which means that the effective capital gains tax rate applicable to trusts are now at 32.8% 
compared to an effective rate of 16.4% for individuals (previously 27.3% for trusts 
compared to 13.7% for individuals)45. These increases will not only affect companies but 
also high-net-worth individuals and trusts that are capital asset-rich. 
A paper by Roeleveld (2012), which discussed the double taxation effect of having both 
estate duty and CGT in the event of death in South Africa, was criticised in the First 
Report46 mainly on the grounds that CGT is not regarded as a wealth tax but as a type of 
income tax on deferred capital income gains47. Therefore the DTC responded that only one 
wealth tax (i.e. estate duty) is being levied on death and included an analysis of the 
effective tax rate (CGT and estate duty combined) conducted by National Treasury in the 
First Report48 to substantiate their response. 
The recent increase in the CGT inclusion rate brings the discussion regarding the effect of 
possible double taxation on death to the fore once more as individuals will be liable for 
both estate duty and now an increased CGT on essentially the same asset base on death. 
In light of all these new developments and the resultant uncertainty, the original problem 
statement of this research report therefore had to be reconsidered. Rather than testing the 
recommendations of the First Report on various trust and inheritance structures, a 
comparison will now be done between the total accumulated taxation of all parties related 
to a wealth base as a percentage of the value of that wealth over the duration of a typical 
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inter vivos discretionary trust holding such assets compared to the situation where such 
assets are being held in the founder’s personal estate (that is, where no use is made of a 
trust to hold the wealth).  
Such a comparison could show if the new recommendations could indeed be sufficient to 
discourage the use of trust and inheritance structures. 
The possible double taxation on death due to both estate duty and CGT will also be briefly 
considered based on the data and information provided in the First Report. 
1.4 Conclusion 
The DTC considers additional wealth taxes as an important mechanism to increase 
revenue collection in order to help address the growing wealth inequality in South 
Africa49. Several recommendations have been made by or suggested by the DTC to date 
with regard to increasing estate duty collections through changing trust taxation 
legislation. Although none of these recommendations appear to be final or have been 
accepted into tax legislation as yet, a comparison of the effect of these recommendations 
over the duration of a typical inter vivos discretionary trust holding such assets compared 
to the situation where such assets are being held in a founder’s personal estate may show if 
any of the new recommendations could assist in discouraging aggressive estate planning 
which makes use of trusts. The possible double taxation on death due to both estate duty 
and CGT will also be briefly considered. 
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2 Problem statement  
2.1 Statement of the problem 
The DTC, in arriving at their recommendations in the First Report with regard to the 
taxation of trusts and changes in estate duty legislation, seems not to have conducted an 
analysis of how their recommendations would have affected typical trust and inheritance 
structures and how it would compare to a similar situation where assets were kept in a 
personal estate.  
Without performing such an analysis it would have been difficult to conclude with any 
confidence that the recommendations would not have been punitive to trust beneficiaries 
or have resulted in any unintended consequences or hardship for such beneficiaries as a 
result of excessive taxation or effective double taxation on death. The other estate duty 
recommendations made in the Report may also have resulted in trusts still being preferred 
from an estate planning point of view. 
The desired effect of the recommendations and proposed recommendations in the First and 
expected Second Interim Report on Estate Duty as well as in the 2016 Budget Review is to 
discourage aggressive estate planning and specifically the usage of trusts purely for estate 
planning purposes. In this regard, the total taxes collected by SARS (income tax, CGT and 
estate duty) over a certain period of time from all parties with regard to a wealth asset (for 
example, investment portfolio, property, etc.) can be compared between the situation 
where a trust was used to house such assets and where the wealth was held in the personal 
estate of a taxpayer (the founder and his or her heirs). It is deemed necessary to include the 
income tax consequences of the DTC’s recommendations with the capital and wealth tax 
consequences as the Committee’s reasoning for introducing punitive income tax 
consequences to trusts and/or trust founders (by, for instance, the repeal of the conduit 
principle) is purportedly to compensate the Receiver for any perceived losses in estate 
duty as a result of the use of such trust and inheritance structures50.  
A baseline comparison of taxes collected over time as a percentage of the value of a 
wealth asset held in a trust versus that collected for the same asset held in a personal estate 
can be done using current legislation. An objective benchmark will be obtained to which 
the total taxes as percentage of the capital value can be compared to determine whether the 
current baseline can be said to be reasonable or whether additional taxation can be 
tolerated without resulting in capital flight. 
                                                     
50 Davis Tax Committee 2015:44 
14 
This comparison can then be repeated by firstly applying the original recommendations 
contained in the First Report and secondly by applying the expected new 
recommendations of the Second Report and the additional proposed recommendations 
contained in the 2016 Budget Review.  
The relevant differences in taxes collected as a percentage of the capital value calculated 
by using the different sets of recommendations may then be able to provide an indication 
of whether the recommendations in the reports would possibly be able to (or would have 
been able to in the case of the First Report) discourage the use of trusts for estate planning 
purposes and not result in any unintended consequences or hardship for any parties 
involved. 
In light of the increased capital gains inclusion rate announced in the 2016 Budget, the 
possible effect of double taxation due to both CGT and estate duty being levied on death 
will also be briefly considered albeit through a different, non-case study-based approach. 
2.2 The sub-problems 
2.2.1 Using a case study approach and current tax legislation, is there an overall tax saving 
when an asset is held in a trust compared to not using a trust? 
This sub-problem will create a baseline comparison based on current legislation51 in order 
to compare the total taxation collected over the duration of the life of a discretionary inter 
vivos trust holding wealth assets to the total taxation collected over the same duration 
where the assets were held in the personal estate of a taxpayer. 
Two basic scenarios or case studies will be created, the first being a scenario where wealth 
assets are transferred to an inter vivos trust and the second where no use is made of a trust. 
Each scenario will have a timeline of sufficiently long duration together with typical life 
events along such timelines (for instance, death of the founder, death of the surviving 
spouse etc.) and typical restructuring events with regard to trusts (for instance, where a 
single trust is restructured to form separate trusts for adult children to be managed 
separately etc.). The capital growth and income growth assumptions used for the wealth 
assets in the two basic scenarios will be the same. All taxation with regard to the income 
produced by the wealth asset, the CGT paid on disposals and estate duty collected will be 
calculated for each scenario on an annual basis. The aggregate tax paid by all parties from 
inception of each scenario will be calculated at the end of each year. This aggregate 
                                                     
51 Including the capital gains inclusion rate increase announced in the 2016 Budget Review 
(Department of National Treasury 2016a:50). 
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taxation amount, which will build up over time, will be expressed as a percentage of the 
theoretical market value of the wealth asset at the end of that particular year (using the 
abovementioned growth assumptions) in order to get a sense of the relative total taxation 
levied on the assets at the end of any given year. The comparison between these two 
scenarios will provide the baseline comparison. 
2.2.2 Using a case study approach and applying the recommendations of the First Interim 
Report on Estate Duty to current tax legislation, is there an overall tax saving when an 
asset is held in a trust compared to not using a trust and how does this compare to the 
same comparison using current tax legislation? 
In the second set of case studies, the same two basic scenarios used in the previous 
problem statement will be used but the recommendations of the First Interim Report on 
Estate Duty will be applied and the relevant difference in total taxation collected over time 
as a percentage of the value of a wealth asset calculated between the two basic scenarios 
will be compared to the baseline comparison in order to determine what the effect of these 
recommendations would have been.  
2.2.3 Using a case study approach and applying the expected recommendations of the Second 
Interim Report on Estate Duty to current tax legislation, is there an overall tax saving 
when an asset is held in a trust compared to not using a trust and how does this compare 
to the same comparison using current tax legislation? 
In the third set of case studies, the same two basic scenarios used in the previous two 
problem statements will be used but the recommendations that are expected to appear in 
the Second Report on Estate Duty together with those recommendations mentioned in the 
2016 Budget Review will be applied and the relevant difference in total taxation collected 
over time as a percentage of the value of a wealth asset calculated between the two basic 
scenarios will be compared to the baseline comparison in order to determine what the 
effect of these recommendations would be. 
Where information with regard to the expected recommendations is not sufficient, 
reasonable assumptions will be made. 
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2.2.4 Can the perceived double taxation on death due to both CGT and estate duty being levied 
be estimated based on information currently available? 
Given the contention in some academic circles52 and in some commentaries to the First 
Interim Report on Estate Duty by professional bodies53 that there may be double taxation 
on death due to both CGT and estate duty being levied, it may be useful to determine 
whether the perceived double taxation is significant enough to be taken into consideration. 
The main issue is that the numbers provided in National Treasury’s annual Tax Statistics 
for total CGT collected from individuals include both normal disposals as well as 
disposals on death as no separate breakdown for CGT collected on death is currently 
provided in the latest Tax Statistics documents issued by the Department of National 
Treasury and SARS54. 
The DTC’s First Report does however contain some assumptions contained in a National 
Treasury analysis on the combined effective tax rates on death55 and samples of estate 
duty collected for 201356. This information could be used together with other assumptions 
to determine whether the amount of CGT collected in the event of death is likely to be 
significant compared to the estate duty collected on death especially given the increased 
capital gains inclusion rates announced in the 2016 Budget.    
3 Scope and limitations 
3.1 Final recommendations still to be released  
At the hand-in date of this research report, the DTC’s Second Report on Estate Duty has 
not yet been released and no clarity has been provided on the proposals regarding the 
taxation of trusts mentioned in the 2016 Budget Review. 
The conclusions drawn in this report with regard to the expected Second Report’s 
recommendations and the legislation changes alluded to in the Budget Review will 
therefore not be based on published recommendations or clear law. The recommendations 
and tax amendments, when eventually published or promulgated, may differ substantially 
from the expected recommendations mentioned by Judge Dennis Davis in the SAIT 
                                                     
52 Notably Roeleveld 2012 
53 Refer chapter 4.8 
54 Department of National Treasury & SARS 2014:224; Department of National Treasury & SARS 
2015:228 
55 Davis Tax Committee 2015:56-58 
56 Davis Tax Committee 2015:31 (Table 2); 56 Davis Tax Committee 2015:63 (Table 6) 
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webinar57 and those mentioned in the 2016 Budget Review. As such, the conclusions 
drawn in this research report may not remain valid. 
The case study framework to be created in this report could, however, still be employed to 
analyse the final recommendations or enacted legislation in order to obtain an 
understanding of the comparative effect of such recommendations and law on the taxation 
and capital preservation of assets held in trusts and of those held in personal estates. 
3.2 Validity of trusts and absence of abuses in trusts assumed  
This study will make the assumption that the trusts used in the case studies are neither 
sham trusts (that is, invalidly created trusts) nor valid trusts where certain abuses take 
place (for instance, trustees or beneficiaries not treating trust assets as separate to their 
own).  
Such scenarios, if challenged in the courts, could in any event result in either the trust 
being declared invalid or the piercing of the veil of the trust which would have the effect 
of treating trust assets as being held by the individuals involved with the resulting tax and 
other legal consequences58. 
All case studies therefore assume the creation of a valid trust where no abuses are taking 
place.  
3.3 Types and uses of trusts included in case studies  
The case studies will be based on structures containing discretionary inter vivos trusts only 
as these are deemed the more common form of trust structures employed for estate duty 
planning purposes – bewind and vesting trusts will therefore not be used. For the purpose 
of the case studies a family type trust is assumed as an alternative to holding assets in a 
taxpayer’s personal name. These scenarios would also be applicable to income-generating 
properties, for instance, agricultural property held in trust (which could be said to be more 
of a business type trust). 
                                                     
57 Davis 2015 
58 As seen, for instance, in the cases of Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C), Land and 
Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) and Badenhorst v Badenhorst 
2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) 
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3.4 Residency of trusts included in case studies 
The focus of the case studies will be on the effect of the recommendations on South 
African resident trusts and estate duty.  
As the Committee also made certain recommendations with regard to the treatment of 
distributions from non-resident trusts to resident beneficiaries in order to ‘discourage 
offshore trust formation’59 and as this aspect is addressed by some commentaries 
submitted by professional bodies, some aspects relating to the taxation of non-resident 
trusts and to the interaction of resident beneficiaries with non-resident trusts will be 
discussed in the literature study.  
3.5 Time value of money 
The aggregate taxation over the duration of the scenarios or case studies will be calculated 
but in order to simplify the calculations, no time value of money adjustments will be made 
to any of the taxation payments. This approach was also followed in an example included 
in another study by Roeleveld60 on the combined effect of the various taxes paid during 
the lifetime of an asset and on the death of the owner and is similar to the approach used in 
certain simple valuation methodologies, for instance in a payback period calculation61.  
3.6 Types of taxes included in scenarios 
The scenarios will not include a transfer of the assets into trust by way of donation, 
therefore the effect of donations tax (and the resultant effect of the attribution rules 
contained in s 7 of the Income Tax Act) will not be considered. As some of the 
recommendations alluded to in the 2016 Budget Review suggested that the transfer of 
assets to a trust via an interest-free loan be categorised as a donation62, one of the 
comparative scenarios will include the effect of a once-off donations tax levied upon entry 
into the trust structure (without the effect of applying the attribution rules). 
Transfer duty upon transfer of the asset to a trust will also be ignored for the purposes of 
this study in order to focus on the effects of CGT, income tax and estate duty only.  
                                                     
59 Davis Tax Committee 2015:45 
60 2012:149 
61 Per Investopedia definition of ‘payback period’ from 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/paybackperiod.asp  
62 Department of National Treasury 2016a:49 
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As the recommendations of the DTC’s First Report seem to want to use measures to 
increase income tax to penalise a perceived loss in estate duty as a result of the use of trust 
and inheritance structures, the effect of the additional income tax will be included in the 
analysis. 
3.7 Limitation of scenario events and starting parameters selected 
There may be a myriad of unique life events in the timeline of actual trusts and wealth 
held in personal estates that may include regular withdrawals with CGT consequences or 
new investments via, for instance, loan accounts into trust capital, which will have an 
effect on the overall tax paid as a percentage of the capital value. In order to study the 
effect of the various recommendations of the DTC, only a few basic events deemed typical 
will be selected to occur along the timelines of the two basic scenarios. This is done to 
both simplify the calculation of the taxes due and to be able to provide a clear graphic 
comparison between the scenarios from which certain conclusions may be drawn. 
Only a single combination of starting investment asset values and retirement withdrawal 
amounts will be used across the various case studies in order to make the results 
comparable. In real life, these starting parameters will vary vastly which may have a 
significant effect on the outcomes of the scenario comparisons. As protection will be 
provided to personal estates falling within the current and various recommended s 4A 
abatement amounts (R3,5 million, R6 million and R15 million respectively), a starting 
asset value was selected that will far exceed such abatement amounts in order to test the 
worst-case effect of the various recommendations on high-net-worth personal estates and 
trusts.  
In addition to the starting value and base cost assumed for the asset transferred to a trust or 
held in a personal estate, certain capital growth and annual income assumptions will also 
be made for the asset as well as for the retirement income withdrawal amounts. Different 
starting values, capital and income growth values or retirement withdrawal amounts will 
have different effects on the total taxation due over the chosen timeline and may affect the 
final evaluation of the various scenarios contained in the comparisons. It is beyond the 
scope of this research report to perform a comparative analysis involving different starting 
parameters, capital growth and income assumptions for each of the case studies. Such an 
analysis may, however, be the subject of another study. This research report will therefore 
only compare a single selection of the abovementioned parameters across all case studies 
and repeat these case studies by applying the different legislation recommendations in 
each comparison. 
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Furthermore, in order to provide a final comparison of potential taxes remaining at the end 
of the timeline in each of the basic scenarios, a hypothetical exit event (the complete 
liquidation of all capital assets) will be added at the end. Such an event may not be 
realistic in real life but is deemed necessary to conclude the comparison and to draw 
conclusions of the possible taxes due on such an exit event.  
As a result of the selection of a single set of starting parameters and only a few basic 
events together with the exit event in the scenario timelines, the conclusions drawn from 
the case studies may therefore be quite different when compared to those drawn from 
studying trusts or personal estates in real life where different starting parameters may 
apply, a more complex set of events may occur along a similar timeline or where no final 
exit event occurred. 
The case studies will, however, still be able to compare the effect on taxation and on the 
capital growth of wealth assets that the DTC’s recommendation will have when typical 
major events occur in a high-net-worth estate or trust. 
3.8 Limitations of data and assumptions used in estimation of CGT due on 
death 
Due to the lack of detailed information for the underlying data used in the 2013 estate duty 
sample and the National Treasury study on the analysis on the combined effective tax rates 
on death contained in the DTC’s First Report, no certainty or statistical significance of any 
of the outcomes related to this problem statement can be determined. Additional high-
level assumptions that will be required may also further distort the outcome. In the 
absence of any other information available in this regard it is deemed to remain useful 
however to see what a potential answer to this question might look like. 
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4 Literature Review 
4.1 Inequality in South Africa 
In the introductory chapter of the DTC’s First Report, the Committee stated that any 
discussion of taxes on wealth (which includes estate duty) should be analysed through the 
prism of wealth and inequality after which a lengthy discussion on the issues and 
arguments from various researchers follows63. Some further sources of inequality 
measures and possible solutions to the issue in South Africa are discussed in the 
paragraphs below. 
4.1.1 Income share of top one-percent 
Even though the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) has found that income inequality 
has been rising in many parts of the world in recent decades, the trends across countries 
with regards to the gross income share of the top one-percent of income earners, which is 
one way of measuring inequality, are mixed64. South Africa was named, however, as one 
of the countries (which also includes the United States) where the share of the top one-
percent has increased dramatically in recent decades65.  
According to the latest available data for South Africa, the share of market income of the 
richest one-percent in 2011 was 16.68% of total income compared to that in 1993, the year 
before the country’s first democratic elections, when it was only 10.27% of total income66. 
There has, however, been a slight downward trend in recent years from a peak of 18.12% 
in 2008 until 201167. In the United States the share of the richest one-percent moved from 
12.82% in 1993 to 17.47% in 2011 (with the latest available figures at 17.85% in 2014) 68.  
Other BRICS69 countries for which the above data for the income share of the top one-
percent is available are India (1993: 8.53% and latest available data is for 1999: 8.95%) 
and China (1993: 4.34% and latest available data is for 2003: 5.87%) which are much 
lower than that seen for South Africa while the figures for South American countries for 
                                                     
63 Davis Tax Committee 2014: 12-24 
64 Lipton 2014 
65 Lipton 2014 
66 Alvaredo et al. 2015 
67 Alvaredo et al. 2015 
68 Alvaredo et al. 2015 
69 BRICS is the acronym for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa. The grouping was originally known as ‘BRIC’ before the 
inclusion of South Africa in 2010. The BRICS members are all developing or newly industrialised 
countries, but they are distinguished by their large, fast-growing economies and significant 
influence on regional and global affairs (Wikipedia 2015). 
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which the data is available are nearer to those of South Africa (Argentina’s earliest 
available data in 1997: 12.39% and latest available data in 2004: 16.75%; Uruguay’s 
earliest available data in 2009: 14.20% and latest available data in 2012: 14.00%)70. Other 
developed countries’ latest data are also lower than that of South Africa (Australia in 
2010: 9.17%; Canada in 2010: 12.22%; United Kingdom in 2012: 12.70%)71. 
4.1.2 Gini coefficient 
Another way of measuring inequality is by means of the Gini coefficient on disposable 
income and South Africa has one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world although a 
recent South African Economic Update by the World Bank confirmed that there has been 
a substantial reduction in the country’s Gini coefficient brought about by a highly 
redistributive fiscal policy72. A recent IMF report stated that South Africa’s Social Grants 
Program includes a means-tested social pension program costing 1.3 percent of gross 
domestic product (‘GDP’) where social pensions are typically in the order of ½ to ¾ 
percent of GDP73. South Africa also collects more than 1 percent of GDP through 
recurrent property taxes where the average yield of property taxes for developing 
economies for which data was available in the 2000s was only around 0.5 percent74. 
The latest World Bank estimate for South Africa’s Gini coefficient is 0.63 (the 2011 
figure) which is the highest figure given in the list of World Bank estimates for any 
country in the world (although estimates are not provided for all countries in this 
database)75. Although the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(‘OECD’) does not provide an estimate for South Africa’s Gini coefficient in its database, 
none of the countries for which the organisation does provide estimates exceed that of 
South Africa76 with the nearest countries in either database being Haiti (2012: at 60.8), 
Honduras (2013: at 53.7), Columbia (2013: at 53.5) and Brazil (2013: at 52.9)77. 
                                                     
70 Alvaredo et al. 2015 
71 Alvaredo et al. 2015 
72 Davis Tax Committee 2015:13 citing a recent World Bank report (World Bank 2014). 
73 International Monetary Fund 2014:27 and footnote 23 
74 International Monetary Fund 2014:40 and footnote 45 
75 World Bank 2015 – The Gini coefficient is expressed as a fraction of 1 in this database. 
76 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015b – The Gini coefficient is 
expressed as a percentage in this database. 
77 World Bank 2015 
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4.1.3 Estate value 
The DTC’s First Report includes a high-level analysis of a sample of estate duty receipts 
covering 70% of the total estate duty collected in the 2013 tax year78 which reflects that 
the top 4% of estates, that is, estates with values in excess of R30 million, is responsible 
for 53% of estate duty collections and the top 17% of estates (with estate values in excess 
of R10 million) contributes 80% of the estate duty collections in the sample79. 
These numbers, although provided in a highly summarised format which does not allow 
the reader to calculate, for instance, the level of wealth associated with the top 1% or top 
0.1% of estates, is another indication of the high level of inequality in wealth in South 
Africa but only shows wealth held in personal estates and would therefore not reflect any 
wealth contained in trust structures.  
4.1.4 Possible solutions 
From the above data it is clear that inequality remains high in South Africa despite 
redistributive policies being in place. A recent IMF staff discussion note on inequality, 
redistribution and growth concluded that more unequal societies tend to redistribute more, 
that lower net inequality is strongly correlated with faster and more durable growth for a 
given level of redistribution and finally that redistribution appears to be generally benign 
in terms of its impact on growth apart from some extreme cases where it may have direct 
negative effects on growth80. The reduction of inequality through redistribution is 
therefore deemed to be desirable but should not be so extreme as to start affecting 
economic growth. 
The DTC’s First Report took aboard, among others, the views of Thomas Piketty who 
stated that the reduction of extreme capital wealth at the top through mechanisms such as 
public policy and taxation could help to curb ever-increasing inequality81. Such proposed 
mechanisms include increasing the progressivity of the tax system and increasing taxes on 
the rich and superrich together with increases in inheritance tax and estate duty82. 
                                                     
78 Davis Tax Committee 2015:31 
79 Per Table 2 in Davis Tax Committee 2014:31 the sample was divided into four bands based on 
estate value. The number of estates between R10 million and R20 million were equal to 10% of the 
sample and contributed 18% to the estate duty collected in the sample; the number of estates 
between R20 million and R30 million were equal to 3% of the sample and contributed 9% to the 
estate duty collected in the sample. The values associated with the estates in excess of R30 million 
are given in the text above and estates with values less than R10 million made up 83% of the 
sample but only contributed 20% of the estate duty. 
80 Ostry, Berg & Tsangarides 2014 
81 Davis Tax Committee 2014:19-20 citing Piketty 2014 
82 Davis Tax Committee 2014:20-21 
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Commentary by Holcombe (2014) on Piketty’s line of reasoning states that the proposed 
wealth tax on the superrich would have to be a global tax to prevent capital flight to lower-
tax jurisdictions which may make it difficult to implement effectively83. It was 
furthermore stated that an excess of social income programs could exacerbate inequality as 
it may discourage people to save in the form of capital ownership as they may choose to 
rather rely on government entitlements which cannot be passed on to heirs84 which would 
have allowed such heirs to take advantage of the fact that capital tends to grow at a higher 
rate than that of output and wages over time85.  
Woolard et al. (2015) found that inequality in South Africa remains stubbornly high, even 
though a mildly progressive taxation and highly progressive government spending reduced 
inequality significantly from a Gini coefficient of 0.77 to 0.59, a reduction of 0.18 Gini 
points. This is the largest reduction in inequality of 12 middle-income countries analysed 
using the same method. The next country coming closest to South Africa in its estimated 
fiscal-related reduction in Gini points is Brazil which achieved a reduction of 0.14 Gini 
points based on 2009 figures86. 
Woolard et al. (2015) further concluded that although their analysis may be interpreted to 
suggest that even greater fiscal redistribution is required, that South Africa’s fiscal deficit 
and debt indicators signal that there is limited fiscal scope to spend more to achieve even 
greater redistribution. This, they stated, is a result of the global economic downturn since 
2008 which brought about an increase in South Africa’s net debt burden from 22.9% of 
GDP in 2008/09 to 39.7% in 2013/14 and the continuing sluggish economic growth which 
does not spell an end to this worsening trajectory as yet. 
Donaldson (2014) came to a similar conclusion and suggested that a policy shift should 
occur to emphasise an improvement of the market distribution of income rather than 
reliance on redistribution only. Donaldson suggested that this could be done by, for 
instance, addressing high unemployment and highly unequal earnings in the labour market 
through policy measures that expand opportunities in the labour market and raise earnings 
of informal or low-wage workers which would help to reduce inequality and enhance 
growth. Consideration should also be given to investment in housing, public transport, 
access to electricity and telecommunication networks in order to enhance households’ 
                                                     
83 Holcombe 2014:557 
84 Holcombe 2014:554 
85 This is the main argument of Piketty’s book (Piketty 2014) that inequality increases over time 
because wealth accumulated in the past grows faster than output and wages due to the fact that the 
rate of return on capital r tends to be higher than an economy’s rate of growth g (Holcombe 
2014:551). 
86 Woolard et al. 2015 
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capacities to participate in work, to generate income and to address barriers faced by 
prospective work seekers and employers87.  
Donaldson further concluded that developing integrated delivery systems in a context of 
fragmented networks in an unequal society (where the quality of services differs greatly 
between high-quality private facilities and low-quality public services in, for instance, 
health and education) was far from straightforward88. It was also noted that measures 
which provide universal benefits or cash transfers (such as social grants, for instance) are 
institutionally less complex and less prone to leakage, corruption or bureaucratic failure 
than targeted in-kind public service delivery such as improved education, health, transport 
and communication services89. 
Woolard et al. (2015) also concluded that taxing the rich even more or having better 
targeted government spending on the poor may well be the answer to addressing 
inequality, which would make South Africa’s fiscal system even more progressive, but 
said that further research would be important to determine the consequences of such 
policies on outcomes such as growth, unemployment, poverty and economic efficiency. 
Finally they concluded that it is essential to attain better outcomes in terms of the initial 
distribution of wages, salaries and capital income (that is, market income) and that fiscal 
redistribution alone is unlikely to achieve the desired reductions in inequality. 
Lastly, a recent OECD economic survey of South Africa suggested as one way of 
increasing tax revenues, among other options, that the collection of recurrent property 
taxes (which can be seen as another type of wealth tax) be improved as opposed to 
transactional or transfer duty taxes since property tax is deemed to be one of the least 
harmful taxes for growth and can be equity enhancing90. Due to severe deficiencies in 
administrative capacity at the local municipal level, the report concluded however that the 
feasibility of increasing property tax rates in the near term was limited91. 
4.1.5 Increase in capital gains tax inclusion rate 
The recent increase in the capital gains inclusion rate which was announced in the 2016 
Budget for individuals, companies and trusts92 will contribute to a more progressive tax 
system as it will burden capital transfers with a higher tax rate. Even though CGT is not 
                                                     
87 Donaldson 2014 
88 Donaldson 2014 
89 Donaldson 2014 
90 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015a:46 
91 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015a:46 
92 Department of National Treasury 2016a:50 
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generally considered to be a wealth tax93, such a higher tax on capital when transferred 
will help to reduce the overall return on capital in the South African economy which in 
turn may, according to the arguments put forward by Thomas Piketty94, assist in curbing 
growing inequality. 
The additional revenue that will potentially be collected as a result of this increase in the 
CGT inclusion rate is likely to be substantially more than what would be achievable by 
any increase in the collection of estate duty or other wealth taxes. The total CGT collected 
from individuals and companies in the 2014/15 tax year amounted to R11,7 billion95 
whereas the total estate duty collected in the same tax year only amounted to R1.5 
billion96. The previous increase in the capital gains inclusion rate which was effective 
from 1 March 201297 resulted in CGT revenue of R11,6 billion being raised in the 2013/14 
tax year compared to the R7,1 billion CGT raised in the previous 2012/13 tax year. This 
amounted to a 63.4% increase in CGT revenue98. Even though the relative increase in the 
capital gains inclusion rate effective from 1 March 2016 is less than that which was 
effective from 1 March 201299 the percentage increase in CGT revenue that could be 
achieved is likely to be almost 40%100 of the current CGT revenue which would amount to 
additional CGT revenue in the region of R4.5 billion that could possibly be collected in 
the next tax year compared to that collected in the 2014/15 tax year101. Based on the same 
principles, the amount of additional CGT revenue collected from individuals only as a 
result of the capital gain inclusion rate increase will be in the region of R2.1 billion102. 
                                                     
93 CGT is regarded as an income tax on deferred capital income gains (Davis Tax Committee 
2015:56). 
94 The main argument of Piketty’s book (Piketty 2014) is that inequality increases over time 
because wealth accumulated in the past grows faster than output and wages due to the fact that the 
rate of return on capital r tends to be higher than an economy’s rate of growth g (Holcombe 
2014:551). 
95 Department of National Treasury & SARS 2015:228 
96 Department of National Treasury & SARS 2015:22 
97 On 1 March 2012 the capital gains inclusion rate for individuals increased from 25.0% to 33.3% 
and for companies and trusts it increased from 50.0% to 66.6% (Department of National Treasury 
& SARS 2015:228). 
98 Calculated as (11.6 – 7.1) / 7.1 = 63.4% 
99 The 1 March 2012 increase for individuals was (33.3% - 25.0%) / 25.0% = 33.2%. 
The 1 March 2016 increase for individuals is (40.0% - 33.3%) / 33.3% = 20.1%. 
100 Using the 63.4% CGT revenue increase obtained previously as a result of a 33.2% capital gains 
inclusion rate increase, one way of roughly estimating the potential CGT revenue increase to be 
realised as a result of the latest CGT inclusion rate increase could be to calculate this using an 
amount proportional to the latest inclusion rate increase, i.e. as 63.4% x 20.1 / 33.2 = 38.4%. 
101 This increase is calculated as 38.4% (see previous footnote) multiplied by the 2014/15 total CGT 
revenue collected of R11,7 billion (Department of National Treasury & SARS 2015:228) which 
equals R4.5 billion. 
102 This increase is calculated as 38.4% (see previous footnote) multiplied by the 2014/15 CGT 
revenue collected from individuals only of R5,5 billion (Department of National Treasury & SARS 
2015:228) which equals R2.1 billion. 
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For the same amount of revenue increase to be achieved by using estate duty revenue 
alone (currently at R1,5 billion103), an increase of 140% in estate duty collections must be 
achieved104 (i.e. almost two and a half times the current amount) which seems an unlikely 
outcome for any but the most radical estate duty legislation changes that could possibly be 
implemented.  
4.1.6 Conclusion 
From the literature above it can therefore be concluded that addressing inequality through 
an increase in some form of wealth tax alone may not be the only mechanism required to 
achieve the desired results but that there may well be scope for increasing the 
progressivity of our tax system somewhat through an increase in wealth taxes as part of an 
overall solution to this problem. The expected recommendation to be included in the 
DTC’s Second Report, which is to have a progressive estate duty rate of 25% above a 
certain estate value105, may therefore be an efficient approach to help address inequality in 
South Africa. 
The recent increase in the capital gains inclusion rate which was announced in the 2016 
Budget for individuals, companies and trusts106 will likewise contribute to a more 
progressive tax system as this will burden capital transfers with a higher tax rate. Such a 
higher tax on capital when transferred will help to reduce the overall return on capital in 
the South African economy which in turn may, according to the arguments put forward by 
Thomas Piketty107, assist in curbing growing inequality. 
The potential increase in revenue to be achieved from the increased capital gains inclusion 
rate is also much higher than any that is likely to be achieved from changes to estate duty 
legislation due to the relatively low level of estate duty revenue currently being collected. 
                                                     
103 Department of National Treasury & SARS 2015:22 
104 Calculated as [(1.5 + 2.1) – 1.5] / 1.5 = 140% 
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106 Department of National Treasury 2016a:50 
107 The main argument of Piketty’s book (Piketty 2014) is that inequality increases over time 
because wealth accumulated in the past grows faster than output and wages due to the fact that the 
rate of return on capital r tends to be higher than an economy’s rate of growth g (Holcombe 
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4.2 Using a wealth tax to address inequality – Margo and Katz 
Commissions’ recommendations compared to those of the Davis Tax 
Committee 
The Davis Tax Committee is not the first tax committee or commission to investigate 
ways to reform the way in which wealth is taxed in South Africa. Both the Margo 
Commission (1987) and the Katz Commission (1997) considered the replacement of estate 
duty and donation tax with a capital transfer tax108. 
4.2.1 Margo and Katz Commissions 
These recommendations were made in particular to curb the tax-free transfer of assets 
from a person’s estate to a trust on loan account as both these commissions were 
commenting on the tax system before capital gains tax was introduced on 1 October 
2001109. The same situation today would give rise to capital gains tax on both the sale of 
the asset to the trust and on the subsequent vesting of the asset or that of the capital gain 
upon the sale of the asset in the trust in a beneficiary110.  
The Katz Commission considered three types of wealth taxes, namely either an annual 
wealth tax or a wealth transfer tax when wealth is transferred by gift or as a result of death 
and then thirdly a national land tax on agricultural land111. In their final conclusion, the 
Commission favoured a capital transfer tax in South Africa112 despite noting certain 
disadvantages relating to such taxes for example notoriously low collection yield as 
percentage of GDP, high costs of collection, administrative problems and the fact that 
such taxes tend to give rise to an unproductive estate planning industry113. The 
Commission further indicated that the object of an appropriately designed capital transfer 
tax should reconcile the most effective utilisation of limited resources in SARS, the 
avoidance of unnecessary complexity and the greatest possible attainment of vertical and 
horizontal equity in the tax system114,115. After considering the types of capital transfer 
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taxes available (such as having either an estate tax or an inheritance tax116), the Katz 
Commission settled on the retention of both donations tax117 and estate duty118 as these 
taxes were already in effect a capital transfer tax for inter vivos transfers of capital and 
transfers on death119. Estate duty was also seen as higher-revenue yielding and easier to 
administer than an inheritance tax120. 
Although a capital gains tax was seen by the Katz Commission as having similar purposes 
and similar problems to that of an annual wealth tax or wealth transfer tax, it was not seen 
as strictly being a wealth tax as such but rather more akin to an income tax121. Roeleveld 
(2012:145) pointed out, however, that while it is acknowledged that capital gains tax seeks 
to tax the appreciation of wealth as opposed to the transfer of wealth, there are many 
instances where the base cost of an asset is low or nil and therefore the amount on which 
capital gains tax is levied is often practically the same as the market value of the asset on 
which estate duty may be levied. 
With regard to so-called generation-skipping trusts, the Katz Commission accepted that 
the conduit principle as laid down in s 25B of the Income Tax Act and in common law122 
would continue to govern income distributed from or retained in trusts123. As capital gains 
tax has not been instituted at that time, they recommended furthermore that the assets in a 
trust should be subject to a periodic valuation and capital transfer tax thereon124 (every 25 
to 30 years125) and that distributions from capital should also be subject to capital transfer 
tax126. With the advent of capital gains tax from 1 October 2001, capital distributions and 
distributions of capital gains realised in a trust are now subject to capital gains tax as 
governed by paragraph 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act which in part 
achieves the implementation of the latter recommendation of the Katz Commission. 
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4.2.2 Davis Tax Committee’s First Interim Report on Estate Duty 
The Davis Tax Committee (2015) also considered a capital transfer tax (which seeks in 
particular to recover lost estate duty collections where assets are transferred to a trust) with 
an emphasis on the periodic taxation of trust assets but concluded that the implementation 
of a capital transfer tax in South Africa would place an enormous burden on the resources 
of both SARS and the taxpayers as was evident when capital gains tax was implemented 
in 2001127. 
The DTC furthermore considered the implementation of an annual or periodic net wealth 
tax to be applied to taxpayers with a large surplus wealth but noted that several countries 
have abolished such wealth taxes because of the fact that affected taxpayers were able to 
move much of their wealth out of reach of such a tax and that the actual collections of 
these taxes were disappointing128. There were also numerous well-known and documented 
disadvantages associated with an annual wealth tax, like high compliance and collection 
costs, significant difficulties in the valuation of net assets on an annual or periodic basis, 
the possible disincentive to entrepreneurship and savings, the transfer of wealth offshore 
and/or emigration and causing the forced sale of assets or requiring increased borrowings 
by taxpayers to enable payment of these taxes if income generated is insufficient to cover 
such taxes129. Even though there were some advantages such as the ability of such taxes to 
contribute to vertical and horizontal equity, the disadvantages were generally considered 
to outweigh the advantages130. The Committee therefore concluded that the complexity of 
a net wealth tax and the uncertainty of a successful implementation thereof would prompt 
the exercise of caution as regards to such a proposal131 and that, with some modification, 
the estate duty system could still achieve the objective of reducing inequality without the 
need to resort to the implementation of a capital transfer tax132.  
Increase in estate duty and CGT collections through changes in trust taxation 
Rather than recommending a new form of wealth taxation, the DTC’s First Report’s 
recommendations aimed at increasing estate duty collections through creating 
disincentives for the use of trusts. With regard to resident trusts, this was done by 
recommending the abolishment of both the conduit principle with regard to trust income 
(that is, s 25B) as well as the attribution rules contained in s 7 which could apply both to 
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trusts and non-trust situations (with the assumption that these recommendations also apply 
to capital gains tax even though not mentioned specifically in the Committee’s list of 
recommendations)133. It was also recommended that all distributions from foreign trusts be 
fully taxed as income rather than as, for instance, receipts of dividends or capital gains134. 
The manner in which the DTC seemed to have hoped to achieve an increase in estate duty 
collections was to make recommendations that would encourage individuals to hold assets 
in their personal names rather than in trusts thereby increasing the values of their dutiable 
estates. Other means of increasing tax receipts would have been in the form of CGT when 
dissolving a trust (where trusts have a 80.0% inclusion of capital gains as opposed to the 
40.0%135 inclusion of gains distributed to individual beneficiaries if the conduit principle 
still applied) or, if the assets were kept in the trust, the taxation of these assets’ disposals 
and income generated in the trust at the flat 41% trust tax rate to compensate for the 
perceived estate duty loss136.  
As the DTC furthermore recommended in the First Report that taxpayers not be granted a 
period of reprieve in order to dissolve existing trust arrangements, the effect of these 
recommendations would have had, in the Committee’s own words, diverse and far-
reaching implications137 (and even more so with the recent increase in the capital gains 
inclusion rate announced in the 2016 Budget). 
Foreign trusts 
The DTC’s First Report made recommendations with regard to foreign trusts, in particular 
with regard to the taxation of distributions received from foreign trusts, to make up for the 
perceived estate duty loss owing to the use of such trusts. The Committee noted the 
deficiency in sub-para 80(2) of the Eighth Schedule with regard to the inclusion of capital 
gains realised in a foreign trust in the hands of a beneficiary when distributed in the same 
year as when it was realised in the trust. Due to the wording used in this sub-paragraph, 
the full range of capital gains so distributed is not brought into the tax net138.  
Rather than recommending that the wording in both sub-paragraphs 80(1) and 80(2) be 
amended, the Committee suggested that all distributions from foreign trusts to South 
African beneficiaries should be taxed, not as per the conduit principle (that is, as being 
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either foreign dividends, interest, capital gains or other income) but as income regardless, 
in other words all distributions are to be taxed at the highest possible tax rate in every 
instance.  
Normally, foreign trustees would assist their South African beneficiaries to prove the 
nature of the income from which distributions are made by keeping accounting records to 
this effect which is under most circumstances a straightforward process to accomplish. In 
the DTC’s First Report, however, they seemed to be of the opinion that the nature of such 
income components was difficult to identify as a rule which is the reason for their 
recommendation of taxing all distributions of foreign trusts as income. The Committee 
furthermore hoped to discourage offshore trust formation with this recommendation and 
felt that the recommended tax amendment could be justified due to the postponement of 
taxes and estate duty savings for beneficiaries139.  
Amendments to existing estate duty legislation 
The two main recommendations with regard to existing estate duty legislation in the 
DTC’s First Report was firstly, to either withdraw or limit the deduction for bequests to 
the surviving spouse from the net estate as provided for in s 4(q) of the Estate Duty Act140 
and secondly, to increase the current estate duty abatement of R3.5 million to R6 
million141. 
One of the results that the DTC hoped to achieve with the latter recommendation of 
having a higher estate threshold is to discourage most South Africans from pursuing estate 
duty saving mechanisms142 like trust structures. 
4.2.3 Davis Tax Committee’s expected Second Report on Estate Duty and the 2016 Budget 
Review 
In a complete about-turn by the Committee, Judge Dennis Davis (who heads up the DTC) 
said in a webinar held on 10 December 2015143 that in the Second Interim Report on 
Estate Duty (which was due for release by the end of January 2016 but was still 
outstanding as at 31 March 2016, the hand-in date of this research report), the taxation of 
both resident and foreign trusts will be left as is. He did however add that the Second 
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Report will recommend that the wording in paragraph 80 of the Eighth Schedule be 
amended in order to address the deficiencies as discussed in the previous section above. 
The estate duty threshold will furthermore be increased to R15 million per person (to 
compensate for a repeal of the s 4(q) spousal bequest deduction) and a progressive estate 
duty rate will be introduced with the rate increasing to 25% for dutiable estate values 
above a certain value (which value is still to be determined). 
Rather than changing the taxation of trusts, which was met with wide-spread concern and 
criticism, Judge Davis’s comments in the webinar seemed to indicate that the Committee 
has refocused their recommendations on estate duty legislation. Where trusts did seem to 
be brought back into the picture was with regard to a possible redrafting of the anti-
avoidance provision in the Estate Duty Act, s 3(3)(d), which would deem trust assets to be 
dutiable property of a deceased if the deceased had a sufficiently large interest-free loan 
account owed to him by such trust which would have in effect resulted in the deceased 
having had control over such trust assets.  
The exact mechanism of this new recommendation is still to be revealed, however, given 
the short paragraph in the 2016 Budget Review relating to the taxation of trusts144 it seems 
as if any transfer of assets from a founder to a trust by means of an interest-free loan (or 
perhaps by means of any loan, the wording is unclear in this regard) would result in all 
such trust assets to be included in the estate of the founder at his or her death. If this latest 
recommendation is taken at face-value it could likewise have far-reaching implications to 
all founders (and other funders) of trusts but depending on how the legislative changes are 
to be worded, it may also be possible to easily circumvent such legislation by merely 
levying interest at, for instance, the official rate145 on such outstanding loans. 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
The Davis Tax Committee went through a similar consideration exercise as was done by 
the Margo and Katz Commissions to arrive at the conclusion that estate duty and 
donations tax remain the preferred types of wealth taxes for the South African context and 
that, despite certain shortcomings, an alternative form of wealth tax would be both 
difficult to implement and unlikely to yield significantly more tax revenue than the 
existing taxes146. 
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In order to increase estate duty tax collections which the Committee feels are low due to 
several estate planning mechanisms being used, they initially made certain far-reaching 
recommendations in their First Report to discourage the use of both local and foreign trust 
structures. 
On reconsideration, the approach followed in the Committee’s Second Report to increase 
estate duty collections was not to change trust legislation but to reintroduce a progressive 
estate duty rate and increase the dutiable threshold significantly in order to reduce the need 
for the creation of trusts purely for estate duty saving purposes.  
Trust assets may still be included as deemed property of a deceased and therefore dutiable 
if either a sufficiently large interest-free loan account, which was due to the deceased from 
a trust, existed at their death147 or if any assets were transferred to the trust and paid for by 
means of an interest-free (or other) loan that is due the founder, regardless of the size of 
such a loan148. Much clarity is still required with regard to the proposed adjustments to the 
anti-avoidance clause of the Estate Duty Act and such adjustments may well still have 
diverse and far-reaching implications for founders with current trust structures which 
include loan accounts due to the founder (or to other funders of the trust). 
4.3 Benchmarks for estate duty as percentage of total tax collections, for 
estate duty rates and for a combined effective tax rate on death  
In order to assess the effectiveness of estate duty to collect tax revenue and its ability to 
support a more equitable and progressive tax system, the DTC compared the South 
African estate duty collections as percentage of total revenue collected149 and the estate 
duty rate150 to international benchmarks. The effective tax rate on death (of CGT and 
estate duty combined) was also analysed and certain conclusions were reached151. A 
consideration of these benchmarks will be useful as a comparison to the overall taxes to be 
levied as a result of the DTC’s recommendations with regard to wealth taxes in the 
proposed case studies and as such are discussed below. 
                                                     
147 Per the explanation provided by Judge Davis in the abovementioned webinar (Davis 2015). 
148 Per the interpretation of the paragraph on the taxation of trusts contained in the 2016 Budget 
Review (Department of National Treasury 2016a:49). 
149 Davis Tax Committee 2015:30 
150 Davis Tax Committee 2015:65,69-73 
151 Davis Tax Committee 2015:56-58 
35 
4.3.1 Estate duty collections benchmarks 
National Treasury estimates for the 2014/15 Budget indicated that estate duty collections 
were expected to amount to R1,237 billion152 compared to the revised 2014/15 Budget 
total estimated revenue collections of R979 billion153. These estimates would have brought 
estate duty collections as a percentage of total revenue collections to about 0.13%154 in the 
2014/15 tax year.  
The actual estate duty collections per the published 2014/15 Tax Statistics were R1,489 
billion155 compared to the total revenue collected of R986 billion156. The actual estate duty 
collections as a percentage of total revenue collections therefore came to about 0.15%157 in 
the 2014/15 tax year which is slightly higher than the estimate. 
The question remains as to what would be an acceptable South African benchmark for 
both a targeted tax contribution percentage for estate duty and for a combined effective tax 
rate on death. The targeted tax contribution for estate duty of 1% to 1.5% of total tax 
collections cited in the First Report158 is a suggestion made by the Katz Commission in 
their Third Interim Report159 but was done in the context of that Commission’s then newly 
proposed capital transfer tax which was to replace both estate duty and donations tax. This 
was also before the advent of capital gains tax in South Africa (instituted from 1 October 
2001). The Committee compared the 0.1% contribution made by estate duty to overall 
South African tax collections to that of nine countries having similar wealth taxes160. 
These nine countries’ wealth tax contributions range from 0.4% to 1.5% of their respective 
total tax collections and the First Report concluded that ‘These figures suggest that South 
Africa is significantly underperforming in terms of revenue collections on the estate duty 
and donations tax and that there is scope to increase performance in this regard’161. The 
countries with which South Africa is compared in the First Report are, however, all 
developed countries which begs the question as to whether these benchmarks are 
appropriate for comparison to South Africa, being a developing country. 
Given the recent increase in the capital gains inclusion rate which would 
disproportionately affect the wealthy who owns a greater amount of capital assets, 
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together with the initial recommendations by the DTC in their First Report which 
amounted to a type of income tax penalty for assets held in trusts in order to penalise 
taxpayers for the supposed loss in estate duty as a result of having such assets transferred 
to a trust, it seems as if the fiscus is agnostic in terms of the source of increased tax 
revenue. This therefore raises the question whether estate duty as a percentage of total 
revenue collected remains a useful benchmark to consider for comparative purposes. 
Given further the increased estate duty abatement of R15 million currently being 
considered, this benchmark seems to have become even less relevant. 
If, however, the proposed changes to the taxation of trusts, as briefly described in the 2016 
Budget Review, is successfully implemented, then all assets of a trust could be included in 
the estate of the deceased trust founder at their present market values if any loan account 
was due by the trust to the founder. Currently only the trust loan account value due to the 
founder would form part of his or her estate on death which would represent the market 
value of the assets when these were first sold to the trust, typically a much lower amount, 
less any distributions or annual donations made over the years. The implementation of 
such a recommendation may well increase the amount of estate duty collected as a 
percentage of total revenue collections due to the fact that several trusts’ assets may now 
also be taken into consideration as deemed property for estate duty purposes. 
4.3.2 Estate duty rate benchmarks 
The DTC cited declining estate duty collections, in real terms over the past 20 years162, 
and the small percentage that estate duty represents of total tax collections in South Africa 
(an estimated 0.13% of total tax collections163) as reasons for the recommendations of the 
implementation of modifications to the estate duty system and their original 
recommendations regarding changes to the taxation of trusts in order to effect an increase 
in estate duty collections and to compensate for the perceived losses in estate duty 
collections due to estate planning. 
It should be noted that the graph of estate duty collections from 1985 to 2013 presented in 
the First Report164 which is sourced from Piketty (2014) shows a marked decrease from 
the 1985/86 real revenue figure (around R1,450 billion) to the 1989/90 real revenue figure 
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(around R450 million) indicating the change from a progressive estate duty rate to a flat 
rate in 1987/88 as reason. When examining the graph presented in the First Report, the 
real estate duty revenues have, however, increased steadily after that year until the 
2012/13 year (to around R1 billion in nominal and real revenues). The graph does not 
include the figure for the 2013/14 tax year which amounted to R1,102 billion165 or the 
figure for the 2014/15 tax year which amounted to R1,489 billion per the latest tax 
statistics166. 
The proposed new recommendation to be included in the Second Report with regard to the 
reintroduction of a progressive estate duty rate167 may therefore well assist in achieving a 
significant increase in overall estate duty collections if the introduction of a flat rate in 
1987/88, as seen in Piketty’s graph, is any indication of the possible effect.  
Both the Katz and Margo Commissions considered the merits of implementing 
progressive estate duty rates168. The Katz Commission stated in their Fourth Interim 
Report on Capital Transfer Tax that although it would be less burdensome from an 
administrative point of view to institute a progressive rate for estate duty only than to do 
so for donations tax as well, the difficult question that arises is whether inter vivos 
donations should be added back for purposes of estate duty computation169. This is due to 
the fact that a progressive estate duty rate would bring the rate at which donations are 
taxed (which is currently the same as that of estate duty at a flat 20%) out of alignment 
with that of estate duty which could give rise to avoidance strategies. The Katz 
Commission concluded however that the adding back of donations ‘would be a complex 
requirement giving rise to difficulties of enforcement and implementation’ and that they 
were therefore opposed to such a regime170.  
The flat rate system with a uniform rate for both estate duty and donations tax was 
therefore preferred by the Katz Commission. The DTC noted in their First Report that 
although progressive tax rates are commonly applied internationally171 (a fact also noted 
by the Katz Commission172) complexities do arise particularly insofar as alignment 
between donations tax and estate duty is concerned173. The DTC therefore concluded that 
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‘increased revenue collections should be achieved through targeted amendments to curb 
estate planning rather than through change of rates’ but that the higher estate duty 
threshold recommended in this report (from R3.5 million to R6 million) will achieve more 
in discouraging most South Africans from pursuing estate duty saving mechanisms174. 
With regard to the question as to how progressive estate duty rates should be constructed 
and what rates to use, both the DTC and the Katz Commission noted that even though 
industrialised countries tend to have progressive rates for estate duty, such rates vary 
dramatically internationally with very little consistency in rates while certain countries 
(like Canada, Australia and New Zealand) have no form of estate or gift taxes (although 
CGT may be triggered on death as in, for instance, Canada)175. It was also noted that high 
progressive tax rates tend to result in an extensive avoidance industry which represents a 
‘wasteful utilisation of resources’176. 
Given this conclusion by the DTC in their First Report, it would be interesting to see how 
the complexities with regard to aligning a progressive estate duty rate with donations tax 
will be dealt with in their Second Report given the announcement by Judge Dennis Davis 
that the portion of dutiable estates above a certain level (still to be determined) will attract 
estate duty at 25%177. The higher suggested estate duty threshold of R15 million178 per 
estate to be recommended by the Second Report is hoped to further aid in discouraging 
most South Africans from pursuing estate duty saving mechanisms. 
4.3.3 Combined effective tax rate on death (CGT and estate duty) 
The DTC’s First Report also included an analysis of an effective tax rate on death (that is, 
a combination of CGT and estate duty) which was recently conducted by National 
Treasury179. In this regard it was mentioned that the Katz Commission’s Fourth Interim 
Report on Capital Transfer Tax cited a 1974 journal article180 which supported their view 
of having a relatively low flat rate of estate duty because ‘International experience 
supports the contention that where capital taxes materially exceed 15%, extensive 
planning results in significant avoidance and evasion, which reduces the effective 
yield.’181. The DTC’s First Report concluded, however, that the recommendations 
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regarding an acceptable combined effective tax rate made by the Katz Commission’s 1997 
report would have to be reconsidered as 18 years have passed since that report was 
issued182. It is unclear, however, whether the DTC feels whether such an acceptable 
combined effective tax rate is likely to be above or below the 15% threshold. 
The First Report did seem to use this 15% threshold mentioned by the Katz Commission 
as a reasonable benchmark in another part of the report183 where the progressive quality of 
the effective rate of estate duty using the increased abatement proposed in the First Report 
(of R6 million per taxpayer) was demonstrated184. In this regard the DTC demonstrated 
that the effective estate duty rate does not exceed 15% unless the estate exceeds R20 
million in the case of single taxpayers (assuming that the s 4(q) deduction for inter-spousal 
bequests is to be repealed)185. 
If the same logic is applied to the increased estate duty abatement of R15 million per 
taxpayer to be recommended by the DTC’s Second Report186 the effective estate duty rate 
will not exceed 15% unless the estate value exceeds R60 million187unless the estate value 
at which the new progressive estate duty rate of 25% will be levied kicks in at an estate 
value that is less than R60 million (in which case the 15% threshold will be exceeded at a 
lower estate value). 
4.3.4 Considering the effect of CGT payable on death 
Since CGT is also collected on death (after taking into account the R300,000 capital gain 
exclusion in the year of death188), even though calculated only on the amount representing 
the capital growth of the estate assets, the collections for this tax may also need to be taken 
into account for the purpose of determining the total collection of taxes on death. 
Per the 2014 Tax Statistics published by the Department of National Treasury and the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS) the total revenue collected for the 2013/14 tax 
year amounted to just over R900 billion189 whereas the total CGT collected from 
individuals in that tax year amounted to just under R7 billion190. Total CGT collections 
from individuals therefore amounted to about 0.78% of total revenue collections in the 
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2013/14 tax year191. Estate duty collections in the same year amounted to R1,102 billion192 
which equals 0.12% of total revenue193. Donations tax came to R113 million194 which only 
accounts for 0.013% of revenue collected in the 2013/14 tax year195. 
The 2015 Tax Statistics shows total revenue collected for the 2014/15 tax year as R986 
billion196 whereas total CGT collected from individuals decreased to R5,5 billion. Total 
CGT collections from individuals were therefore only 0.56% of total revenue collections 
in the 2014/15 tax year197. Estate duty collections amounted to R1,489 billion198 which 
equals 0.15% of total revenue199, an increase from the previous year. Donations tax was 
R167 million200 which accounts for only 0.017% of revenue collected in the 2014/15 tax 
year201. 
The numbers given above for total CGT collected from individuals include both normal 
disposals as well as disposals on death as no separate breakdown for CGT collected on 
death is currently provided in the latest Tax Statistics documents issued by the Department 
of National Treasury and SARS202. 
It would therefore be useful to be able to arrive at a reasonable estimate of total CGT 
collected from individuals in the event of death in order to determine whether the 
contention raised by, for instance, Roeleveld203, that CGT payable on death results in a 
type of double taxation, is justified. It is widely acknowledged that CGT is not seen as a 
tax on the transfer of the market value of the wealth (that is, a wealth tax) but rather as a 
tax on the appreciation of wealth from date of purchase to date of sale204 (that is, an 
income tax on capital income205). It could be argued, however, that there are many 
instances where the base cost of an asset is nil or very low compared to the market value 
on death and that CGT and estate duty are therefore levied on essentially the same 
value206. There is also recognition by the Committee of this fact and the First Report 
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includes an analysis of the combined effective rate of taxation on death which was 
recently conducted by National Treasury207. The analysis states that the majority of assets 
in most deceased estates are excluded from CGT due to specific exclusions and rollovers 
and the percentage of the total value of an estate subject to CGT would therefore be low 
with a worst-case scenario considered, that is a maximum, of only 50% of an estate being 
subject to CGT208. 
CGT collected from individuals still contributes far more to total revenue than estate 
duty209 therefore CGT paid during the lifetime of taxpayers still makes up a large amount 
of revenue compared to estate duty collections on death. It may therefore be argued that 
even though CGT is not strictly a wealth transfer tax it does assist in the taxation of the 
transfer of assets into, for instance, trusts and also in the taxation of the distribution of 
capital assets out of a trust to beneficiaries. Neither of these events would have had any 
tax consequences prior to the implementation of CGT on 1 October 2001 which was part 
of the reasons that both the Margo and Katz Commissions considered the implementation 
of a capital transfer tax in their respective recommendations210. 
In the light of the newly increased capital gains inclusion rates announced in the 2016 
Budget Review for individuals, companies and trusts211, the contribution of CGT collected 
from individuals is set to increase even further. Based on the assumptions contained in 
chapter 4.1.5, CGT collected from individuals is likely to increase to about R7,6 billion212 
as a result. Given the current total revenue estimates by National Treasury for the 2016 tax 
year of R1 070 billion213 this will amount to about 0.71% of total revenue collected214. 
Either way, it could be concluded that CGT collections on death be considered for 
inclusion in the estate duty collections number to determine whether the total contribution 
of death taxes in South Africa compare favourably with international benchmarks or not 
and also to determine whether a form of double taxation occurs on death as a result of both 
CGT and estate duty being levied.  This is also deemed reasonable in the light of the 
argument put forward by FISA based on the European Union wealth taxes report quoted 
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by the DTC in their First Report which classifies wealth taxes as taxes due on the transfer 
of assets regardless of whether income is realised215.  
In this regard an estimated figure of total CGT collected on death will be determined 
based on certain high-level assumptions in chapter 6.1. 
4.3.5 Conclusion 
From an analysis of the estate duty and wealth tax benchmarks discussed in the DTC’s 
First Report it seems that the 1974 finding by Whalley216, cited by the Katz Commission’s 
Fourth Interim Report on Capital Transfer Tax of 1997217, that capital taxes should not 
materially exceed 15% in order to avoid significant avoidance and evasion and resultant 
reduced effective tax yield, is still considered to be a relevant benchmark.  
Given the newly proposed taxation of trusts alluded to in the 2016 Budget Review which 
may result in trust assets being included as deemed property for estate duty purposes 
together with the increased capital gains inclusion rate and the possibility of a progressive 
estate duty rate being introduced, it remains to be seen if the overall taxation on assets on 
death will tend to materially exceed this generally accepted benchmark or whether it will 
remain within reason. 
4.4 Relevant aspects of South African estate duty legislation 
This section will highlight the salient aspects of current and proposed estate duty 
legislation in South Africa as it relates to this research report. 
4.4.1 Current estate duty legislation 
Estate duty is currently calculated on the dutiable value of a deceased’s person’s estate at a 
rate of 20%218. The dutiable estate is the net estate less an abatement which is currently an 
amount of R3,5 million219. The net estate is calculated as the market value of all property 
and deemed property220 less deductions allowed221. 
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Deemed property of an estate specifically includes any amounts or assets donated in terms 
of a donatio mortis causa which was exempt from donations tax in terms of s 56(1)(c)222. 
Therefore a loan account or assets donated in terms of a donatio mortis causa would be 
included in the deceased’s net estate and may be dutiable223.  
Any other property that was not included in the property or deemed property of a deceased 
estate (such as, for instance, property held in a trust) but which the deceased was 
immediately prior to his or her death competent to dispose of for his or her own benefit or 
for that of his or her estate, would under the anti-avoidance provision of s 3(3)(d) of the 
Estate Duty Act also be treated as deemed property of the estate and therefore potentially 
dutiable. 
Any bequests to the surviving spouse would be treated as a deduction from the net estate 
per section 4(q) of the Estate Duty Act. 
Prior to the commencement of capital gains tax on 1 October 2001, estate duty was levied 
at 25%. The reduction to 20% coincided with the implementation of CGT to compensate 
for the double tax exposure created when both CGT (initially established at a 25% 
inclusion rate for individuals) and estate duty are levied on a deceased estate224. 
If the full R3,5 million abatement was not utilised on the death of the first-dying spouse, 
the unutilised portion is portable to the estate of the surviving spouse225. If the first-dying 
spouse’s net estate value was Rnil (due to, for instance bequeathing all assets to the 
surviving spouse and thereby receiving the s 4(q) deduction) then the last-dying spouse 
will have a total abatement of R7 million available to be deducted from their net estate. 
4.4.2 Proposed estate duty legislation changes 
In the DTC’s First Report, the most prominent changes recommended were firstly an 
increase in the s 4A abatement from R3,5 million to R6 million226 and secondly the 
proposed repeal or limitation of exempt inter-spousal bequests per s 4(q)227.  
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In the First Report, it was recommended for the estate duty rate to remain at 20%228. 
Based on comments by Judge Dennis Davis, the recommendations likely to appear in the 
Second Report still to be released will be a larger increase in the s 4A abatement to R15 
million per estate and the introduction of a progressive estate duty rate229. The estate duty 
rate will be 20% up to a certain dutiable estate value (not yet disclosed) after which it will 
be increased to 25%230.  
The 2016 Budget Review seemed to suggest changes to be made to s 3(3)(d) of the Estate 
Duty Act (the anti-avoidance provision) in order for trust assets to be considered as 
deemed property in the estate of the trust founder at his or her death if the founder funded 
the trust by means of a loan account due by the trust to the founder231. 
4.4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter briefly discussed the salient aspects of current and proposed estate duty 
legislation in South Africa as it relates to this research report in order to outline the basics 
with regard to estate duty calculations which will be compared in the case studies. 
4.5 Relevant aspects of South African trust law 
This section will provide a brief summary of the relevant aspects of South African trust 
law as it relates to this research report. This section does no purport to cover every aspect 
of trust law matters but merely seeks to provide context for the case study scenarios to be 
created as well as for the commentaries from professional bodies on the DTC’s First 
Report’s recommendations with regard to trusts.  
4.5.1 Sources of South African trust law 
South African trust law has developed over the course of more than two centuries and can 
be said to be a hybrid between English trust law (or common law) and Roman-Dutch law 
concepts (or civil law concepts)232,233 or differently put, it is the incorporation into South 
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African law of the English trust as an institution as explained with reference to Roman-
Dutch law without incorporating the English law of trust itself234. 
The Trust Property Control Act235, which came into force on 31 March 1989, replacing the 
Trust Moneys Protection Act of 1934236, furthermore regulates the registration and 
administration of South African trusts237 (as opposed to the formation of a valid trust 
which is determined according to common law principles238). This Act also provides 
clarity regarding the separate position of trust property from that of a trustee’s own 
estate239 (except in so far as the trustee is entitled thereto as a trust beneficiary), stipulates 
certain statutory fiduciary duties of trustees240 and contains other definitions and 
stipulations regarding South African trusts. The Trust Property Control Act is, however, 
not a codification of trust law but merely addresses certain specific issues241 and is only 
applicable to trusts reduced to writing242. The main source of South African trust law 
remains embodied in common law principles established by the Courts over time243.  
4.5.2 Classification of South African trusts 
Cameron et al. describes a trust as ‘a legal institution in which a person, the trustee, 
subject to public supervision, holds or administers property separately from his or her 
own, for the benefit of another person or persons or for the furtherance of a charitable or 
other purpose’244. 
Trusts can be classified along several lines: 
 Time from when trust will take effect / manner of creation of trust:  
o A trust that only takes effect after the death of the founder is known as a 
mortis causa trust245. 
 A mortis causa trust that is created by means of the will of a 
deceased person is also known as a testamentary trust, which 
means that after such trust comes into existence in the event of the 
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death of the testator, it becomes one of the heirs of all or of a 
portion of the deceased founder’s assets246. 
 A mortis causa trust can also be created in contemplation of the 
founder’s death and will then be created by contract during his or 
her lifetime but will only take effect in the event of their death. A 
donatio mortis causa or donation in contemplation of death is 
made by the testator or founder of this trust of his or her assets to 
the trustees and the same requirements as that for making a valid 
will should apply to such a donation agreement for such a trust to 
be valid247. 
o A trust that takes effect from the time of its creation for a period which 
will be both during and most often also after the lifetime of the founder, is 
known as an inter vivos trust248,249.  
 An inter vivos trust is created by contract. Assets are transferred 
to an inter vivos trust during the founder’s lifetime and further 
assets may be bequeathed to such a trust at the time of the 
founder’s death without affecting its definition as an inter vivos 
trust250. 
 Ownership of and control over trust property: In s 1 of the Trust Property 
Control Act, the two broad types of trusts are defined as follows: 
o Firstly, trusts where the ownership and control of the trust property vests 
in the trustees (para (a) of the definition of ‘trust’ and also known as the 
narrow definition of a trust); and  
o Secondly, where the ownership of the trust property vests in the 
beneficiaries but is controlled by the trustees (para (b) of the definition of 
‘trust’ and also known as a bewind trust or the wide definition of a 
trust)251.  
The narrow or strict definition of a trust per the para (a) definition originated from 
English trust law whereas the bewind trust originated from the Roman-Dutch law 
concept of administration252,253. 
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 Nature of rights of beneficiaries to income and/or capital of the trust: The 
vesting of either income or capital from a trust in a beneficiary will have income 
tax consequences for beneficiaries and a distinction can be drawn in the manner in 
which beneficiaries acquire such vested rights as follows: 
o Vested trust: Even if ownership of the trust assets vests in the trustees 
(that is, a para (a) trust per the Trust Property Control Act definition of 
‘trust’ discussed in the previous point), the beneficiaries may still have 
vested rights to the income or capital of the trust if the trustees have no 
discretion as to whether to distribute income or capital to them. Such a 
trust will then also be classified as a vested trust. This is distinct from the 
bewind trust discussed in the previous point (where ownership of the trust 
assets vests in the beneficiaries from the start).  
If a beneficiary with vested income rights passes away before the income 
accrues to him or her, his or her deceased estate will acquire the right to 
such income. Beneficiaries with vested capital rights will have certainty 
that the trust assets will be distributed to them once the trust comes to an 
end.254 Even if the trust is regarded as a vested trust, it does not 
necessarily mean that beneficiaries are immediately entitled to trust 
income or capital, that is, having a vested right does not mean that actual 
cash or assets will be distributed to beneficiaries as the vested income 
may be capitalised by the trustees only to be enjoyed by beneficiaries at 
some point in the future255. 
A vested trust may have different income tax consequences for the 
beneficiaries than that of a discretionary trust in so far as the timing of any 
tax liability is concerned. Being a beneficiary of a vested trust will also 
have an estate duty consequence as any vested assets will be included in 
his or her estate on death, which will not be the case for a beneficiary of a 
discretionary trust (if no assets or income have been distributed by the 
trustees to such beneficiaries).    
A vested trust may be created inadvertently by using inappropriate 
wording in the trust deed which may not match the intention of the 
founder. 
o Discretionary trust: If the timing and amount of trust income or capital 
distributed to beneficiaries is within the sole discretion of the trustees 
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(apart from the fact that beneficiaries may have been classified as either 
income or capital beneficiaries by the trust deed) such a trust will be 
classified as a discretionary trust. A discretionary right held by such 
beneficiaries means that they have no right to ownership of the trust 
property but it does not mean that they have no right whatsoever to 
income or capital either256. They do, however, only have a mere hope or a 
spes to such income or capital257 and as such their rights are of a personal 
nature258. 
Income tax consequences will only arise for discretionary beneficiaries 
when the trustees vest income or capital in them by exercising the 
discretion conferred on the trustees by the trust deed to do so259.   
If any loan account is due to a beneficiary by the trust at the time of death 
of the beneficiary, such loan account amount will be included in the estate 
of the beneficiary for estate duty calculation purposes. 
 Object of trust:  
o A personal trust is a trust where the object of a trust is the benefit of a 
defined individual or group of individuals as in the case of typical family 
trusts with named beneficiaries and the possible inclusion of their 
descendants as future beneficiaries260. 
o An impersonal trust is a trust where the object of the trust is the benefit of 
beneficiaries that are not predefined individuals but could be individuals 
belonging to a specific community or a group of individuals with specific 
needs as in the case of charitable trusts261.  
 Tax classification of trust: The next sub-section will discuss the taxation of trusts 
in greater detail but the different tax classifications could also be used to 
distinguish different types of trusts from each other: 
o A trust that does not fall within any of the special trust definitions below – 
this is the default classification of any trust.  
o A special trust is defined in s 1 of the Income Tax Act and applies, 
broadly speaking, to any one of the following situations: 
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 Para (a) special trust: A trust solely for the benefit of a disabled 
person(s) as defined while such person(s) is/are still alive – this 
trust may be in the form of a testamentary or an inter vivos trust. 
 Para (b) special trust: A testamentary trust only that is for the 
benefit of living relatives of the deceased where at least one such 
beneficiary is a minor (that is, where the youngest relative is 
under the age of 18 years) – this definition therefore does not 
apply to inter vivos trusts with minors as beneficiaries. 
o Note that a special trust may cease to be so defined if either the last 
disabled beneficiary in the case of a para (a) special trust dies or the 
youngest beneficiary in a para (b) special trust turns 18 years of age. The 
special tax dispensation available to such trusts (see discussion below) 
will therefore cease at that time and the taxable income of these trusts will 
then be taxed at 41%262 like any ordinary trust.  
 Purpose of trust:  
o A trust where the main or substantial aim of the trust is to conduct a 
business is known as a trading or business trust but such trusts are treated 
in all respects the same as ordinary trusts, including the regulation and 
taxation thereof263 (in some countries trading trusts may be classified and 
taxed as companies264).  
Examples of so-called private trading trusts are where agricultural land is 
transferred to a trust in order to avoid the prohibition on the subdivision of 
agricultural land into uneconomic units265, also investment trusts or, more 
specifically, property-holding trusts (that is, where immovable property is 
held in trust)266 among others. 
4.5.3 Validity of trusts vs. trust abuse and the relevant tax consequences  
One of the essentials of a valid trust is that the trust property be defined with sufficient 
certainty. If this is not the case, the trust will be rendered invalid267. An inter vivos trust is 
typically created by the making of a small donation by the founder to the trustees268 (for 
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instance, of R100). The founder must furthermore be actually divested or bound to divest 
him- or herself of at least a part of the legal proprietary power over the trust property269 for 
a valid trust to be formed270 and have the intention to form a trust as such (as opposed to, 
for instance, forming a partnership or other legal entity)271,272.  
There are several other essentials for a valid trust to be formed (for instance, the trust 
object must be lawful) but even if a valid trust has been formed, certain abuses of the trust 
and trust assets may still cause the Court to look behind the trust veil without the trust 
itself being rendered a sham or invalid trust273,274. 
Such abuses may include treating the trust as a so-called alter ego trust where the founder 
or other parties who have transferred assets from their personal estates to the trust retain 
control over these assets either through any provisions in the trust deed (for instance, 
through controls over trustees and positive veto rights over decisions made by trustees 
which will constitute de jure control) or, more definitively, through conduct (that is, not 
treating the trust assets as separate to their own estates which will constitute de facto 
control)275,276,277. Any control retained and exercised over trust assets by the founder in his 
or her capacity as co-trustee must be done in a manner that is in the best interests of all the 
beneficiaries and not only in the founder’s own best interests278. 
If it can be shown that a founder retained control over trust assets then such assets may be 
deemed to form part of the founder’s estate for purposes of, for instance, determining the 
amounts due in divorce orders or in disputes with creditors or insolvency cases as was 
seen, for instance, in the court cases of Jordaan v Jordaan279, Land and Agricultural Bank 
of South Africa v Parker280 and First Rand Limited trading, inter alia, as First National 
Bank v Britz and others281. 
If a founder retained control over trust assets as if these were his or her own there could 
also be estate duty consequences on the death of the founder. Per s 3(3)(d) of the Estate 
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Duty Act282, if it can be shown that the deceased was, immediately prior to his or her death 
competent to dispose of the trust assets for his or her own benefit or for the benefit of his 
or her estate then such property will be deemed to be property of the deceased for estate 
duty purposes. Section 3(5)(a) states that, for purposes of s 3(3)(d), the word ‘property’ 
includes the profits of any property and in s 3(5)(b) the phrase ‘competent to dispose of 
property’ is determined to mean that the deceased either had the power to appropriate or 
dispose of such property as he or she saw fit by any manner (in the case where he or she 
was sui juris)283 or if, under any deed of donation, settlement, trust or other disposition 
made by him or her, the power to revoke or vary the provisions of such deed relating to 
such property was retained by him or her284. 
If s 3(3)(d) can be shown to apply, such trust property could attract 20% estate duty on the 
market value of such assets (depending on whether the inclusion of the trust assets causes 
the net estate of the deceased to exceed the estate duty abatement amount of R3,5 
million)285.  
It should be noted that any remaining loan account amounts held by the founder which is 
still owed to him or her by the trust at the time of the founder’s death would be an asset in 
the founder’s estate which would attract estate duty at 20%. Even if such a loan account is 
donated back to the trust in the event of the founder’s death by means of a donatio mortis 
causa (which would be exempt from donations tax per s 56(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act) 
such loan account would still be deemed property included in the founder’s estate for 
estate duty purposes per s 3(3)(b) of the Estate Duty Act as a result of this donations tax 
exemption. 
4.5.4 Legal nature of trusts 
According to a decision made in CIR v Friedman NO286 a trust possesses no legal or 
juristic personality in South African law287. A trust would therefore not have been 
considered to be a taxable entity were it not for the amendment to the definition of 
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‘person’ in s 1 of the Income Tax Act288 in response to the above decision289. The 
definition of ‘person’ now specifically includes ‘any trust’ in para (c) of that definition. 
It can therefore be said that in South African law a trust does not have juristic personality 
except if given such status by statute290.   
In CIR v Macneillie’s Estate291 it was held that a trust is also not a taxable entity for estate 
duty purposes in the case where the ownership of the trust assets is conferred on the 
trustees (that is, in the case of a discretionary trust but not a bewind trust)292. A trust is also 
defined as a ‘juristic person’ in several other acts, including the Companies Act293,294. 
It was also noted in both Cameron et al. (2002:72) and in Pace & Van der Westhuizen 
(2014:para B5.1) that ‘The fact that a trust, though a legal entity for some purposes, does 
not possess juristic personality outside statute, does not, in practice, create too many 
difficulties, since the relevant assets and liabilities are vested in the trustee, who is either a 
natural or juristic person and who possesses all the capacities needed for the proper 
administration of the trust’.  
4.5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter briefly highlighted relevant aspects of South African trust law as it relates to 
this research report in order to provide context for the case study scenarios that will be 
constructed as well as for the comments submitted by professional bodies on the DTC’s 
First Report’s recommendations with regard to trusts that were discussed elsewhere295. 
4.6 The taxation of trusts 
This chapter will summarise the current legislation with regard to the taxation of trusts in 
order to provide context for the tax calculations to be performed in the case studies as well 
as to provide context for the commentaries by professional bodies on the DTC’s First 
Report’s recommendations with regard to the taxation of trusts296. As with the previous 
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chapter, this chapter does not purport to cover every aspect of trust taxation but will 
merely act as a high-level summary of salient matters as it relates to this research report. 
4.6.1 Nature of income received from a trust 
With regard to the nature of income received from a trust, the conduit principle, as laid 
down in Armstrong v CIR297 and SIR v Rosen298, will apply. In these court cases it was 
held that income passing through a trust retains its identity and the trust acts merely as a 
conduit pipe through which income flows299. This means that, generally speaking, 
dividends received by a trust and distributed to a beneficiary will be taxed as dividends in 
the hands of the beneficiary and the same would apply to distributions to beneficiaries 
from interest, capital gains or ordinary income such as rental income received in the trust.  
The notable exceptions to the common law conduit principle apply, firstly to local 
dividends received by a trust that is distributed to a beneficiary as an annuity which, in 
terms of s 10(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act, will not enjoy the local dividend exemption of 
s 10(1)(k) in the hands of the beneficiary300. The second exception applies to dividends 
received by a company in consequence of the exercise of a discretionary power by any 
trustee of a trust (that is, where the company is a beneficiary of such trust) which would 
also not enjoy the local dividends exemption per para (ee) of the proviso contained in s 
10(1)(k) and the dividend would therefore be subject to normal tax in the company. In the 
latter case, however, if the trust vests the dividend in the company in the same year of 
assessment that it was received by the trust per s 25B(1) and (2), then such company will 
be deemed to be the beneficial owner of the dividend and the exemption of dividend 
withholding tax under s 64F(1)(a) will apply to such vested dividend amounts301. 
4.6.2 Taxation of income received in a trust or received by beneficiaries from a trust 
In a vesting trust, both ownership and control of the trust property vests in the trustees but 
they would not typically have discretion over whether income or capital amounts are to be 
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distributed to beneficiaries as they would already have vested rights in the income and/or 
capital as determined by the trust deed302. As a result, all vested income and capital may 
be taxable in the hands of the beneficiaries303 (subject to the attribution rules contained in 
the Income Tax Act as discussed below). 
In a bewind trust, as ownership rests with the beneficiaries, each beneficiary will be liable 
for the tax due on such trust property (income tax and CGT) from the inception of such a 
trust but also subject to the attribution rules.  
In a discretionary trust the beneficiaries will only obtain a vested right to any income or 
capital when such amounts are distributed to them as a result of the trustees exercising 
their discretion as conferred upon them by the trust deed in this regard304. If a trustee has 
the discretion about how and also about whether or how much income or capital to 
distribute to beneficiaries from a trust, then such beneficiaries have a contingent right to 
income or capital only305. A mere contingent right is not generally subject to tax nor does 
it form part of a beneficiary’s estate for insolvency or estate duty purposes306. 
A discretionary trust may also contain some elements of a vesting trust if, for example, 
some beneficiaries have vested rights to capital but contingent rights to income307. 
The tax liability amount as well as the determination of which taxpayer is liable for tax on 
income received in a trust will, however, depend on several factors308 such as: 
 The provisions laid down in the trust deed with regard to the type of income rights 
given to beneficiaries and whether trustees are given discretionary powers or not; 
 The manner in which the trust was funded (whether by donation to the trust by the 
founder or by another donor, by sale of assets to the trust or by loans made to 
trusts); 
 In the case of the trust being funded by donation, whether the donor is still alive or 
not; 
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304 Pace & Van der Westhuizen 2014:para B21.3.1; De Koker & Williams 2015:12.19 
305 Honiball & Olivier 2009:75 
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 If the donor is still alive,  
o whether the beneficiaries obtaining vested rights to income are minors or 
majors (that is, whether these beneficiaries are younger than 18 years or 
not); 
o whether there are any conditions attached to beneficiaries receiving 
benefits (for instance, only obtaining benefits from a certain age 
onwards); 
o whether the trust is an offshore trust or a South African resident trust; 
o whether other persons are involved in schemes envisaged by subsections 
7(2), 7(4), 7(6) or 7(7). 
 Regardless of the manner of funding, whether income is distributed to 
beneficiaries or retained in the trust in any given year of assessment. 
The amount of tax payable would depend on whether the taxpayer is an individual (that is, 
either the founder, donor or an individual beneficiary), a company (which could also be a 
beneficiary) or the trust itself as different tax rates would apply to each of these types of 
entities. A comparison of the tax rates applicable can be found in Table 1 in chapter 4.7.5. 
The taxpayer could, generally speaking309, either be the founder of or donor to the trust, 
the trust itself (with the trustees being liable as representative taxpayers on behalf of the 
trust) or the beneficiaries of the trust310.  
The liability for tax on income received in a trust or received by beneficiaries from a trust 
is governed by s 25B of the Income Tax Act, which effectively codifies the common law 
conduit principle discussed above. The provisions in this section are, however, subject to 
the anti-avoidance provisions or attribution rules of s 7 of the Income Tax Act. The 
liability for tax on capital gains realised in a trust or received by beneficiaries from a trust 
is again governed by para 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, which 
paragraph is also subject to the capital gains attribution rules contained in paras 68, 69, 71 
and 72 of the Eighth Schedule. 
The attribution rules in section 7 and paras 68, 69, 71 and 72 of the Eighth Schedule do 
not only apply to trusts but have a wider application. The discussion below regarding these 
provisions will, however, only relate to the specific application thereof to trusts. 
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4.6.3 Section 25B – conduit principle for income (trust-specific provision) 
Section 25B(1) states that any amount received by or accrued to or in favour of a trust (or 
more correctly, to any person acting in the capacity as trustee of a trust) during any tax 
year shall, subject to the provisions of s 7, to the extent to which such amount has been 
derived for the immediate future benefit of any beneficiary who has a vested right to that 
amount during that tax year, be deemed to be an amount accrued to such beneficiary, and 
to the extent to which that amount is not derived for the benefit of a beneficiary with 
vested rights, be deemed to be an amount which has accrued to the trust in question311.  
Vested income is therefore taxed in the hands of the relevant beneficiary (unless section 7 
applies, in which case it would be taxed in the hands of the donor) and income not vested 
in any beneficiary is taxed in the trust. In the case of discretionary trusts, per s 25B(2), 
amounts will only be deemed to have accrued to a beneficiary in any tax year if the 
trustees exercised the discretion vested in them by the trust deed to distribute amounts 
received by or accrued to the trust in that tax year to a beneficiary in that same tax year, 
otherwise it is taxed in the trust312.  
Amounts that were deemed to have accrued to the trust and were taxed in the trust in any 
tax year and then distributed to beneficiaries in subsequent tax years will therefore be 
treated as capital distributions to beneficiaries in those years and not taxed again as 
income in the hands of the beneficiaries313,314,315. If such future distributions are, however, 
made in the form of an annuity these will be included in a beneficiary’s gross income as 
annuities are specifically included in para (a) of the definition of ‘gross income’ in s 1 of 
the Income Tax Act.  
Distributions from foreign or non-resident trusts to resident beneficiaries of income that 
are made in the same year as when such amounts were received in the foreign trust will 
similarly be governed by s 25B(1) and (2) as discussed above. 
Distributions out of capitalised income of non-resident trusts will, per s 25B(2A), be 
included in the ‘income’ of the resident beneficiaries if the trust capital arose from any 
receipts and accruals of the non-resident trust which would have constituted ‘income’ as 
defined if the trust had been a resident in any previous tax year during which that resident 
had a contingent right to that amount, and if that amount has not been subject to tax in 
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South Africa in terms of the Income Tax Act316. This means that the conduit principle is in 
effect applied retrospectively at the time when distributions from a foreign trust make its 
way into the hands of resident beneficiaries. 
Per s 102(a) of the Tax Administration Act317 the beneficiaries will bear the burden of 
proving that the amounts so received are exempt or partially exempt (for instance, if such 
amounts are distributed from foreign dividends received in the trust) and therefore they 
would need the support of the trustees of the offshore trust to keep record of the amounts 
of, for instance, foreign dividends included in the capitalised income of the foreign trust in 
order to assist the beneficiaries to discharge their burden of proof in this regard318.  
The treatment of deductions and allowances in the trust related to income distributed to 
beneficiaries is governed by s 25B(3) to (7) but these provisions will not be discussed 
further for the purpose of this study. 
4.6.4 Section 7 – attribution principle for income (not specific to trusts but an anti-avoidance 
provision with regard to any donations made) 
If a founder donated assets to a trust319 (as opposed to, for example, selling the assets or 
lending amounts to the trust) and any income or capital gains320 derived from such 
amounts vest in or are distributed to minor beneficiaries, or the amounts to be received by 
beneficiaries are subject to a condition to be fulfilled or to the occurrence of an event (for 
instance, the attaining of a specific age), or the donation is made to a foreign resident or 
foreign trust321 then such income or capital gains will be deemed to be the income or gains 
of the donor and not that of the beneficiary, should the donor still be alive.  
The provisions in s 7 will first be applied before the provisions in s 25B may be applied322. 
If the donor has passed away, the provisions of s 7 cannot apply and the taxation of such 
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amounts would be in the hands of the beneficiaries with vested rights to such income 
regardless of their age or the other provisions contained in s 7. 
4.6.5 Paragraph 80 – conduit principle for capital distributions (trust-specific provision) 
Sub-paragraph 80(1) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act regulates the treatment 
of capital gains realised when a trust asset vests in a trust beneficiary and states that the 
capital gain of such a distribution will be added to the aggregate capital gain or loss of the 
beneficiary, not the trust.  
Sub-paragraph 80(2) regulates the treatment of the distribution of a capital gain itself 
when trustees sell a trust asset and distribute the profits of that sale (which will include the 
capital gain amounts) to a trust beneficiary in the same tax year as when the capital gain 
arose in the trust (that is, when the asset was disposed of).  
The above two sub- paragraphs are both subject to paragraphs 68, 69, 71 and 72 of the 
Eighth Schedule, which mirror the attribution rules with regard to income contained in s 7 
of the Act. Furthermore, as the trust and its beneficiaries are ‘connected persons’ as 
defined in s 1 of the Income Tax Act, para 38 of the Eighth Schedule (with regard to 
disposals between connected persons not at an arm’s length price) may also be 
applicable323. For the calculation of the capital gain with regard to the distribution of an 
asset by a trust to a beneficiary, the proceeds to be used will be the market value of the 
asset (para 38(a)) at the date of the distribution. The base cost of that asset for calculating 
capital gains on its eventual disposal by the beneficiary will similarly be equal to the 
market value at the date of the distribution (para 38(b)). 
It should be noted that the use of the word ‘trust’ in the wording of sub-paragraphs 80(1) 
and (2) is taken to refer to both resident and non-resident trusts. Furthermore, the use of 
the defined phrase ‘capital gain’ in the wording of the above two sub-paragraphs has the 
effect that, in relation to assets disposed of in non-resident trusts or capital gains realised 
on assets and distributed to resident beneficiaries in the same tax year, only amounts that 
are deemed capital gains with respect to non-residents (as the trust is non-resident) will be 
included in the beneficiaries’ aggregate capital gain or loss. Capital gains in relation to a 
non-resident is defined in para 2(1)(b) of the Eighth Schedule as South African immovable 
property or an interest or right in such property and assets attributable to a permanent 
establishment in South Africa.  
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These provisions therefore have limited application for including amounts distributed to 
resident beneficiaries from the sale of assets held in a foreign trust, in the hands of those 
resident beneficiaries, if distributed in the same tax year as when they arose (either 
through vesting of the asset or sale of the asset in the trust). The sale or distribution of any 
asset held in the foreign trust that is not a South African fixed property or interest therein 
or an asset of a South African permanent establishment (that is, all other assets like South 
African and foreign shares or foreign properties held in the trust) will therefore not be 
treated as a capital gains event in the hands of the resident beneficiary if distributed to 
them in the same tax year324.  
If assets like South African and foreign shares and foreign properties were held in the 
name of the resident beneficiaries themselves, the capital gains on the sale of these assets 
would have been included in their taxable income as residents are taxable on their 
worldwide income325. 
Sub-paragraph 80(3) deals specifically with capital gains vested in resident beneficiaries 
from non-resident trusts and even though the wording mirrors s 25B(2A), which speaks to 
the treatment of vested income from non-resident trusts, and as such will result in treating 
capital gains distributed from such a trust as if such a trust had been a resident (that is, 
disposal of all assets will fall into the tax net and not only the restricted set of assets listed 
in para 2(1)(b) for non-residents), this sub-paragraph only deals with distributions made in 
tax years subsequent to the one in which the capital gain had been realised in the trust. The 
attribution of capital gains which arise in and is vested in the same tax year is therefore not 
addressed by this sub-paragraph326. 
4.6.6 Paragraphs 69, 70, 71 and 72 – attribution principle for capital gains (not specific to 
trusts but an anti-avoidance provision with regard to any donations made) 
Similar in wording to the sub-sections of s 7 of the Income Tax Act, these paragraphs will 
find application to trusts with regard to capital gains realised in the trust, whether such 
gains are vested in beneficiaries or not, if the founder has donated any assets to the trust 
(as opposed to an outright market-related sale of such assets to the trust). If the donor is 
still alive then these paragraphs may cause capital gains to be included in the donor’s 
aggregate capital gain or loss regardless of whether such gains remained in the trust or 
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were vested in beneficiaries where these beneficiaries are minors, or where the capital gain 
was subject to conditional or revocable vesting or vested in a non-resident.  
As s 7 can apply to both income and a capital gain, para 73 provides relief by limiting the 
total amount of the income that is deemed to accrue to the donor and the capital gain 
attributed to him, to the amount of the benefit derived from the donation, settlement or 
other disposition so that normal tax is not payable on both the deemed income and the 
capital gains as a result of the same donation327. 
4.6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a high-level summary of the current trust taxation legislation in 
order to provide context for the tax calculations in the case study scenarios, for the 
discussion regarding tax consequences of certain manners of interaction with trusts in the 
next section, for the comments submitted by professional bodies on the DTC’s First 
Report’s recommendations with regard to trusts that will be discussed thereafter as well as 
for the new recommendations discussed by Judge Davis to be contained in the Second 
Report and those contained in the 2016 Budget Review. 
4.7 Tax consequences of certain manners of interaction with trusts  
This section will discuss some of the tax consequences (estate duty, donations tax and 
income tax) for taxpayers when interacting with South African and offshore trusts in 
certain ways in order to provide background and an understanding of the context in which 
the recommendations of the DTC’s First Report were made, for the comments submitted 
by professional bodies on the DTC’s First Report and for the new recommendations 
discussed by Judge Davis to be contained in the Second Report and those contained in the 
2016 Budget Review. 
4.7.1 Testamentary and donatio mortis causa trusts 
Neither a testamentary trust nor a donatio mortis causa trust can be said to be entered into 
for the purpose of estate duty avoidance by the founder as these trusts only take effect on 
the death of the founder. When the founder passes away, all assets to be transferred to 
such trusts will first form part of his or her estate and estate duty will be levied on the 
value of the founder’s net estate (assuming no other trust structures exist). As the founder 
will be deemed to have disposed of all his or her assets on death, CGT will also be levied 
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on any capital gains on death prior to moving such assets at a base cost equal to the market 
value on the date of death to the above types of trusts. No CGT rollovers328 will apply if 
all assets are transferred to such a trust and therefore the maximum amount of CGT will be 
due (less the capital gains exemption of R300,000 available in the year of death).  
Beneficiaries of testamentary or donatio mortis causa trusts (other than the founder) 
however may be seen to obtain an estate duty advantage if the majority of their total 
wealth at their respective deaths is represented by the trust assets not yet distributed to 
them. Any distributed amounts vesting in the beneficiaries would be taxable in their hands 
for income tax and CGT purposes in the year that such distributions are made by the 
trustees. If distributed capital assets are still in the possession of a beneficiary at the time 
of their death, then these assets may also attract both estate duty and CGT on death. 
If a restructuring of the assets in these trusts are required in the future, for instance if it 
becomes necessary because of administrative and family relationship management 
purposes, for trust assets held in the single testamentary trust to be split between 
beneficiaries and distributed in equal shares to new trusts for the benefit of each of the 
individual beneficiaries, CGT will be payable on such restructuring transactions (the 
payment of which will require a cash flow transaction).   
4.7.2 Reasons for transferring assets to an inter vivos trust apart from perceived tax savings 
Although the DTC contends that inter vivos trusts are mainly used for purposes of 
reducing estate duty on death and for other tax advantages, individuals move assets that 
are currently held in their personal name to an inter vivos trust for various non-tax-related 
reasons329, some of which are discussed below: 
 Protection of assets against third parties 
o For instance, where an individual is in a profession where a risk exists of 
personal liability lawsuits being brought against such an individual (for 
example, medical doctors, lawyers, engineers, financial and investment 
advisors and others) such individual might consider moving assets, like 
the primary residence, outside of his or her personal estate into a trust 
where it would be protected against any such legal action.  
o Protection against divorce claims 
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o Protection against creditors for entrepreneurs or directors (similar 
considerations as for individuals in a profession with a risk of personal 
liability lawsuits) 
 Preserving wealth for future generations 
o Rather than bequeathing accumulated family wealth directly to children, 
who may be young and inexperienced but also at risk of being taken 
advantage of by for instance a spendthrift spouse, such wealth could be 
better preserved if placed in trust for such children with distributions 
being controlled by and made at the discretion of the trustees of such trust. 
 Providing for the care and maintenance of elderly, minor or disabled family 
members 
o Such persons may equally be unable to manage their own financial affairs 
and could be at risk of being taken advantage of by outside parties. 
 Holding assets subject to limited ownership regulations 
o Agricultural land may not be subdivided330 and can therefore only be held 
in the name of a single entity. A trust is therefore commonly used if the 
agricultural land is operated for the benefit of multiple persons. 
 Orderly succession of assets and income to surviving family members on the 
death of the founder 
o The process and time it takes to wind up a deceased estate may result in 
surviving family members suffering hardship due to income-generating 
assets being frozen until the executor is able to finalise the deceased 
estate. Due to the formalities prescribed and the possibility of any issues 
arising which may delay the finalisation of the deceased estate, there may 
be a significant time delay before surviving family members gain control 
and access to income-producing assets which may cause hardship to them 
or be detrimental to the efficient income-producing ability of any business 
enterprise forming part of the deceased estate (for instance, a farming 
concern). If such assets or business concerns are contained within a family 
trust, the death of the founder will not affect the trustees’ ability to 
continue managing the assets and business concerns within the trust or 
their ability to distribute any income for the benefit of the beneficiaries. 
Beneficiaries are therefore less likely to suffer hardship due to the 
untimely death of the founder and owner of the family wealth if such 
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wealth is contained within a family trust rather than held in such a 
person’s personal estate. 
Many trust specialists will strongly advise against any individual to form a trust merely for 
the perceived tax advantages331 as this may place the validity of the trust at risk or open up 
such trust arrangement to the risk of certain abuses occurring which could have negative 
consequences for the founder regarding asset protection and the tax due related to such 
assets332.  
4.7.3 Different manners of transferring assets to South African trusts – donations vs. loan 
accounts 
A founder or other party may transfer assets from their own estates to that of the trust in 
one of the following ways: 
 Donate asset to trust: 
o The consequences are that donations tax will be levied at 20% of the 
market value of the donation that exceeds the R100,000 annual tax-free 
limit available to individuals333.  
o The attribution rules of s 7 of the Income Tax Act may be applicable to 
any distributions made from such donated amounts for the duration of the 
founder’s lifetime. This could result in distributions made to certain 
beneficiaries being taxable in the hands of the donor334. 
o Subsequent distributions from the trust may also be kept on loan account 
due to the founder and other beneficiaries (see next subsection for detailed 
discussion) in which case such loan accounts will also be included in the 
respective beneficiaries’ estates on death and liable for estate duty. 
o The upfront donations tax payment on the initial estate value should be 
compared with the estate duty saving of not paying estate duty on the 
market value of the assets on death (also levied at 20% of the net dutiable 
estate after the s 4A abatement, currently at R3,500,000).   
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 Sell asset at market value to trust and amount due by trust to founder remains 
outstanding on loan account: 
o Assuming that a newly formed trust will have little or no cash available, 
the founder may sell the assets at market value to the trustees (which 
means that no donation or gratuitous disposal has taken place hence no 
donations tax will be due) but agrees with the trustees to leave the amount 
due to him or her outstanding on loan account. This loan account will be 
an asset in their personal estate but as an interest-free loan account it will 
remain at the same value as when the sale was done and any growth in 
market value of said assets will remain outside of his or her personal 
estate335. 
o CGT will be due by the founder on the sale of the assets to the trust at the 
market value on date of transfer (other taxes, like transfer duty in respect 
of immovable property may also be payable at this time). 
o Regardless of other movements in the founder’s loan account over the 
years following the inception of the trust (see next subsection for a 
detailed discussion), the remainder of the loan account on the death of the 
founder will be an asset in his or her estate which will be liable for estate 
duty at 20% of the net estate exceeding the current s 4A abatement of 
R3,500,000336. 
o The value of the remainder of the loan account on death is however likely 
to be significantly less than the market value of the assets now held in the 
trust which will result in an estate duty saving (since more estate duty 
would have been due if the market value of the assets on death were 
dutiable in the founder’s estate).  
Regardless of whether assets are transferred to a trust via a donation or via a sale on loan 
account, the saving of CGT that may have been due on such assets on death should also be 
considered. Depending on the heir to whom such assets are bequeathed (CGT roll-over 
will apply if the surviving spouse is the heir337), if the assets remained in the founder’s 
estate, CGT on the full market value thereof (less original base cost, which is likely to be 
low due to the passage of time) may also have been due on death. 
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4.7.4 Other uses and considerations for loan accounts due by a resident trust to its 
beneficiaries 
At the time of inception of a trust, only the founder will typically have a loan account due 
to him or her by the trust as a result of the initial sale of assets to the trust at market value 
(unless the assets were donated to the trust).  
Distributions on loan account 
If any distributions are made by the trustees to the beneficiaries in any year, such 
distributions can either be paid out in cash from cash reserves in the trust or such amounts 
can be kept on a loan account due to each beneficiary while the income earned is 
reinvested in the trust thereby achieving greater potential growth in the trust. The latter 
option will result in loan accounts due to beneficiaries that will increase over time as 
distributions are declared but not paid out in cash. For founders and beneficiaries other 
than a founder who sold the initial assets to the trust on loan account, this loan account 
will start from Rnil whereas, for a founder who sold assets to the trust on loan account, 
this practice will increase the initial loan account over a period of time. 
Regular distributions to beneficiaries are commonly done to obtain a tax advantage 
through the working of s 25B of the Income Tax Act (conduit principle) by having trust 
income and gains vest in the hands of beneficiaries and therefore taxable at the lower 
effective tax rates applicable to individuals (as opposed to the high tax rates applicable to 
trusts)338. In order to avoid a depletion of trust assets through regular cash distributions, 
such distributions are then often kept on loan account and reinvested in the trust to ensure 
maximum capital growth of the trust assets. 
Such loan accounts due by the trust will be an asset in each of the estates of the founder 
and beneficiaries. These loan accounts are consequently open for attachment by third 
parties to the beneficiaries, like creditors or former spouses in divorce cases. Therefore, if 
such loan accounts are allowed to become sufficiently large compared to the value of the 
trust assets, the protection of wealth initially achieved through the use of a trust will 
effectively be partially undone. If a third party manages to attach a beneficiary’s loan 
account by means of a court order, the trustees may have to liquidate some of the trust’s 
assets in order to pay out such loan account to such third party on behalf of the relevant 
beneficiary. A significant reduction of trust capital may hamper the growth of trust assets 
in future years, affecting all other beneficiaries’ potential distributions. 
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Large remaining loan accounts of the founder or beneficiaries will also attract a large 
estate duty liability on death which may undo the short-term income tax savings achieved 
from regular annual distributions in the past.  
Cash distributions to beneficiaries on a regular basis (as opposed to keeping such amounts 
on loan account or within the trust) will likewise form part of such beneficiaries’ personal 
estates and, if not consumed for living expenses, could also result in the undoing of the 
protection of wealth achieved by use of a trust as well as being subject to excessive estate 
duty on the death of the beneficiaries.  
Interest-free loan accounts 
As transfer pricing will not be applicable between connected persons who are residents339 
(for instance, the founder and the trust), there is no taxation requirement for the loan 
account to a resident trust to carry an arm’s length interest rate. Interest-free loans are 
therefore the norm as any interest earned by the trust would merely have been distributed 
as income to the various beneficiaries in order for such income to be taxed at the 
individual’s marginal tax rate. This would also create an additional accounting and 
administrative burden.  
Even though an interest-free loan is not seen as a donation itself340, it has been argued that 
the interest foregone constitutes a continuing, common law donation and that s 7 and paras 
68 to 73 of the Eighth Schedule may therefore apply to the amount that would have 
accrued to beneficiaries as a result of such interest amounts foregone341. 
Reducing loan accounts 
A portion of each distribution made by trustees to beneficiaries could be made in cash in 
order to assist in paying the taxes due on such distributions in the hands of the various 
beneficiaries or if to be used to finance living expenses, while the rest of the distribution 
remains on loan account.  
The founder and other beneficiaries will also typically opt to reduce their loan accounts 
annually by using their R100,000 annual donation free of donations tax342. The reduction 
of debt will not have any capital gain consequences in the trust as para 12A of the Eighth 
Schedule, which governs the calculation of capital gains in these cases, exempts debt 
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reductions which occurred by way of donation343. Prior to 1 January 2013, the application 
of the now-repealed para 12(5) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax, may have 
resulted in such annual donations being viewed as the reduction a debt for no 
consideration344 which could have been considered as a deemed disposal attracting capital 
gains in the trust in those years of assessment345. 
A retired beneficiary (for instance, the founder) could furthermore start to draw down on 
their loan account in order to supplement retirement income thereby reducing his or her 
remaining loan account more rapidly which will result in less estate duty payable on this 
asset in their estate on death. 
Another advantage of drawing down on a loan account is that such amounts will be cash 
distributions free from additional taxation (assuming that such withdrawals are paid from 
cash reserves in the trust and no sale of trust assets, resulting in taxable capital gains, is 
required). Distributions kept on loan account were taxed in the hands of the beneficiary in 
the years of assessment when these distributions were made and the withdrawal of cash 
from these loan accounts in later years will therefore have no additional tax implications 
for the beneficiary at that time. 
Treatment of trust loan accounts on death of beneficiary 
As stated above, a loan account due by a trust to a beneficiary will be regarded as an asset 
in the estate of such beneficiary and on death, the remainder of such loan account will 
therefore be included in his or her estate and subject to estate duty of 20% on the net estate 
exceeding the s 4A estate duty abatement (currently at R3,500,000) 346.  
An excessive estate duty liability as a result of large remaining loan accounts on death due 
to distributions in excess of the living expense requirements of a beneficiary can therefore 
undo the previous short-term income tax benefits achieved by distributing income to 
beneficiaries each year.  
A further arrangement that could be considered is for the founder to donate the remaining 
loan account due by the trust back to the trust via a donatio mortis causa (donation in 
contemplation of death). Such a donation will be exempt from donations tax per s 56(1)(c) 
                                                     
343 Para 12A(6)(b)(i) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
Even though no donations tax would be payable, this sub-paragraph only refers to donations as 
defined in s 55(1) of the Income Tax Act and no reference is made to donations tax to have been 
levied in order for this exemption to apply.  
344 Per the now-repealed para 12(5)(a)(i) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act applicable 
prior to 1 January 2013 
345 De Koker & Williams 2015:para 24.132 
346 Foster et al. 2015:9 (para 2.2.3) 
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of the Income Tax Act but will be regarded as deemed property in the estate of the founder 
on death per s 3(3)(b) of the Estate Duty Act and therefore liable for estate duty. Even 
though such a loan account will remain in the founder’s estate for estate duty calculation 
purposes, no executor’s fees will be due on such a loan account (typically charged at the 
statutory maximum of 3.99% of the estate’s gross asset value, inclusive of VAT347) as it 
will no longer form part of the deceased estate to be managed by the executor. The 
founder’s deceased estate will therefore save up to a maximum of 3.99% of the 
outstanding loan account in expenses which would otherwise have been payable by the 
estate. For sufficiently large loan accounts such a saving may not be insignificant which 
may make this option worth considering.  
With regard to CGT consequences to both the trust and the founder, the donation of the 
founder’s loan account to the trust via a donatio mortis causa amounts to a reduction of 
debt (due by the trust) which is governed by para 12A of the Eighth Schedule to the 
Income Tax Act. If this reduction of debt fell into the provisions of para 12A, then it 
would have resulted in a reduction of the base cost of any assets held in the trust 
purchased as a result of the reinvestment of the loan amounts due to the founder348. This 
would have resulted in an additional capital gain equal to the loan amount to be recognised 
on the eventual sale of such assets by the trust. Even though no donations tax was due on 
the donatio mortis causa, the amount by which the debt is reduced by the deceased estate 
of the founder (that is, the full loan account amount) forms part of the property of the 
deceased estate for the purposes of the Estate Duty Act349 and therefore the donation of the 
loan account to the trust falls outside the provisions of s 12A350 so it is submitted that there 
will be no CGT consequences for the trust as a result of the reduction of this debt.  
As the founder is a connected person to the trust by virtue of being a beneficiary of the 
trust351 it is furthermore submitted that the capital loss in the founder’s estate as a result of 
the disposal (via donation) of the loan amount to the trust will be ring-fenced per para 
39(1)(a) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. Additionally, as the trust was not 
required to reduce the base cost of assets in the trust per para 12A, it is submitted that the 
exceptions to the ring-fencing of capital losses contained in para 56 of the Eighth Schedule 
                                                     
347 Per Regulation 8(1)(a) promulgated under s 103 of the Administration of Estates Act, No. 66 of 
1965 the executor’s remuneration equals 3.5% on the gross value of estates. This is the amount 
exclusive of VAT, therefore if an executor is registered as a VAT vendor, an amount of 3.5% x 
1,14 = 3.99% will be due. 
348 Para 12A(3) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
349 Per s 3(3)(b) of the Estate Duty Act 
350 Para 12A(6)(a) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
351 Per para (a)(ii) of the definition of “connected person” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act 
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will also not apply352. The donation of the founder’s loan account to the trust via a donatio 
mortis causa will therefore neither result in a capital gain being recognised in the trust nor 
a capital loss being recognised in the founder’s estate. 
4.7.5 Income-splitting of resident trust income 
The DTC submitted in their First Report that the original intention of the attribution rules 
contained in s 7 of the Income Tax Act was to prevent taxpayers prior to the 1999 tax year 
from using South African resident trusts as income-splitting devices. This was done by 
placing income-generating investments in a number of trusts in order to take advantage of 
the tax regime applicable to resident trusts in those years (a sliding scale with the same 
maximum marginal rate as for individuals) and thereby avoiding the extremely high 
individual tax rates that prevailed at the time (which could be as high as 78%)353.  
After the introduction of a flat rate of tax for trusts in 2003 equal to the highest marginal 
tax rate for individuals and the same high CGT inclusion rate for trusts as applies to 
companies (introduced in 2001), the DTC submitted that section 7 no longer served its 
purpose as an anti-avoidance provision. They submitted that, in fact, the opposite effect 
occurred in that high-net-worth individuals were now able to avoid the high taxes payable 
in a trust through use of this section354. Together with the working of s 25B and by making 
distributions to several beneficiaries having lower levels of taxable income, income-
splitting could therefore still be achieved through the use of trusts which is why the DTC 
wished to combat income-splitting by suggesting a repeal of both s 7 and s 25B (including, 
it is presumed, the related CGT paragraphs). 
Under current tax legislation, income-splitting occurs where the total income and gains 
realised in a trust are split into smaller distributions made to each trust beneficiary. Since 
only a portion of the total trust income will now be included in each beneficiary’s tax 
return and as some beneficiaries may be minors with no other sources of income who are 
taxed at the lowest marginal tax rate, the effective tax rate at which the trust income and 
gains will be taxed will be lower than if all the trust’s income and gains were lumped 
together and included in the tax return of a single beneficiary (for instance, the founder) 
who may also have other sources of income and who may be paying tax at the highest 
marginal tax rate.  
                                                     
352 Para 56(1)(a)(i) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
353 Davis Tax Committee 2015:37 
354 Davis Tax Committee 2015:38 
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Income-splitting, in the context of trust assets originally transferred to the trust by the 
founder via loan account (and not by donation), is mainly achieved by making use of s 
25B (the conduit principle) which deems trust income that was distributed to a beneficiary 
to be taxed in the hands of such beneficiary (therefore such income is not taxable in the 
trust).  
Due to the high capital gains inclusion rate and flat income tax rate applicable to trusts, 
capital gains are currently effectively taxed at 32.8%355 if it remains in the trust. It is often 
such gains that are distributed to individual beneficiaries (using para 80 of the Eighth 
Schedule, the CGT equivalent of the conduit principle) as the effective tax rate for capital 
gains for individuals ranges only between 7.2% and 16.4%356 before taking into account 
the effect of any normal tax rebates per s 6 of the Income Tax Act357 (that is, at worst only 
half of the capital gains tax due compared to such gains remaining in the trust).  
As South African income taxes levied in respect of individuals are based on a progressive, 
marginal tax rate, the effective tax rate for an individual will rarely be at the highest 
bracket’s tax rate of 41%. At the highest tax bracket of R701,300358 (from which amount 
all additional taxable income will be taxed at 41%) the effective tax rate, based on the 
2016/2017 tax tables and assuming a primary rebate of R13,500359, will only be 
approximately 27.59% with a corresponding effective capital gains tax rate of 40% x 
27.59% = 11.04%. For illustrative purposes, at just over double that amount, for an annual 
taxable income of R1,5 million the effective income tax rate based on the same 
assumptions is approximately 34.73% and the corresponding effective capital gains tax 
rate equals approximately 13.89% (= 40% x 34.73%). 
                                                     
355 Refer Table 1 below 
356 Refer Table 1 below 
357 In other words, the final effective tax rate for capital gains may range from 0% after the 
application of the normal tax rebates of s 6 of the Income Tax Act.  
358 Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendment of Revenue Laws Bill (Draft) 2016 (in respect of 
taxable income of any natural person) 
359 Section 4(1) of Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendments of Revenue Laws Bill (Draft) 
2016 
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Table 1 – Comparative tax rates between individuals, trusts and companies  
                   Type of  
                    income 
Taxpayer 
Income tax rate360 
Capital gains 
effective tax rate361 
(capital gains 
inclusion rate362 x 
income tax rate) 
Dividend 
withholding tax 
rate363 
Individual 
Varies from 
18% to 41% 
= 40% x (18% to 41%) 
7.2% to 16.4% 
15% 
Company 28% 
= 80% x 28% 
22.4% 
0% 
Trust 41% 
= 80% x 41% 
32.8% 
15% 
 
The above table therefore illustrates why there would be a tendency for trustees to ensure 
that any income or capital gains realised in a trust are distributed to individual 
beneficiaries in order to enjoy the lower tax rates applicable to individuals. If the trust 
income is furthermore split between multiple individual beneficiaries then the overall 
effective tax rate can be kept low despite the fact that the total net taxable income may 
have attracted a higher effective tax rate if taxed as a whole or in the hands of a single 
beneficiary. 
The common law principle that taxpayers are allowed to organise their financial affairs in 
a manner that will result in a reduction of the tax legally payable under the appropriate tax 
Acts, was established in cases like IRC v Duke of Westminster364 and Dadoo Ltd and 
others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council365.  
                                                     
360 Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendments of Revenue Laws Bill (Draft) 2016 
361 These are the effective tax rates calculated before taking into account the effect of any normal 
tax rebates per s 6 of the Income Tax Act. 
362 The taxable gain inclusion rates given above are as per para 10 of the Eighth Schedule to the 
Income Tax Act as to be amended by the promulgation of the Draft Rates and Monetary Amounts 
and Amendments of Revenue Laws Bill 2016 (s 10 of the Bill) and applicable in respect of years of 
assessment commencing on or after 1 March 2016.  
From 1 March 2012 to 29 February 2016 the capital gains inclusion rate for individuals was 33.3% 
and for companies and trusts, 66.6% (Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendments of Revenue 
Laws Act 2015). 
363 The income from which dividends are paid are effectively taxed at 28% in the company and then 
again with 15% dividend withholding tax when declared as a dividend to a non-exempt 
shareholder. Therefore the overall tax rate collected on such income (paid by different parties) 
would be equal to 1 – (1 – 0.28) x (1 – 0.15) = 38.80%. If a company forms part of an overall 
structure of a taxpayer or group of taxpayers then this effective rate needs to be taken into 
consideration. 
364 [1936] AC 1 
365 1920 AD 530 
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The short-term tax benefits achieved by so-called income-splitting practices and regular 
distributions on loan account to individual beneficiaries should be weighed up against the 
effect this may have on the ability to protect the wealth held in the trust from third parties 
as well as on the eventual estate duty liability of such amounts for the founder and 
beneficiaries. As noted in the section on loan accounts above, the amount of distributions 
and amounts due to beneficiaries on loan accounts would be assets in the hands of the 
beneficiaries’ personal estates, which could be attached by third parties through a court 
order and would also constitute dutiable assets in their estate upon their demise. Large 
distributions and loan accounts could therefore partially undo the protection of wealth 
provided by a trust if a trust has to liquidate trust assets in order to pay out a beneficiary’s 
loan account to a third party on behalf of that beneficiary as a result of such a court order. 
Additionally, the short-term income tax benefits achieved by distributing large amounts of 
income to beneficiaries over time may be undone in the end by an excessive estate duty 
liability arising from large remaining loan accounts on death.  
4.7.6 Considerations for resident beneficiaries’ interactions with non-resident trusts  
Transfer pricing considerations 
If a South African resident founder creates an offshore trust by lending funds from an 
approved foreign investment366 to such offshore trust, the transfer pricing provisions of s 
31 of the Income Tax Act will apply as the resident beneficiary and the foreign trust are 
connected persons as defined367 which will result in such a loan falling within the 
definition of an ‘affected transaction’ per s 31(1). 
Even though it may be practical to have such loan account to a foreign trust remain free of 
interest for administrative purposes in the trust, an arm’s length deemed interest income on 
such loan account will have to be declared in the South African beneficiary’s annual tax 
returns in order to adhere to the transfer pricing principles set out in s 31 and if transfer 
pricing adjustments are to be avoided368.  
                                                     
366 The foreign capital investment amount available to South African private individuals is currently 
R10 million per calendar year and must be done after obtaining the necessary Reserve Bank 
approval through an Authorised Dealer for such foreign investment. See chapter F.6.1.1 of the 
SARB’s Exchange control manual (Financial Surveillance Department of SARB 2015:O1) 
367 Per para (a)(ii) of the definition of “connected person” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act 
368 For residents who are natural persons, the difference in such residents’ taxable income as a 
result of not applying an arm’s length interest on such loans to foreign trusts will be deemed to be a 
donation made by such persons which will be subject to donations tax of 20% after the annual 
exemption has been taken into account (s 31(3) of the Income Tax Act). 
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The basis of the calculation of an arm’s length deemed interest income is, however, open 
to much debate as no clear guidelines currently exist in this regard369. The relevant interest 
rate applied will also depend on, inter alia, the currency in which such loan is held370. 
Interest in a foreign currency will then be translated to either the spot rate or the average 
exchange rate of said currency371 to calculate the rand amount of interest income to be 
included in the individual taxpayer’s tax return. 
Taxation of foreign trust income and distributions from foreign trusts 
Income and capital distributions from a foreign trust will be governed by s 25B(2A) and 
para 80 of the Eighth Schedule respectively372. The income and gains retained in a foreign 
trust will not be taxable in South Africa unless distributed to South African beneficiaries, 
in which case such income will be taxable in the hands of the resident beneficiaries. If, 
however, a founder opted to donate foreign investment amounts to a trust rather than 
lending such money to the trust, donations tax would be levied at the date of transfer and 
the attribution rules contained in s 7(8) will furthermore apply resulting in all income 
earned in the trust on such donated amounts being taxable in the hands of the founder in 
every year of assessment following such donation. 
Treatment of foreign trust loan accounts on death of beneficiary 
A foreign trust loan account will similarly be an asset in the estate of the founder or 
beneficiary at his or her death on which estate duty will be levied. In order to avoid the 
administration of creating a foreign-based will and appointing a foreign executor to deal 
with such loan account (as such loan account will constitute an asset in the foreign 
jurisdiction of the trust), a donation of the loan account to the foreign trust could be made 
via a donatio mortis causa. As before, South African estate duty will still be due on a 
foreign loan account donated in this manner but there will be no need to create or register 
a foreign will with regard to this asset in such cases and no foreign executor’s fees will be 
payable either. 
                                                     
369 Even though the provision of an interest-free loan is not seen as a donation as such, it has been 
argued that the interest foregone constitutes a continuing, common law donation for donation tax 
purposes and that s 7 and paras 68 to 73 of the Eighth Schedule may therefore apply the amount 
that would have accrued to beneficiaries as a result of such interest amounts foregone (De Koker & 
Williams 2015:para 12.27; Foster et al. 2015:9). If these attribution rules are utilised to determine 
the additional amounts to be included in a taxpayer’s income, s 31 may still apply if the taxable 
income so included is deemed insufficient.  
370 Taxpayers may therefore select a loan currency to which a low inter-bank rate applies which, if 
adjusted to an arm’s length interest rate, may still be lower than that which applies to a loan 
denominated in, for instance, South African rand.  
371 Section 25D(1) read together with s 24D(3) of the Income Tax Act 
372 See detailed discussions with regard to these in chapters 4.6.3 and 4.6.5. 
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4.7.7 Suggested changes to legislation that may affect the way assets and income in trusts are 
taxed 
As discussed elsewhere in this research report373, some of the initial recommendations 
contained in the DTC’s First Report included a repeal of both s 7 (attribution principle) 
and s 25B (conduit principle) with regard to trusts and for distributions from foreign trusts 
to residents to be treated as income regardless of the source of such income.  
These recommendations were heavily criticised by various professional bodies374. 
In a SAIT webinar presented by Judge Dennis Davis375, who heads up the DTC, he stated 
that the recommendations in the First Report regarding the taxation of South African trusts 
in particular will be abandoned and that the conduit principle (s 25B) and the attribution 
principle (s 7) will therefore remain unchanged. He further mentioned that the 
recommendation with regard to foreign trusts was also incorrect and that distributions will 
continue to be taxed according to the nature of the income received in the foreign trust if 
distributed to residents (as currently governed by s 25B(2A) and para 80 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Income Tax Act).  
In addition, the wording of para 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, which 
deals with capital gains distributed to trust beneficiaries, will be refined in order to correct 
some of the deficiencies in the wording of this paragraph which currently results in most 
distributions from capital gains received by resident beneficiaries from non-resident trusts 
which occurs in the same tax year as when such gains arose, to be excluded from a 
beneficiary’s aggregate capital gain or loss, as discussed in chapter 4.6.5 above. 
Judge Davis also mentioned that a recommendation will be made in the Second Interim 
Report on Estate Duty (still to be released) with regard to redrafting s 3(3)(d) of the Estate 
Duty Act to deem a trust’s property to be that of a deceased’s estate if the deceased had a 
sufficiently large loan account owed to him or her by the trust which would constitute the 
deceased having had de facto control over the trust assets.  
The 2016 Budget Review contained a paragraph, ‘Tax treatment of trusts’, which 
suggested however that if the founder transferred assets to a trust in exchange for a loan 
account due to the founder (possibly regardless of whether such loan account is interest-
free or not) then all trust assets will be regarded as deemed property in the estate of the 
                                                     
373 Refer chapter 1.1 
374 Refer chapter 4.8 
375 Davis 2015 
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founder upon his or her death regardless of the size of such loan account376. Furthermore, 
this paragraph indicated that assets transferred to a trust through an interest-free loan 
account will be categorised as a donation. Although clarity is still required this may mean 
that s 7 of the Income Tax Act (with regard to trust income) as well as paras 69 to 72 of 
the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act (with regard to capital gains in trusts) may 
apply in such cases377. 
It would be deemed unfair however for such a transfer to attract both donations tax upon 
initial transfer as well as estate duty on death as these two taxes are under normal 
circumstances intended to be mutually exclusive. Donations tax is levied on transfers 
made from a taxpayer’s estate to compensate the tax authorities for the loss in estate duty 
that will be suffered due to the reduction of the taxpayer’s estate as a result of the 
donation, hence the fact that the donations tax rate and estate duty rate are normally the 
same. 
As neither the suggested legislation nor the Second Report on Estate Duty has been 
released to date, more clarity is required with regard to the intended working of the new 
changes being recommended to fully understand the possible taxation consequences. 
If the proposed legislation is going to result in a higher expected estate duty and CGT 
liability for a founder of a trust, the founder will be required to plan for the provision of 
liquidity in his or her estate (typically through the use of life insurance policies378) in order 
for the executor to be able to pay the tax liabilities without requiring estate assets to be 
sold to raise the necessary cash. For founders who may be too old to take out additional 
life insurance to provide for an increased tax liability in the immediate to near future, such 
legislative changes may therefore result in hardship for their surviving spouse and family 
members who may be dependent on the estate assets for income after his or her death. 
It remains to be seen if any of the proposed new legislation will be applied to existing 
structures or even retrospectively to any transfers done to trusts via loan accounts in the 
past. In the DTC’s First Report, the Committee was not in favour of allowing taxpayers a 
grace period in which to dissolve their trust structures prior to the implementation of the 
suggested legislation changes (repeal of conduit principle and attribution rules)379. As trust 
structures are typically entered into for long time horizons across the lifetime of more than 
one generation, such a sudden change to existing legislation will result in a massive effort 
from both taxpayers and their tax practitioners to restructure affected taxpayers’ affairs in 
                                                     
376 Department of National Treasury 2016a:49 
377 Department of National Treasury 2016a:49 
378 Foster et al. 2015:5 (para 2.2) 
379 Davis Tax Committee 2015:44 
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a manner that will not undo the careful planning done over many years prior to such a 
change to achieve the preservation of hard-earned wealth for future generations. 
4.7.8 Conclusion 
This section discussed some of the tax consequences (estate duty, donations tax and 
income tax) for taxpayers when interacting with South African and offshore trusts in 
certain ways in order to provide background and an understanding of the context in which 
the recommendations of the DTC’s First Report were made, for the comments submitted 
by professional bodies on the DTC’s First Report and for the new recommendations 
discussed by Judge Davis to be contained in the Second Report and those contained in the 
2016 Budget Review. 
This section set out both the non-tax-related reasons for using trusts as well as the manners 
in which assets are transferred by founders to trusts. The section furthermore discussed the 
uses of and considerations for beneficiary loan accounts due by trusts, the concept and 
mechanisms of income-splitting in resident trusts which the DTC intends to curb with 
their various proposals as well as additional considerations for resident beneficiaries of 
non-resident trusts. Finally the potential consequences of the various recommendations by 
the DTC and the 2016 Budget Review were briefly considered. 
4.8 Select commentaries on the DTC’s First Interim Report on Estate Duty 
Comments on the First Interim Report on Estate Duty released on 13 July 2015 could be 
submitted to the Committee until 31 August 2015. Various professional bodies and firms 
submitted commentaries to the Committee. Four of these commentaries were reviewed for 
the purpose of this research report and some aspects contained in these are briefly 
discussed below380.  
4.8.1 FISA 
The Fiduciary Institute of Southern Africa (‘FISA’) noted that the repeal of the conduit 
principle with regard to distributed trust income contained in s 25B of the Income Tax Act 
may cause hardship to beneficiaries requiring the use of a trust for asset protection and for 
the management of capital and income on behalf of financially unsophisticated or elderly 
                                                     
380 Note that although certain comments were repeated or overlapped between the four 
commentaries discussed in the above text, such comments will mostly only be discussed under one 
of the commentaries’ sub-headings to reduce repetition.  
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individuals381. Such trusts may typically hold property to a total value of only a couple of 
million Rand while paying out the income generated by such property to the beneficiary or 
assisting the caregiver of the beneficiary to meet the beneficiary’s cost of living. 
Aggressively taxing such distributed income would therefore greatly reduce the cash 
available for the care of such beneficiaries382.  
FISA also contended that the tax leakage as a result of the conduit principle is probably 
substantially overstated and that any loss in capital gains tax on the death of the original 
owner of the assets (who has transferred such assets to an inter vivos trust) will be offset 
by any future distributions from the trust of capital gains to beneficiaries and any actual 
distribution of trust property to such beneficiaries383. They furthermore submitted that the 
perpetual nature of family trusts as alluded to by the DTC’s First Report (who seemed to 
deem capital assets transferred to a trust to be lost forever for taxation opportunities since 
no estate duty will be levied on such assets on the death of the original owner384) was also 
overstated385. This is due to the fact that the experience of FISA members is that the 
typical family trust very rarely lasts longer than the second generation and that necessity 
together with the desire of beneficiaries to own assets individually usually lead to the 
undoing of the majority of such trusts every second generation386. 
FISA furthermore listed several non-tax purposes for high-net-worth individuals to set up 
trust structures, for instance to protect the inheritances of their children from themselves 
until they are old enough to deal with such wealth responsibly and to protect such 
children’s inheritances from being abused by third parties (e.g. a spendthrift spouse); or 
for individuals who are about to enter into risky entrepreneurial businesses, to transfer 
primary residences to a trust in order to safeguard the individual’s assets from high risk 
exposure (to, for instance, creditors and third parties)387. 
With regard to the repeal of the attribution principles contained in s 7 of the Income Tax 
Act (which section also applies to situations where no trust is present), FISA felt that the 
concern regarding this section was misplaced388. The reason for this contention is that the 
application of this section with regard to trusts will in most cases where an asset would 
have been taxed in the hands of a beneficiary, but for this section, result in such asset now 
being taxed in the hands of the founder or donor (that is, both outcomes will result in the 
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382 FISA 2015:3 (para 2.4) 
383 FISA 2015:4 (para 2.6.1) 
384 Davis Tax Committee 2015:7-8 
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asset being taxed in the hands of an individual). The application of this section therefore 
does not typically result in the taxation entity being changed from the trust to the founder 
and unless the proposed repeal of s 25B was also implemented, amounts distributed from 
the trust to beneficiaries would have resulted in these amounts being taxable in the hands 
of the beneficiaries in any event389. 
FISA criticised the repeal of s 4(q) of the Estate Duty Act with regard to the inter-spousal 
deduction as a sudden repeal would result in the estates of taxpayers who are too old to 
take out additional life insurance to provide for the cash shortfall, that would now have 
been created by an increased estate duty liability, to be placed at a significant 
disadvantage. Cash shortfalls as a result of an increased estate duty liability may then 
necessitate the sale of the assets in the estate (for instance, farms or small to medium 
business concerns) in order to pay the additional estate duty which in turn may result in 
the surviving spouse being left vulnerable without an income-generating asset base from 
which to be supported390. 
With regard to the notion that CGT is not regarded as a wealth tax, FISA noted that, the 
review on tax on wealth and transfers of wealth in the European Union that the DTC 
referred to in the First Report391, differentiates CGT from wealth taxes on the premise that 
CGT does ‘not aim to tax the sole possession or transfer of certain assets, because tax is 
only due when the possession or transfer of the assets results in the realisation of 
income’392. This review continues by stating that ‘wealth taxes on the other hand are 
typified by the fact that the transfer or possession is taxed, regardless of whether income is 
realised’393. Differently put, FISA contends that in the text quoted from the authority that 
the DTC used to justify not classifying CGT on death as a wealth tax, it is clearly stated 
that wealth taxes are typified by the fact that the transfer of possession of such assets itself 
is taxed regardless of whether income is realised394. Therefore by this very definition, both 
CGT levied on assets on death as well as estate duty levied will be classified as wealth 
taxes. Where CGT is levied on the disposal of an asset for market-related consideration 
(that is, the transfer of assets results in the realisation of income) then only can it be said to 
truly be a tax on deferred income, that is, not be regarded as a wealth tax.  
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390 FISA 2015:7 (para 4) 
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4.8.2 SAIT 
The South African Institute of Tax Practitioners (‘SAIT’) noted in their commentary with 
regard to the recommendation regarding the repeal of the s 4(q)395 inter-spousal deduction 
that this would be contrary to overwhelming international precedent and that this 
deduction exists because married couples typically operate as a single economic unit396. It 
was furthermore noted that the common principle of estate duty or succession taxes is that 
such a tax is applied only when assets are transferred from one generation to the next and 
that various other married relief provisions (for instance, the CGT rollover provisions397 
and the inter-spouse donations tax exemption398) correctly recognise that spouses form an 
economic unit and that transfers between spouses should have no tax effect unless such 
transfer has a tax avoidance motive399. 
The SAIT also noted that the conduit principle (s 25B of the Income Tax Act) has been a 
well-established principle of tax law for almost a century and that this principle is well-
accepted amongst countries with a common law background such as South Africa400. They 
further noted that there are a myriad valid reasons for forming trusts and that the genuine 
vesting of assets and income does exist which therefore validates the flow-through 
principle401. 
With regard to the proposals regarding foreign trusts, the SAIT felt that an additional 
amnesty programme for foreign assets held in foreign trusts, which was deemed 
unnecessary by the DTC’s First Report402 may well be a reliable process to collect lost 
taxation403. They noted that the voluntary disclosure programme which the DTC felt 
should be used to deal with such cases404 will have limited benefit as this programme only 
applies to defaults that have arisen since the implementation date of the Tax 
Administration Act405 which was 1 October 2012 where many of these funds would have 
been expatriated many years before406. The programme also provides no limitation on the 
                                                     
395 Of the Estate Duty Act 
396 Engel & Arendse 2015:6 
397 In para 67 of the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act 
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399 Engel & Arendse 2015:6 
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401 Engel & Arendse 2015:7 
402 Davis Tax Committee 2015:44 
403 Engel & Arendse 2015:8 
404 Davis Tax Committee 2015:45 
405 No 28 of 2011 
406 Engel & Arendse 2015:8 
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interest charges that would be levied on undisclosed amounts which could be substantial 
given the length of time involved407. 
The SAIT also felt that the focus on excess abuse arising from inter-spousal donations 
mentioned by the DTC in their First Report408 was misplaced and that as couples get older 
such inter-spousal relief in this regard provides more of a timing benefit given that most 
spouses die within a 10-year period of one another409. 
4.8.3 STEP 
The commentary submitted by the combined Johannesburg and Cape Town branch 
committees of the Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners (‘STEP’) pointed out that 
SARS could do better to use existing common law with regard to trust abuses410 in 
situations where founders do not, for instance, relinquish control over trust assets as well 
as better application of s 3(3)(d), the anti-avoidance provision of the Estate Duty Act, to 
combat estate duty avoidance rather than attempting to tax trusts in such a punitive fashion 
as to discourage the use of trusts altogether411. 
The STEP also pointed out (similar to the comments submitted by FISA) that trusts are 
very rarely perpetual and typically last no longer than two generations whereupon the 
trust’s assets are either disposed of for the benefit of grandchildren or poured-over into 
sub-trusts412. Upon these occurrences, a substantial amount of CGT would arise on the 
value of the trust’s disposed assets, having achieved considerable capital growth by then, 
and that such assets will then form part of the beneficiaries’ estates (if not transferred to 
sub-trusts) and therefore subject to estate duty413. A deferral of tax rather than a complete 
elimination of tax is therefore achieved through the use of trusts. Furthermore, donations 
tax, CGT and/or transfer duty may be levied upon the initial transfer of property into any 
trust which is an upfront cost that the trust founder accept in order to protect such assets 
from creditors and immature or spendthrift children (and not necessarily from SARS)414. 
The STEP’s commentary also pointed out the wide variety of non-tax purposes for the 
creation of trusts, for instance, the protection of assets from commercial risk, from 
                                                     
407 Engel & Arendse 2015:8 
408 Davis Tax Committee 2015:52-53 
409 Engel & Arendse 2015:9 
410 As seen, for instance, in the cases of Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C), Land and 
Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) and Badenhorst v Badenhorst 
2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) 
411 Foster et al. 2015:3 (para 2.1) 
412 Foster et al. 2015:4 (para 2.2) 
413 Foster et al. 2015:4 (para 2.2) 
414 Foster et al. 2015:5 (para 2.2) 
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bereaved and former spouses, from children’s current and former spouses and their 
offspring, from minor or immature children, from incapacitated persons (who do not 
qualify for having a special trust as defined) and more415. They also pointed out that trusts 
are often required for assets subject to limited owner regulations, like agricultural land that 
can only be held in one name416. Trusts also offer a means to ensure orderly succession, 
rather than relying on the speedy and efficient execution of a deceased estate by an 
executor or the courts417. 
A further response by STEP with regard to the DTC’s comment that interest-free loans 
that are used to fund a trust are gradually repaid over the years whereby the founder’s 
estate is reduced prior to death418 was that it should be remembered that such loans remain 
an asset in the estate of the founder which will be subject to estate duty. Any loan 
repayments that have not been consumed will be cash which will still fall within the 
founder’s estate. Only the growth of the assets within the trust will fall outside the 
founder’s estate as such assets are now owned by the trust419. 
With regard to the DTC’s recommendation that all distributions from foreign trusts to 
South African beneficiaries be treated as income, the STEP noted in their commentary that 
treating distributions which formed part of original capital as income for tax purposes 
would be grossly unfair and that such a recommendation would simply discourage 
investors from bringing back funds to South Africa420. They are also of the opinion that 
the identification of sources of income in offshore trusts (which would in most 
circumstances consist of dividend income, interest and occasional capital gains) is 
straightforward when proper records are kept, as is the responsibility of professional 
offshore trustees, and that there would therefore be no difficulty in identifying the origin 
of amounts distributed421. 
The STEP also commented on the unsuitability of the voluntary disclosure programme as 
a way by which taxpayers could regularise their affairs with regard to undisclosed foreign 
assets due to the fact that the programme does not provide a limit on the interest charges 
that would be due422. Currently there is also no certainty on the levies that will be imposed 
by the South African Reserve Bank when such amounts are declared as these could range 
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from 5% to 30% of the value of the foreign assets at the time such assets are declared423. 
They are therefore of the opinion that the potential excessive cost of regularisation, which 
could be in excess of 50%, will not encourage potential applicants to bring their assets 
within the tax base424. 
With regard to the DTC’s recommendation that the exemption of inter-spousal bequests be 
repealed, the STEP noted in their commentary that wealth should be taxed when there is 
an inter-generational transfer of wealth but that the transfer from the first dying to the 
surviving spouse cannot be said to be such an inter-generational transfer425. If the inter-
spousal bequest exemption is removed or limited, the effect of inflation on property values 
in South Africa may also result in the surviving spouse having to sell the family home in 
order to generate sufficient liquidity to meet the estate duty liability which would be 
considered an unfair result426. 
4.8.4 LSSA 
The Law Society of South Africa (‘LSSA’) noted in their comments that the conduit 
principle is not a creature of statute or legislation which can be neutralised simply by 
repealing sections 7 and 25B of the Income Tax Act. As this principle has been part of the 
common law principles applicable to trusts as decided in the Courts427, complicated 
legislative intervention will be required to neutralise the conduit principle428. The LSSA 
further noted that this will go against the DTC’s recommendation of ‘simple yet 
fundamental amendments to existing legislation’429 and will have all the potential of 
litigation and clarification which the Society cannot support430. 
The LSSA likewise noted the likelihood of trusts to be unbundled when the next 
generation wants to take control of the trust assets after the death of the founder which will 
result in both CGT and eventually estate duty revenue being collected431. Further 
comments on the conclusions reached by the DTC with regard to the issues relating to 
double taxation on death created by the imposition of both CGT and estate duty was that 
they felt that CGT should only be payable on the realisation of an asset and not on death. 
They added that the capital gains realised are not adjusted for inflationary growth which 
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could lead to the absurdity of CGT being imposed on inflationary artificial gains which in 
real terms may even constitute losses432. 
With regard to the withdrawal or limitation of inter-spousal exemptions and roll-overs the 
LSSA was of the view that this recommendation will have catastrophic consequences 
which will lead to undue hardship to many households, especially the elderly and 
vulnerable433. 
4.8.5 Conclusion 
Four commentaries by professional bodies on the DTC’s First Interim Report on Estate 
Duty were reviewed which highlighted several concerns with regard to the 
recommendations made in this report, notably the technical and practical difficulties that 
would be associated with a repeal of ss 7 and 25B of the Income Tax Act, the risk of 
undue hardship to households as a result of the withdrawal or limitation of the inter-
spousal exemptions and roll-overs suggested and the Committee’s rejection of the idea 
that double taxation occurs on death due to both CGT and estate duty being levied.  
It therefore seems that, generally speaking, these professional bodies felt that it would be 
imperative to conduct further research on several matters presented in the First Report 
before any final decisions can be taken. 
4.9 Conclusion 
The literature study section contained a review of inequality in South Africa by means of 
various indicators and a review of the Margo and Katz Commissions’ views on using a 
wealth tax to address inequality which was compared to the Davis Tax Committee’s 
submissions in this regard. The section continued with a review of benchmarks for estate 
duty as percentage of total tax collections, for estate duty rates and for a combined 
effective tax rate on death which concluded that a relevant benchmark for capital taxes is 
for such taxes to not materially exceed 15% in order to avoid significant avoidance and 
evasion and a resultant reduced effective tax yield. The possible double taxation effect of 
both estate duty and CGT levied on death was also considered. 
This section was followed by high-level summaries of the relevant aspects of estate duty, 
trust law and trust taxation and a discussion of the tax consequences of certain manners of 
taxpayers’ interactions with trusts. The literature study was concluded with a review of 
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commentaries on the DTC’s First Report submitted by four professional bodies, namely 
FISA, SAIT, STEP and the LSSA.  
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5 Methodology 
5.1 Case studies to compare aggregate taxation as percentage of capital 
held in trust versus that held in personal estate  
5.1.1 Two basic scenarios used in each comparison and high-level description of comparisons 
Two basic scenarios or case studies will be created, the first being a scenario where wealth 
assets are transferred to an inter vivos trust and the second where no use is made of a trust. 
Each scenario will have a timeline of sufficiently long duration together with typical life 
events along such timelines (for instance, death of the founder, death of the surviving 
spouse etc.) and typical restructuring events with regard to trusts (for instance, where a 
single trust is restructured to form separate trusts for adult children to be managed 
separately).  
The capital growth and income growth assumptions used for the wealth assets in the two 
basic scenarios will be the same. All taxation with regard to the income produced by the 
wealth asset, the CGT paid on disposals and estate duty collected will be calculated for 
each scenario on an annual basis. The aggregate tax paid by all parties from inception of 
each scenario will be calculated at the end of each year. This aggregate taxation amount, 
which will build up over time, will be expressed as a percentage of the theoretical market 
value of the wealth asset at the end of that particular year (using the abovementioned 
growth assumptions) in order to get a sense of the relative total taxation levied on the 
assets at the end of any given year. The comparison between these two scenarios using 
current legislation will provide the baseline comparison (Comparison 1). 
This comparison will then be repeated using the DTC’s First Report’s recommendations 
(Comparison 2) and again using the expected recommendations in the DTC’s Second 
Report and those in the 2016 Budget Review (Comparisons 3a and 3b). 
5.1.2 Duration of trust and personal estate scenarios 
In order to test the build-up of wealth in a typical trust structure and that in a personal 
estate together with testing the effect of typical events, for instance the death of the 
founder, spaced out in time, a duration of 50 years was arbitrarily selected over which the 
comparative analyses will be performed. 
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Within this 50 year timeline, certain parameters will be applied during certain periods 
which should coincide with the age and life situation of the founder and beneficiaries in a 
typical family trust. 
5.1.3 Trust timeline and assumptions 
The timeline in the trust scenarios will consist of the following events occurring in the 
following years. For ease of calculation, all events are assumed to occur on the last day of 
the year (unless otherwise indicated). The timelines are summarised in Table 2 below and 
all the parameters and assumptions used are summarised in Table 3. The trust timeline and 
events are as follows: 
 Beginning of year 1: 
o Founder (age around 40 years) sells an investment asset to an inter vivos 
discretionary trust (Trust 1) of which the beneficiaries are the founder, 
spouse and two children (family of four). 
 A market value of R10,000,000 and base cost of R5,000,000 will 
be used across all scenarios. 
 The asset is assumed to have a fixed capital value growth (using 
Piketty’s assumptions that the growth in capital is higher than that 
of the growth of income, income is assumed to grow at an 
assumed rate of inflation). The average annual capital growth rate 
includes all reinvestment of income produced and is net of all 
expenses except the payment of tax. The average capital growth 
value used will be 10%434.  
 The asset is also assumed to produce a fixed rate of taxable 
income per year of 5% of the asset value at the beginning of that 
year435. In order to simplify tax calculations only a rate of taxable 
income is calculated and exempt income (such as dividends) is 
left out of the picture. The only effect that exempt income may 
have on the scenarios is an increase in loan account growth. 
Capital gains will only be taken into account when a major 
                                                     
434 The investment asset is deemed to consist of a mixture of assets types similar to those held in a 
balanced fund unit trust. The 10% average capital growth value is a conservative estimate selected 
based on a rough average of 10-year forecasts of local equity (7 – 10%), global equity (10 – 13%), 
local property (7 – 10%) and local bonds and cash (6 – 9%) (Coronation Asset Managers 2015:9) 
and annualised return benchmarks for 10 years (10.8%) and beyond (13.6%) used by a prominent 
balanced fund (Allan Gray 2016:1). 
435 Arbitrary assumption that roughly half of average long-term capital growth is due to 
reinvestment of taxable income earned. 
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restructuring or forced liquidation event occurs which will result 
in all (or a large portion) of the assets in the trust being sold at the 
same time. 
 Income is distributed annually between the four beneficiaries on 
an equal basis on loan account. Each year, the tax amount due by 
the beneficiaries will be distributed as cash (this causes a 
reduction of the each beneficiary’s outstanding loan account each 
year). A further R100,000 annual donation of each loan account is 
made to reduce the loan accounts further. 
 Cash distributions for purposes of paying tax are assumed to be 
made from cash reserves therefore no sale of assets or CGT 
thereon is required. 
 The beneficiaries other than the founder are assumed to have a 
lower effective tax rate due to being minors (children) or not 
earning additional income (for instance, non-working spouse). 
 From year 11 onwards: Children start to earn income  
o Adult children who are beneficiaries start working and their effective tax 
rates increase (not yet at highest tax bracket). This rate will be adjusted 
upward every 5 years to reflect their increasing earning capacity. 
 From year 21 onwards: Founder retires 
o Adult children’s tax rates increase to maximum marginal rate as they start 
to become higher income earners. 
o Founder and spouse draw down annually on loan accounts in order to 
supplement retirement income. Draw down amounts increase with an 
assumed rate of inflation of 6% each year436. 
o Founder’s effective tax rate remains high due to other retirement income 
coupled with loan account draw down amounts or other cash distributions. 
o All cash distributions are assumed to be from cash reserves in the trust 
therefore no additional CGT due to sale of assets will be due. 
 Year 30 (end): Founder dies 
o Founder donates remainder of loan account to trust (Trust 1) through a 
donatio mortis causa (or not, but estate duty may be due on the value of 
the remaining loan account regardless). 
o Surviving spouse continues to draw down on loan account to supplement 
retirement income. 
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 Year 35 (end): Trust is restructured as adult children have own families and 
require separate trusts for each (Trust 2a and Trust 2b) 
o There is a capital gain event in the trust (Trust 1) on distribution of all 
assets that adult children are entitled to (two thirds of trust capital). Adult 
children transfer such amounts net of CGT to their own trusts (Trusts 2a 
and 2b) on loan account. The capital gain on the sale of two thirds of the 
original trust’s assets is distributed to the living beneficiaries in order to 
take advantage of the lower capital gains inclusion rate. 
o Each of the new trusts (Trust 2a and 2b) have four beneficiaries (founder, 
spouse, two children).  
o The same principles with regard to loan accounts, cash distributions for 
tax payments and annual donations of loan accounts will apply as with the 
original trust (Trust 1). 
o The beneficiaries (of Trusts 2a and 2b) other than the founders are 
assumed to have lower effective tax rates due to being minors (children) 
or not earning additional income (for instance, non-working spouse). 
o The surviving spouse (Trust 1) continues to draw down on loan account 
and cash reserves from remaining assets in the original trust. 
 Year 40 (end): Surviving spouse dies 
o Surviving spouse donates remainder of loan account to trust (Trust 1) 
through a donatio mortis causa (or not, but estate duty may be due on the 
value of the remaining loan account regardless). 
o Original trust (Trust 1) distributes remainder of capital to living 
beneficiaries who transfer it into their respective trusts (Trusts 2a and 2b) 
on loan account. 
 Year 50 (end): Restructuring of trusts for 3rd generation 
o This is a final CGT event in order to test the comparative effect of a full 
exit or disposal of all assets between the trust and personal estate 
scenarios. All assets in each of the new trusts are disposed of and 
distributed to all individual beneficiaries. 
5.1.4 Personal estate timeline and assumptions 
The timeline in the personal estate scenarios will consist of the following events occurring 
in the following years. For ease of calculation, all events are assumed to occur on the last 
day of the year (unless otherwise indicated). The timelines are summarised in Table 2 
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below and all the parameters and assumptions used are summarised in Table 3. The 
personal estate timeline and events are as follows: 
 Beginning of year 1: 
o Founder (age around 40 years) keeps an asset in his or her personal name, 
that is, it forms part of his or her estate. 
 The same starting market value and base cost of the asset as used 
in the trust scenario will apply. 
 The same average annual fixed capital growth rate will be used as 
in the trust scenario. 
 The same fixed rate of taxable income per year will be used as in 
the trust scenario. 
 All income will be taxed in the hands of the founder or owner 
whose tax rate is assumed to be at the same starting tax bracket as 
used for the founder in the trust scenario. 
 Tax is assumed to be paid out of cash reserves in the investment 
therefore no CGT event as a result of cash payments. 
 From year 21 onwards: Owner retires 
o Owner and spouse draw down investment income earned to supplement 
retirement income which will result in a reduction of the estate value. 
o All cash distributions are assumed to be from cash reserves in the 
investment vehicle therefore no additional CGT due to sale of assets will 
be due. 
 Year 30 (end): Owner dies 
o The full asset is deemed to be bequeathed to the surviving spouse and 
therefore subject to the s 4(q) deduction when calculating the founder / 
owner’s dutiable estate. 
o There is a CGT inter-spouse rollover with regard to the asset therefore no 
CGT will be due. 
o Estate duty is levied at 20% of the dutiable estate value after the 
deduction of the s 4A abatement (currently at R3,5 million per taxpayer). 
o The surviving spouse continues to draw down investment income to 
supplement retirement income, which income is assumed to be from cash 
reserves (that is, no CGT as a result). 
 Year 40 (end): Surviving spouse dies 
o The full asset is deemed to be bequeathed to the adult children of the 
couple therefore no s 4(q) estate duty deduction is applicable. 
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o CGT is calculated on death with no inter-spouse rollovers now applicable 
(original base cost used). 
o Estate duty is levied at 20% of the dutiable estate value after the 
deduction of the s 4A abatement (currently at R3,5 million per taxpayer 
but if this abatement was not fully utilised in the estate of the first-dying 
spouse then an amount of up to R7 million may be available as abatement 
in the last-dying spouse’s estate). 
o If applicable, it is assumed that no rapid succession estate duty rebate will 
apply. 
o The base cost assumed by the heirs equals the market value of the asset on 
the death of the last-surviving spouse. 
 Year 50 (end): Sale of assets by heirs 
o This is a final CGT event in order to test the comparative effect of a full 
exit or disposal of all assets between the trust and personal estate 
scenarios. CGT is calculated on the sale of all assets in the hands of the 
two adult beneficiaries. 
5.1.5 Summarised comparative timeline for trust and personal estate 
Below is a table which summarises the events and timelines for each of the trust and the 
personal estate scenarios as set out in more detail in the sections above. 
Table 2 – Summary of trust and personal estate timelines 
Year Trust timeline Personal estate timeline 
1 Asset sold to trust (Trust 1) on loan 
account (at start of year) 
Asset remains in personal estate 
11 Effective tax rate of beneficiaries 
increase (adjusted every 5 years) 
- 
21 Founder retires (from start of year);  
Founder and spouse start making annual 
withdrawals to supplement retirement 
income, adjusted annually for inflation 
– withdrawals assumed to be from cash 
reserves, i.e. no CGT 
Owner retires (from start of year);  
Owner and spouse start making annual 
withdrawals to supplement retirement 
income, adjusted annually for inflation 
– withdrawals assumed to be from cash 
reserves, i.e. no CGT 
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Year Trust timeline Personal estate timeline 
30 Founder dies (at end of year) and 
bequeaths loan account via donatio 
mortis causa to trust (estate duty on 
remaining loan account, no CGT) 
Owner dies (at end of year) and 
bequeaths full asset value to surviving 
spouse (s 4 (q) deduction and CGT 
rollover) 
35 Trust restructured (at end of year) for 
each child beneficiary (CGT event) and 
two new trusts created (Trusts 2a and 
2b);  
Surviving spouse remains beneficiary of 
original trust (Trust 1) and continue 
withdrawals. 
- 
40 Surviving spouse dies (at end of year) 
and bequeaths loan account via donatio 
mortis causa to trust (estate duty on 
remaining loan account, no CGT); 
Remaining trust assets distributed to 
surviving children and transferred to 
their respective trusts (Trusts 2a and 2b) 
Surviving spouse dies (at end of year) 
and bequeaths assets to surviving 
children (estate duty and CGT on full 
asset value – no rapid succession 
rebate) 
50 Restructuring of Trusts 2a and 2b for 3rd 
generation of beneficiaries (CGT event 
– sale of all trust assets) 
Sale of all assets by heirs (CGT event) 
 
5.1.6 Assumptions used with regard to taxation and the effect that paying of taxes has on the 
capital value of the investment asset 
It is assumed that CGT will only be due when a major restructuring event occurs and that 
the CGT due by all parties will reduce the value of the investment or wealth asset when 
reinvested. It will further be assumed that all income taxes paid annually, with regard to 
the taxable investment income generated by the wealth asset and which is due by either 
the trust or the beneficiaries, will reduce the value of the wealth assets. It will also be 
assumed that such cash distributions are paid from the cash reserves of the investment and 
will therefore not require the disposal of any investment assets or any additional CGT.  
Withdrawals by the founder and spouse for the period after retirement will likewise be 
deemed to be made from cash reserves and not result in additional CGT as a result of the 
disposal of investment assets. 
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Estate duty and CGT due on the death of either the founder or spouse in the scenarios 
where the investment asset is held in the taxpayers’ personal estates will be assumed to 
result in a liquidation of investment assets in order to pay such taxes but as such disposal 
will be deemed to occur immediately after the CGT calculation on death, the base cost and 
market value of such assets will be assumed to be the same at the time of such disposal 
and therefore no additional CGT will be calculated as a result of this disposal. 
5.1.7 Parameters and assumptions used in trust and personal estate scenarios 
The following tables show the various parameters used in the calculation of the scenarios 
with explanations provided regarding the rationale behind these assumptions in the 
footnotes or below the tables. 
Table 3 – Parameters and assumptions used in trust and personal estate scenarios 
Parameter Value 
Market value of investment asset at start of Year 1 R 10,000,000 
Base cost of asset at start of Year 1 R 5,000,000 
Average annual capital growth rate (including reinvestment 
of income net of tax and expenses) 437 
10% 
Annual taxable income as percentage of investment asset438 5% 
Founder's assumed effective income tax rate (due to other 
income earned elsewhere, e.g. employment)439 
38% 
Initial annual post-retirement withdrawal (from Year 21) per 
person (founder and spouse)440 
R 750,000 
Assumed inflation rate at which post-retirement withdrawal 
amounts increase annually441 
6% 
                                                     
437 The investment asset is deemed to consist of a mixture of assets types similar to those held in a 
balanced fund unit trust. The 10% average capital growth value is a conservative estimate selected 
based on a rough average of 10-year forecasts of local equity (7 – 10%), global equity (10 – 13%), 
local property (7 – 10%) and local bonds and cash (6 – 9%) (Coronation Asset Managers 2015:9) 
and annualised return benchmarks for 10 years (10.8%) and beyond (13.6%) used by a prominent 
balanced fund (Allan Gray 2016:1). 
438 Arbitrary assumption that roughly half of average long-term capital growth is due to 
reinvestment of taxable income earned. The annual taxable income will be calculated using the 
opening value of the capital in any given year. 
439 This effective tax rate relates to a total taxable income for a person under the age of 65 of 
approximately R3,1 million per annum (see Table 80 in Annexure 9.5.2. 
440 Arbitrarily chosen amount to achieve a reduction of the founder’s loan account after retirement 
without reducing the remaining loan account on death to a value below the current s 4A abatement 
amount of R3,5 million in order to include the effect of estate duty on such loan in Comparison 1. 
441 Coronation Asset Managers 2015:9 
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The following table contains the effective tax rates at which the distributed income from 
the trust is taxed in the hands of each beneficiary at each point in the trust timeline in order 
to demonstrate the effect of income-splitting. The effective tax rates are calculated using a 
lookup table contained in Table 80 in Annexure 9.5.2 and for beneficiaries under the age 
of 65 as per the latest personal income tax rates announced442. Even though some 
beneficiaries (notably the founder and spouse) may reach ages older than 65 in the latter 
stages of the various case studies, the effect of the additional secondary and tertiary 
abatements are assumed to be negligible in determining the applicable effective tax rate. 
Table 4 – Effective tax rates used for individuals at various points in the timelines 
Period (years) and 
explanation of timeline 
situation 
Founder’s 
tax rate 
(effective)443 
Spouse’s tax rate 
(effective) 
Child 
beneficiaries’ tax 
rate (effective) 
Years 1 – 10 
Beneficiaries are minors / 
unemployed spouse – no 
other income 
38% 
Per effective tax rate 
tables 
(Annexure 9.5.2) 
Per effective tax rate 
tables 
(Annexure 9.5.2) 
Years 11 – 20 
Beneficiaries start earning 
other income 
38% 
Per effective tax rate 
tables 
(Annexure 9.5.2) 
Yr 11 – 15: 25% 
Yr 16 – 20: 30% 
Years 21 – 30 
Founder retires, 
beneficiaries are higher 
income earners 
38% 
Per effective tax rate 
tables 
(Annexure 9.5.2) 
Yr 21 – 25: 35% 
Yr 26 – 30: 38% 
Years 30 – 50 
Founder has died, 
beneficiaries remain high-
income earners 
- 
Per effective tax rate 
tables 
(Annexure 9.5.2) 
Yr 31 – 50: 39% 
(Spouse and children 
in Trusts 2a and 2b: 
per effective tax rate 
tables) 
 
                                                     
442 Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendment of Revenue Laws Bill (Draft) 2016 
443 In the trust scenarios, the effective tax rate used for the founder was 38% unless the effective tax 
rate tables resulted in a higher effective tax rate, in which case the higher effective tax rate was 
used. 
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5.1.8 Loan accounts due to trust 
For all the trust scenarios, the founder will sell the capital asset to the trust on loan account 
at the start of each trust scenario. All loan accounts will be interest-free. In order to 
demonstrate the effect of income-splitting, each beneficiary, including the founder, will 
receive income distributions on loan account annually. The income tax calculated on such 
distributions will be deemed to be distributed in cash to enable the beneficiaries to pay the 
tax due in their personal tax returns as a result of such vested income. Such cash 
distributions will therefore reduce the loan accounts each year. 
Annual donations of R100,000 will also be made by each beneficiary on his or her loan 
account. Post-retirement withdrawals will be calculated using the starting value as set out 
in the parameters above and increased with the assumed inflation percentage annually. 
Both the founder and spouse will start to draw down these amounts to supplement their 
retirement accounts from their loan accounts from the year of retirement (Yr 21) until their 
respective deaths.  
The loan accounts in the trust are calculated in order to determine the estate duty effect of 
a remaining loan account on death in the trust scenario. 
5.1.9 Treatment of cash distributions in both trust and personal estate 
It is assumed that any cash distributions made with regard to the income tax payments and 
the post-retirement withdrawals are done from cash reserves of the capital investment and 
that such amounts will not require any disposals of the capital which will result in CGT. 
These cash distributions will, however, reduce the total capital value (invested capital plus 
cash reserves) of the investment each year. This assumption applies to both the trust and 
personal estate scenarios. 
Any estate duty and CGT due on any taxpayer’s death will however be deemed to require 
a disposal or reduction of capital (assumed to occur directly after the date of death 
therefore no additional CGT will be due on such disposal as proceeds will equal base 
cost). This assumption will also apply to both the trust and personal estate scenarios. 
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5.1.10 Comparisons of total taxation collected in trust and personal estate scenarios using 
current legislation, recommendations of the First Report and expected 
recommendations of the Second Report on Estate Duty 
The following comparisons will be made between the total taxation collected over the 50 
year period as a percentage of the capital value of an asset held in a trust compared to 
holding such asset in a personal estate.  
As no clarity has yet been given with regard to the implementation of the vague 
suggestions made with regard to the taxation of trusts in the 2016 Budget Review and as it 
seems unfair to levy both donations tax and estate duty on the same assets444, Comparison 
3 was split into two sub-comparisons: one where the upfront donations tax will apply with 
regard to an interest-free loan made to a trust when transferring assets to such trust 
(Comparison 3a) and one where no upfront donations tax was paid but where the trust 
assets are deemed to be included in the founder’s estate on his or her death (Comparison 
3b). 
Table 5 – Description of applicable legislation in each comparison case study 
Comparison 
case study 
Trust Personal estate 
Comparison 1 Using current trust legislation Using current estate duty legislation, 
rates and abatements 
Comparison 2 Using recommendations regarding 
changes to trust taxation contained in 
the First Interim Report on Estate 
Duty 
 - Repeal of conduit principle (s 
25B)445: all income taxed in trust at 
41% 
Using recommendations regarding 
changes to estate duty legislation 
contained in the First Interim Report 
on Estate Duty 
- Repeal of s 4(q) deduction446 
- Estate duty abatement of R6 
million447 
                                                     
444 See discussion under chapter 4.7.7 
445 Davis Tax Committee 2015:39 
446 Davis Tax Committee 2015:51 
447 Davis Tax Committee 2015:64 
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Comparison 
case study 
Trust Personal estate 
Comparison 3a Using current trust legislation 
2016 Budget Review – initial sale of 
assets in trusts on loan account is 
treated as a donation448 attracting 
donations tax at 20% 
 
Using recommendations regarding 
changes to estate duty legislation 
contained in the expected Second 
Interim Report on Estate Duty 
- Repeal of s 4(q) deduction 
- Estate duty abatement of R15 
million449 
- Progressive estate duty rate of 25% 
to apply above certain dutiable estate 
value (assumed to apply to so much 
of dutiable estate value as exceeds 
R15,000,000)450  
Comparison 3b Using current trust legislation 
2016 Budget Review – on death of 
founder, trust assets are included in 
founder’s estate and attracts estate 
duty451 under the expected new estate 
duty legislation (same as for personal 
estate) 
Same as in Comparison 3a above 
 
5.1.11 Manner of evaluating the comparison case studies 
In order to compare the effect of taxation on a typical trust and inheritance structure to that 
of assets held in a taxpayer’s personal estate, the total taxation (income tax paid by all 
parties, estate duty, CGT and donations tax) which accumulated from the beginning of the 
entire test period until the end of a particular year is expressed as a percentage of the 
capital value of the investment asset at the end of that particular year.  
                                                     
448 Department of National Treasury 2016a:49 
449 Davis 2015 
450 As no indication was given by Judge Davis as to the dutiable estate value from which the 
increased estate duty rate of 25% will apply (Davis 2015), the assumption was made for the 
purpose of this study that this level would be the same as the suggested abatement value. This 
higher rate will therefore apply to the portion of dutiable estate values above R15 million which 
will therefore affect estates with net estate values exceeding R30 million (where the dutiable estate 
value is calculated as R30 million net estate value less R15 million s 4A abatement). 
451 Department of National Treasury 2016a:49 
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This would therefore give an indication of whether the total taxation paid to date in any 
particular year compared to the value of the capital value at the end of that year may be 
deemed punitive or in excess of the benchmarks generally regarded as the maximum 
tolerable taxation of wealth (that is, 15%)452. In order to present a more refined 
comparison which isolates CGT and wealth taxes from income tax, the accumulated tax 
value per year will also be calculated by taking only CGT, estate duty and donations tax, 
where applicable, into account (that is, all taxes excluding income tax). 
To present a visual format in which the comparison may be evaluated, a graphic 
representation will be made of the following parameters over the 50-year timeline: 
 ‘Cumulative total tax’ set of charts: 
o Cumulative total tax paid per year (income tax, CGT, estate duty and 
donations tax) in each scenario (trust and personal estate) within each 
comparison. 
o Trust capital or estate value per year 
o Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value per year 
o Difference between personal estate and trust: Cumulative total tax as 
percentage of capital value per year 
 ‘Cumulative total CGT, estate duty and donations tax’ set of charts: 
o Cumulative total CGT, estate duty and donations tax paid per year (all 
taxes except income tax) in each scenario (trust and personal estate) 
within each comparison. 
o Trust capital or estate value per year (same as in previous set of charts) 
o Cumulative total CGT, estate duty and donations tax as percentage of 
capital value per year 
o Difference between personal estate and trust: Cumulative total CGT, 
estate duty and donations tax as percentage of capital value per year 
This would help to indicate in which scenarios the capital value is severely affected as a 
result of the taxes due as well as whether situations may arise where the total cumulative 
taxes as a percentage of the capital value materially exceeds 15% at which point it 
becomes more likely that significant avoidance and evasion (and a resultant reduced 
effective tax yield) will occur453.  
To simplify the visual evaluation, the difference between the cumulative total tax as 
percentage of capital value line graph in the trust scenario and the personal estate scenario 
                                                     
452 See discussion under chapter 4.3.3 
453 See discussion under chapter 4.3.3 
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related to each comparison will also be calculated and displayed in a chart (that is, 
cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value for asset held in personal estate less 
cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value for asset held in trust).  
If this derived value is greater than 0% then more tax as a percentage of the capital value 
is paid if the asset is held in a personal estate than in a trust which means that, holding the 
asset in a trust is more tax effective relevant to the preservation of wealth achieved than 
holding the asset in a personal estate.  
If this derived value is less than 0% then more tax as a percentage of the capital value is 
paid if the asset is held in a trust than in a personal estate in which case it may be more 
advantageous to hold the asset in a personal estate than to transfer it to a trust. If the latter 
is the case, an effective deterrent for the use trusts and aggressive estate planning may be 
created. 
The same difference value will be determined for the cumulative CGT, estate duty and 
donations tax as percentage of capital value data sets. 
Each chart presented will have indicators showing the time at which the major events in 
the scenarios occurred (for instance, the death of the founder, restructuring of trust, death 
of surviving spouse) in order to evaluate visually how these events affect the various 
outcomes in those years. 
5.1.12 Data sheets and supplementary charts 
The detailed data sheets related to each scenario in each comparison will be calculated 
using Excel and contained in the Annexures in chapter 9. The following data tables and 
charts will be presented in the annexures per comparison (that is, for each of Comparison 
1, 2, 3a and 3b): 
 All scenarios: 
o All scenarios: Post-retirement withdrawal schedule (from Yr 21 to Yr 40) 
o Effective tax rate lookup tables 
 Trust scenario: 
o Trust 1: Capital growth (from Yr 0 to Yr 40) 
o Trust 2a and 2b: Capital growth combined (from Yr 35 to Yr 50) 
o Trust 1: Income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
o Trust 2a and 2b: Income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
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o All trusts (1, 2a, 2b): Other taxes (CGT on transfer, estate duty on death, 
CGT on death, donations tax (trust scenario in Comparison 3a only)) – all 
years 
o Trust 1: Loan accounts: 
 Founder 
 Spouse 
o Trust summary: 
 Total capital (Trust 1 + Trust 2a and 2b) 
 Total taxes (Trust 1 income tax  + Trust 2a and 2b income tax + 
All trusts’ other taxes) 
 Cumulative total taxes 
 Cumulative total tax / Total capital 
 Cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax 
 Cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax / Total capital 
o Trust summary (using capital year-end values before year-end 
adjustments) 
 Personal estate scenario: 
o Personal estate: Capital growth 
o Personal estate: Income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
o Personal estate: Other taxes (CGT on transfer, estate duty on death, CGT 
on death) 
o Personal estate summary: 
 Total capital 
 Total taxes (Income tax + Other taxes) 
 Cumulative total taxes 
 Cumulative total tax / Total capital 
 Cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax 
 Cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax / Total capital 
o Personal estate summary (using capital year-end values before year-end 
adjustments) 
 Comparative data and charts: 
o Cumulative total tax  
 Trust v. Personal estate 
o Capital value 
 Trust v. Personal estate 
o Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value 
 Trust v. Personal estate 
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o Cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax 
 Trust v. Personal estate 
o Cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax as percentage of capital 
value 
 Trust v. Personal estate 
 Difference data and charts: 
o Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value 
 Personal estate less Trust 
o Cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax as percentage of capital 
value 
 Personal estate less Trust 
The charts that will be presented in the results section will combine all data sets in all 
scenarios for all comparisons as line charts on a single graph per output parameter. The 
detail per comparison as listed above will be available in the Annexures in chapter 9. 
5.2 High-level estimate of CGT payable on death – considering the possible 
double taxation effect of estate duty and CGT on death 
As stated in the literature study section, the numbers provided by the Department of 
National Treasury and SARS for total CGT collected from individuals include both 
normal disposals as well as disposals on death but no separate breakdown is currently 
provided for CGT collected on death in the Tax Statistics documents issued by the two 
government entities454. 
The DTC’s First Report, however, contains a sample of estate duty collected by SARS in 
2013 with a high-level breakdown of the distribution across four broad estate value bands 
in Table 2455 (and again in Table 6456) of the Report. This sample is said to represent 70% 
of the estate duty collected in the 2013 tax year457 and can therefore be said to be most 
likely representative of the full population of estates from which estate duty was collected 
during that tax year. Not enough information is provided in the Report, however, to 
perform any detailed statistical analysis on this data. The Report also states that there is no 
                                                     
454 Department of National Treasury & SARS 2014:224 
455 Davis Tax Committee 2015:31 
456 Davis Tax Committee 2015:63 
457 Davis Tax Committee 2015:31 
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information to determine, among other facts, what the effect of the double taxation of 
estate duty and CGT is on death458. 
The DTC’s First Report also furnished an unpublished SARS statistic in a different section 
to where the estate duty sample was discussed which states that only 4% of the estates 
reported to SARS in 2013 were liable for CGT459. The results of an analysis of the 
effective tax rates on death by National Treasury is furthermore included in the Report 
which uses further assumptions with regard to the percentage of an estate that is likely to 
be subject to CGT, with a stated worst-case scenario maximum of 50% of the value of the 
estate460. 
The above information in addition to the amount of CGT collected in total from 
individuals as provided with regard to the 2013 tax year in the 2014 Tax Statistics 
document461 by the Department of National Treasury and SARS462 may, however, be 
utilised in conjunction with some reasonable assumptions to arrive at a very rough 
estimate of the amount of CGT possibly paid on death in the 2013 tax year. 
Although there may be many ways of approaching the calculation of such an estimate 
given the little information available, the methodology followed in this research report 
represents only one possible approach and by no means purports to provide a definitive or 
accurate answer or even a statistical probability of the correctness of the estimate.  
The assumptions used and the calculations are explained in detail in the results section 
below. Such an estimate would provide an indication of the double taxation effect of CGT 
payable on death in conjunction with estate duty and help to arrive at an indication of the 
total taxes paid on death as a percentage of total revenue collected in South Africa, with 
specific reference to the 2013 tax year. This may then be used to better compare the 
collection of taxes on death as percentage of total revenue of South Africa to that of other 
countries as was done in the DTC’s First Report463. 
As these numbers will only be able to provide an overall or average indication of CGT 
payable on death based on a large sample of estates, a case study approach would not have 
been appropriate for this problem statement. Any individual high-value estate contained in 
                                                     
458 Davis Tax Committee 2015:32 
459 Davis Tax Committee 2015:57 
460 Davis Tax Committee 2015:57 
461 The 2013 Tax Statistics document did not contain a chapter on Other Taxes and Collections as 
this chapter was only included in the Tax Statistics publications from the 2014 tax year onwards. 
The 2014 Tax Statistics document does, however, contain historical data with regard to CGT 
collections for individuals and companies per tax year going back to the 2010 tax year. 
462 Department of National Treasury & SARS 2014:224 
463 Davis Tax Committee 2015:29-30 
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a case study may still be subject to some form of double taxation under certain 
circumstances (for instance, where little or no CGT exemptions or roll-overs are 
applicable to the assets in such an estate). It will therefore not be possible, using such an 
approach, to reach a conclusion on the overall or average double taxation that occurs as a 
result of assets in estates possibly being subject to both CGT and estate duty on the death 
of the taxpayer. Instead, high-level extrapolations of the data made available in the DTC’s 
First Report will be used to arrive at a rough, high-level estimate for total CGT collected 
as a result of taxpayers’ deaths in the 2013 tax year. 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter explained the methodology used for the three case study problem statements 
and for the problem statement regarding a high-level estimate of CGT paid on death. With 
regard to the case studies, the case study timelines for both a trust and a personal estate 
scenario were explained and the starting parameters and other assumptions used were 
provided. The output parameters to be calculated were furthermore explained and the type 
of data sets that will be made available in the annexures were listed. With regard to the 
high-level estimate of CGT paid on death, the source of the seed information used in the 
estimate was discussed as well as the high-level approach to be followed. Lastly, the 
reasoning behind not following a case study approach for this problem statement was 
discussed. 
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6 Results and Discussion  
6.1 Case studies to compare aggregate taxation as percentage of capital 
held in trust versus that held in personal estate 
In this section the results related to each outcome parameter introduced in chapter 5.1.11 
will be presented as line graphs and discussed. 
All the charts presented in this section use the following symbols and colour coding: 
Solid lines with diamond-shaped markers denote the trust scenarios: 
Dotted lines with open circle markers represent the personal estate 
scenarios:  
The comparisons are colour-coded as follows: 
 Comparison 1: Current legislation:   BLUE 
 Comparison 2: DTC’s First Report:   RED 
 Comparison 3a: DTC’s expected Second Report and 2016 Budget Review 
(upfront donations):     GREEN 
 Comparison 3b: DTC’s expected Second Report and 2016 Budget Review (trust 
assets deemed property in estate on death):  ORANGE 
6.1.1 Cumulative total taxation 
The following chart represents the cumulative total tax, that is, income tax, CGT, estate 
duty and donations tax (the latter relates to Comparison 3a only) over the course of each 
scenario for all 4 comparisons.  
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Figure 1 – Cumulative total taxation 
 
Discussion 
The cumulative total tax amounts at the end of the various scenarios (in Year 50) do not 
seem to differ greatly between the scenarios with roughly only a R20 million variance 
between all scenarios after a period of 50 years (ranging from about R120 million to R140 
million). The timing of the tax events at each of the major events will however have an 
effect on the capital value retained, as will be seen in the charts to follow (Figure 3).  
The sudden increases in cumulative tax seen in the various line graphs coincide with a 
significant tax event in each scenario, for instance, estate duty and CGT on the death of 
the founder or spouse or CGT payable due to a restructuring. When the capital value is 
decreased due to a major tax event, the investment income generated in the following year 
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(calculated as a percentage of the capital value at the start of each year464) will be reduced 
which will result in less income tax due annually. This can be seen as a decreased slope in 
certain line graphs after the occurrence of a significant tax event compared to other line 
graphs.  
As the capital is allowed to grow over the years following such an event, the taxable 
income generated each year will gradually increase as will the income tax due. This can be 
seen as a gradually increasing slope in each line graph in the above chart over a period of 
time.  
Year 30: In Year 30 (death of founder) all the personal estate line graphs for Comparisons 
2, 3a and 3b see an increase as a result of estate duty due in the founder’s estate because of 
the suggested repeal of the s 4 (q) estate duty deduction (with regard to inter-spousal 
bequests)465. The only personal estate scenario that does not see an increase in taxes in this 
year is that of Comparison 1 due to the s 4 (q) deduction still in place per current 
legislation. 
The only trust scenario that has a major tax event on the death of the founder is the one in 
Comparison 3b due to the treatment of the trust assets as deemed property in the estate of 
the founder. In the trust scenarios, the death of the founder could possibly result in a minor 
increase in total taxes in that year as a result of estate duty due on the portion of any 
remaining loan account of the founder that exceeds the s 4A abatement amount applicable 
to each scenario. The only trust scenario that will have a minor estate duty on the death of 
the founder is that of the baseline Comparison 1 as a result of the remaining loan account 
exceeding the R3,5 million estate duty abatement per current legislation. In all the other 
trust scenarios, the remaining loan account will fall below the increased s 4A abatements 
(R6 million and R15 million in Comparison 2 and in Comparisons 3a and 3b respectively) 
and therefore no estate duty will be due on the founder’s loan account in these scenarios.  
Year 35: The major tax event in Year 35 will only affect the trust scenarios as this is the 
CGT due as a result of restructuring the trust by distributing two thirds of the trust assets 
to the two adult children (one third each) in order for them to set up their own trusts. The 
extent of the tax event will however vary as the tax payable will depend on the value of 
the trust assets at the end of Year 35. As can be seen, the amount of CGT paid by the trust 
in Comparison 3b is markedly less than that paid in the other trusts as the trust in this 
scenario already had a major tax event as a result of the death of the founder in Year 30 
(estate duty) which would have depleted the capital value on which CGT will be 
                                                     
464 Refer assumptions per Table 3 in chapter 5.1.7 
465 See discussion under chapter 4.4 
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calculated in Year 35. The tax event in Comparison 2 (the DTC’s First Report’s 
recommendations, which repealed the conduit principle) is also greater than that in the 
other trust scenarios due to the higher capital gains inclusion rate applicable to trusts 
which applies to the CGT calculation in this scenario. 
Year 40: Year 40 shows a significant tax event for all the personal estate scenarios as a 
result of estate duty and CGT due on the death of the surviving spouse. Even though the 
total cumulative tax paid by all the personal estate scenarios are very similar at this point 
(about R90 million), the real difference will be seen in the effect on the capital value in the 
charts to follow (Figure 3). In the trusts, a relatively minor tax event occurs in this year as 
the remaining assets in the original trust (Trust 1) is distributed to the two living 
beneficiaries which triggers CGT.  
Year 50: The exit event in Year 50 will attract more CGT in scenarios where the capital 
value that has been achieved at the end of Year 50 is greater. It can therefore be seen that 
the extent of the increase in cumulative taxes in that year is lower for the personal estate 
scenarios than for the trust scenarios where higher capital values have been achieved. 
Conclusion 
Even though the initial recommendations in the DTC’s First Report with regard to the 
repeal of the conduit principle was expected to be punitive for the trust scenario, it seems 
as if such recommendations, if implemented, would not have resulted in significantly more 
tax to be collected over the lifetime of a typical trust compared to that collected from trust 
assets held under current legislation. The reason for this is that the capital gains on a 
complete exit event (sale of all assets in a trust) under current legislation would have 
resulted in a significant amount of CGT payable due to the increased capital growth that 
had been achieved in a trust over several years. As mentioned in some of the 
commentaries by professional bodies to the DTC’s First Report in chapter 4.8, the 
restructuring of trust assets to cater for the needs of next generations is a fairly common 
occurrence466 and if trust assets are allowed to grow in a trust without the interference of 
punitive income taxes, the CGT payable at the time of such a restructuring is likely to be 
significant. 
                                                     
466 FISA 2015:4 (para 2.6.2) 
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6.1.2 Cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax 
The next chart shows all cumulative taxes, with the exception of income taxes, over the 
course of each scenario for all 4 comparisons.  
Figure 2 – Cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax 
 
Discussion 
The final cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax values at the end of the timeline 
each scenario (in Year 50) do not seem to differ greatly between the various scenarios 
with an estimated variance of just over R10 million between all scenarios after a period of 
50 years (ranging from just under R60 million to just over R70 million). Just over half of 
the estimated R20 million variance in the final value of total cumulative taxes seen in the 
previous chart is therefore explained by the differences in CGT, estate duty and donations 
tax collected over the 50-year period. The relevant differences in the once-off taxes 
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collected at each of the major tax events between each of the scenarios can be more clearly 
seen in this chart than in the previous chart and will therefore be discussed in more detail 
below (although some overlap of the points raised in the previous chart’s discussion will 
occur). 
Year 0: The scenario with the highest cumulative tax collection at the inception of the 
timeline is the trust in Comparison 3a due to the upfront donations tax due on transfer of 
the assets to the trust. This will be over and above the CGT due on such a disposal which 
will apply to all the other trust scenarios. None of the personal estate scenarios will have 
any taxes due until the occurrence of death or a disposal. 
Year 30: In Year 30 it can be seen that the highest taxation will occur in the trust scenario 
of Comparison 3b due to the fact that the trust assets are included as deemed property in 
the estate of the deceased founder (no CGT is assumed to be calculated on such assets on 
death). The higher estate duty charge in this scenario (compared to those in the personal 
estates in Comparisons 2, 3a and 3b) is a result of the trust assets having obtained a greater 
capital value than the assets held in the personal estates due to the lower effective taxation 
achieved in the trust as a result of income-splitting over a period of 30 years. With less 
taxes deducted from the capital value in the trust each year than in the personal estate 
scenarios, the effective capital growth achieved in the trust will be higher as a result of a 
higher amount of after-tax capital remaining in the trust each year (while using the same 
capital growth assumptions). This results of this increased capital growth will also be 
demonstrated in the next chart (Figure 3) which depicts the capital value of the investment 
asset over the course of the scenarios.  
A minor increase in taxes will be seen for the trust scenario of Comparison 1 as a result of 
the estate duty payable on the remaining value of the loan account of the founder which 
exceeds the relatively lower s 4A abatement amount of R3,5 million. In the other trust 
scenarios, the higher s 4A abatement amounts assumed (R6 million and R15 million) will 
result in the remaining loan account on death to be free of estate duty in those scenarios. 
The capital in the scenarios where assets are held in personal estates would have been 
depleted by higher income tax payments in the hands of the original owner on the income 
generated by such assets due to a higher effective income tax rate applying to such person. 
The scenarios where assets are held in personal estates where the s 4(q) inter-spouse 
deduction has been repealed (Comparisons 2, 3a and 3b) show the effect of estate duty due 
on the death of the original owner. Due to the high estate values used in the scenarios, the 
effect of the different s 4A abatement amounts (R6 million and R15 million respectively) 
is not very pronounced in the graphical depiction of these cumulative tax values. 
109 
Year 35: As a result of the CGT payable due to the restructuring in the trust scenarios, the 
trusts which have not seen any significant tax events up to this point (trust scenarios in 
Comparisons 1, 2 and 3a), will see their first significant increase in cumulative taxes in 
this year. The abovementioned trust scenarios’ cumulative tax values are now in closer to 
those of the personal estate scenarios where the s 4 (q) deduction was repealed 
(Comparisons 2, 3a and 3b). The trust scenario of Comparison 2 (in respect of the DTC’s 
First Report’s recommendations) shows a marked increase in CGT payable in the year due 
to the higher capital gains inclusion rate in trusts being used to calculate CGT as a 
consequence of the suggested repeal of the conduit principle. The CGT paid in the trust 
scenario of Comparison 1 is slightly less than such amount paid in the trust scenario of 
Comparison 3a. This is mainly because of the upfront donations tax paid by the founder in 
Comparison 3a’s trust scenario in Year 0 reduced somewhat by the relatively smaller 
amount of estate duty paid in Comparison 1’s trust scenario on the founder’s loan account 
in Year 30.  
Year 40: The biggest tax amount levied on the death of the surviving spouse is in the 
personal estate scenario of Comparison 1 (based on current legislation). The total tax paid 
at that point in the other personal estate scenarios exceed the total cumulative estate duty 
and CGT on death using current legislation by no more than about R5 million after a 
period of 40 years. The timing of the estate duty payments in the first-mentioned scenarios 
will however have a significant impact on the remainder of the capital value of the 
investment asset as will be seen in the charts to follow (Figure 3). The trust scenarios 
show CGT payments of varying magnitudes as a result of the distribution of the remaining 
assets in Trust 1 to the two living beneficiaries. As explained in the previous section, the 
CGT levied will be dependent on the capital value of the assets when liquidated. If the 
capital value has therefore been depleted due to previous large tax payments, less CGT 
will be due upon this liquidation. In the trust scenario of Comparison 2, the higher CGT 
amount can also be explained as a result of the repeal of the conduit principle and the fact 
that the gains realised will be subject to the high capital gains inclusion rate applicable to 
trusts. 
In the personal estate scenarios, the effect of the proposed increased estate duty rate of 
25% applicable from a certain level of dutiable estate (assumed to apply to so much of 
dutiable estates as exceed the value of R15 million467) can be seen as the estate duty 
calculated in the personal estate scenarios of Comparisons 3a and 3b is higher than that 
                                                     
467 See case study parameters selected in Table 5 in chapter 5.1.10. 
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calculated for the scenario in Comparison 2 (where a single estate duty rate of 20% 
applies). 
Year 50: As was discussed with regard to the cumulative total tax chart in the previous set 
of results, the exit event in Year 50 will attract more CGT in scenarios where the capital 
value achieved at the end of that year was greater. It can therefore be seen that the extent 
of the increase in cumulative CGT in that year is lower for the personal estate scenarios 
than for the trust scenarios where higher capital values have been achieved. The CGT due 
as a result of the exit from the trust scenario in Comparison 2 will be further elevated due 
to the trusts’ high capital gains inclusion rate. 
Conclusion 
Even when income tax is stripped out from cumulative taxes, as was done in this part of 
the analysis, it can still be concluded that, for the given set of scenarios, no large 
additional amounts of taxes will be collected over a 50 year time period through the 
implementation of the various recommendations. The timing of the taxable events will, 
however, be affected by the recommendations and such events will now occur a couple of 
years earlier than what is the case under current legislation. This is seen in the trust 
scenario of Comparison 3b and the personal estate scenarios of Comparisons 2, 3a and 3b. 
The potential therefore exists for wealth to be taxed earlier and more regularly, potentially 
on the death of the founder or owner as well as on the death of the surviving spouse. In 
high-net-worth estates and trusts, this would occur regardless of the large increases in the s 
4A estate duty abatement being proposed as can be seen in the personal estate scenarios of 
Comparisons 2, 3a and 3b where these increased abatement amounts have been applied. 
6.1.3 Capital value 
The following chart represents the capital value of the investment asset over the course of 
each scenario for all 4 comparisons. 
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Figure 3 – Capital value 
 
Discussion 
The potential punitive effect of the DTC’s First Report’s recommendations and the repeal 
of the s 4(q) deduction for inter-spousal bequests can clearly be seen in this chart. The 
end-values of the accumulated wealth in the scenarios differ vastly from about R140 
million in the case of holding the assets in certain personal estate scenarios (Comparisons 
2, 3a and 3b) to about R300 million when holding such assets in certain trust scenarios 
(Comparisons 1 and 3a).  
In this case study, holding the assets in a personal estate under the proposed estate duty 
legislation results in a reduction of the eventual wealth to more than half of what it would 
have been had the assets been kept in a trust under current legislation. Even if the 2016 
Budget Review suggestions are implemented, whereby the trust assets are regarded as 
deemed property in the estate of the founder on death (Comparison 3b), it will still be 
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more beneficial from a capital appreciation point of view to hold the assets in a trust 
instead. The recommendations are therefore not likely to result in more taxpayers opting to 
hold assets in their personal estates but could rather result in the opposite, of more 
taxpayers embracing estate planning opportunities with trusts, especially where high estate 
values are involved. 
Note that, if no exit event occurred in Year 50, the capital value at the end of that year 
would have been allowed to grow at the same increasing slope seen in each line graph 
prior to Year 49. Therefore the actual reduction of capital that occurred in Year 50 will be 
greater than what is apparent from each line graph. As the exit event is deemed to occur on 
the last day of Year 50, the taxation related to this event was calculated using the end-
value of the capital in Year 50, that is, after capital growth has been taken into account for 
that year (less applicable income taxes paid on income generated by the capital value as at 
the beginning of that year). This also applies to all other years in which a major tax event 
occurred. 
As can clearly be seen in this chart, the capital growth achieved over time by the 
remaining capital value will partly recover the capital lost due to taxes but as the growth 
occurs off a lower base, the capital value will forever be at a comparatively diminished 
value. 
Comparisons 1 and 3a: As it is assumed that the trust capital invested at inception of the 
trust is unaffected by the taxes paid by the founder on initial transfer (that is, CGT and 
donations tax in the case of Comparison 3a), the capital value achieved in the baseline 
trust scenario in Comparison 1 is nearly the same as that achieved in Comparison 3a. The 
capital end-value for the trust scenario of Comparison 1 will be slightly less due to the 
relatively small amount of estate duty paid from the cash reserves of the trust assets on the 
founder’s remaining loan account on his or her death in Year 30. 
Comparison 2: It is only in Comparison 2 (the DTC’s First Report’s recommendations) 
where the capital values in the trust scenario and the personal estate scenario are relatively 
close to each other at the end of the 50-year test period. This is mainly the result of the 
higher capital gains inclusion rate applicable to trusts which is used to calculate the CGT 
payable in the trust scenario of this comparison as a result of the exit event in Year 50. In 
all the other comparisons the capital end-value achieved in the trust scenario far exceeds 
that achievable in the personal estate scenario. 
Repeal of s 4(q): It can also be seen how the repeal of the s 4(q) deduction causes the 
capital value in the personal estate scenarios of Comparisons 2, 3a and 3b to be reduced 
for a second time in the space of 10 years on the death of the surviving spouse in Year 40. 
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In these scenarios, the value to which the capital is reduced in Year 40 is nearly the same 
lower capital value achieved in the year of the death of the founder or original owner in 
Year 30. Long-term wealth preservation will therefore be severely hampered in these 
cases by the fact that the capital value will have to recover from two major tax events in 
relatively quick succession of each other. This successive reduction may even result in a 
loss of capital in real terms468. 
Estates containing assets with lower starting values may be protected by the increased s 
4A abatements recommended but as soon as an estate’s value starts to significantly exceed 
the abatement amounts, the founder may deem it a better option to preserve the family 
wealth through the use of a trust structure. 
Comparison 3b: Even where trust assets are included as deemed property in the estate of 
the founder at his or her death, as seen in the trust scenario of Comparison 3b, the capital 
growth potential still far exceeds that of holding the assets in a personal estate where the 
assets could be subject to punitive successive estate duty payments on the death of both 
the founder and the surviving spouse. 
Conclusion 
The potential punitive effect of the repeal of the s 4(q) deduction for high-value estates is 
clearly indicated when comparing the effect of these recommendations on the capital value 
of the asset achieved over time in the various scenarios. It seems as if capital losses in real 
terms may be the result in certain cases which could further encourage high-net-worth 
individuals to make use of estate planning strategies and trusts structures. Estate values 
falling below the proposed increased s 4A abatements may however be protected from the 
effect of this proposal. Studying the effects of the various recommendations on such 
smaller estate values falls outside the scope of this research report. 
Some of the taxation proposals with regard to trusts could also result in decreased trust 
capital values over a period of time as a result of taxes levied at the major tax events and 
deemed to be paid from cash reserves forming part of the total investment asset held in the 
trust. 
                                                     
468 In the assumptions used in the case studies, the capital value in the personal estate scenarios of 
Comparison 3a and 3b is only about R8 million more at the end of Year 40 (R69 million) than what 
it was at the end of Year 30 (R61 million) (Refer Table 46 in Annexure chapter 9.3.4). Doing a 
time-value of money calculation (PV = 61, FV = -69, N = 10, I = ?) this amounts to an effective 
annual capital growth over this 10-year period of just 1.2% per year. With inflation assumed at 6% 
per annum, this would constitute a loss in real terms of 4.8% per annum. 
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6.1.4 Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value 
The following chart represents the cumulative total tax (presented in Figure 1) as a 
percentage of the capital value in each scenario as presented in Figure 3 above for each 
scenario in all 4 comparisons. 
Figure 4 – Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value 
 
Discussion 
This chart shows total cumulative taxes paid to date in any given year as a percentage of 
the capital or estate value at the end of that year. The sudden increases seen in this 
parameter in the year of a major tax event will be due to both the taxes (CGT or estate 
duty) calculated in that year based on the capital value at the end of that year (prior to the 
reduction of capital as a result of such taxes) and the decreased capital value at the end of 
that year after such taxes have been deducted. In the years following a major tax event, 
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this parameter will steadily decrease as the denominator (capital value) increases due to 
annual capital growth (net of income taxes and withdrawals).  
Also note the slight concave shape of the line graphs which coincides with the 
commencement of retirement withdrawals in Year 21. This is an effect which was not as 
visually apparent in earlier charts. The retirement withdrawals (which increase with 
inflation each year) will reduce the capital value more rapidly in each successive year and 
the decreasing capital value (as the denominator of this parameter) will result in a slightly 
increasing slope in the years immediately following the commencement of retirement 
withdrawals (from Year 21).  
If the capital value starts to decrease below the cumulative tax amounts paid to date, the 
slope will increase until the capital has been fully depleted. Due to the high starting values 
for the asset base selected together with relatively small retirement withdrawal amounts, 
this effect will not be seen using the selected parameters. If these parameters are adjusted 
(for instance, a lower starting value of the assets held and/or an increased annual 
retirement withdrawal amount) such effects will, however, appear. Studying the 
differences in the end-results for different starting parameters falls outside the scope of 
this research report. 
For the most part, all the trust scenarios follow a similar pattern with marked increases in 
this parameter in the years when the trust is restructured (Year 35), when the final amount 
of assets is distributed on the death of the surviving spouse (Year 40) and as a result of the 
exit event (Year 50). 
Comparison 3a (Trust): The line graph for the trust scenario in Comparison 3a differs 
from that of the other trust scenarios in that it has a higher starting value due to the upfront 
donations tax paid upon transfer of the assets to the trust. As the growth in the capital 
value starts to overshadow this upfront payment, the parameter converges nearly 
completely with that of the trust scenario of Comparison 1 over time. As a result, the 
overall cumulative taxes paid calculated as a percentage of the remaining capital value 
rarely exceeds the maximum income tax margin of individuals (41%) which therefore 
seems to be a reasonable outcome. 
Comparison 3b (Trust): Comparison 3b also differs from the rest of the trust scenarios 
due to the impact of estate duty due on the death of the founder in Year 30 in addition to 
the events in other years. As the assets remain in the trust and subject to the conduit 
principle, it can be seen that this parameter does recover somewhat over time as increased 
capital growth is achieved. 
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Comparison 2 (Trust): The impact of the repeal of the conduit principle tested in 
Comparison 2 can be clearly seen in the line graph depicting the trust scenario. The annual 
income taxes are higher than those of the other trust scenarios throughout the test period 
and the effect this has on the parameter in years when major tax events occur is much 
more pronounced than what is seen in the other trust scenarios. As a result of the high 
capital gains inclusion rate in the trust, the exit event in Year 50 causes the parameter in 
the trust scenario to end up at a value that is very close to that of the personal estate 
scenario used in this comparison set. This is the only comparison in which this is the case, 
with the end-result of all the other trust scenarios being more beneficial than their personal 
estate scenario counterparts by a much larger margin. 
Personal estate scenarios: Of concern is the level to which the cumulative taxes as a 
percentage of capital value increases for the personal estate scenarios where the repeal of 
the s 4(q) deduction was applied. The cumulative taxes paid as a percentage of the 
remaining capital value, calculated in the year that the surviving spouse dies, exceeds the 
value of the remaining capital at that time by about 20% to 30% of such capital value. This 
means that the overall taxes paid on an asset at that point in time will exceed the value of 
the remaining capital by a wide margin. Even though some recovery will occur as the 
remaining capital is allowed to grow over the years following the death of the surviving 
spouse, it is likely that more than one decade of capital growth will be required before a 
better balance between the cumulative taxes paid and the capital value can be obtained. 
Conclusion 
The parameter discussed in this section includes income taxes as well as CGT and estate 
duty (and donations tax where applicable) as a percentage of the remaining capital value 
of an investment asset. Even though these taxes include more than just the capital taxes it 
will give an indication of any unintended consequences of the DTC’s various proposals as 
the Committee’s reasons for the repeal of the conduit principle in the First Report, for 
instance, was to compensate the Receiver for any perceived losses in estate duty as a result 
of the use of such trust and inheritance structures469. It was therefore deemed necessary to 
include overall taxes in the analysis and not only capital or wealth taxes in order to get an 
understanding of the overall consequences of the various recommendations. 
The DTC’s First Report’s recommendations would have more than compensated for any 
estate duty loss per current legislation, that is, if comparing Comparison 2’s trust 
scenario’s final outcome to that of the personal estate scenario of the baseline Comparison 
                                                     
469 Davis Tax Committee 2015:44 
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1 (see Figure 1) but at the cost of depleting the remaining capital value markedly more 
(see Figure 3). Once again, the punitive effects of the repeal of the s 4(q) deduction was 
clearly demonstrated in the personal estate scenarios of Comparisons 2, 3a and 3b.  
6.1.5 Cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax as percentage of capital value 
The following chart represents all cumulative taxes except income tax (presented in Figure 
2) as a percentage of the capital value in each scenario as presented in Figure 3 above for 
each scenario in all 4 comparisons. Supplementary results will be presented in table format 
prior to the discussion below. 
Figure 5 – Cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax as percentage of capital value 
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Supplementary results 
This chart has a similar set of outcomes as seen in the discussion of the previous 
parameter’s results but excludes the effect of cumulative income taxes. An analysis of this 
parameter can be used to test whether these taxes will tend, over time, to materially exceed 
the maximum international benchmark for capital taxes of 15%, which was cited earlier470 
(shown as a dashed black line in the above chart). 
The sudden increases seen in this parameter in the year of a major tax event will be due to 
the combined effect of the capital taxes (CGT, estate duty or donations tax in the case of 
Comparison 3a) calculated in that year based on the capital value at the end of that year 
(prior to the reduction of capital as a result of such taxes) and the decreased capital value 
at the end of that year after such taxes have been deducted. In the years following a major 
tax event, this parameter will steadily decrease as the denominator (capital value) 
increases due to annual capital growth (net of income taxes and withdrawals). 
As this parameter will be evaluated against a benchmark it is important to note that the 
way that these parameters have been calculated and shown in the various line graphs will 
result in an elevated percentage in the year of the major tax event due to the simultaneous 
impact of the event on both the numerator and the denominator of the parameter in the 
same year. The data represented graphically in years following a major tax event will be 
unaffected by this effect as cumulative taxes will be calculated as a percentage of the new 
reduced capital value at each year end which will yield the same high values as seen on 
the line graphs in those years.  
The following table provides additional values not represented graphically which 
calculates the capital taxes as a percentage of the capital value at the end of each year 
before the deduction of such taxes from the capital value for each of the major tax event 
years. The values presented per scenario for each of the major tax events in the below 
table will therefore be lower than those represented graphically in Figure 5 for those 
scenarios but only in the years in which those tax events occur. All other values depicted 
in the above chart in all other years will remain unchanged for all scenarios. Values 
exceeding the 15% benchmark in the table below will be shown in red and table cells with 
progressively darker backgrounds depict progressively higher bands of values above the 
15% benchmark. 
                                                     
470 See discussion under chapter 4.3.3 
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Table 6 – CGT, estate duty and donations tax as percentage of year-end capital value before payment of tax 
Comparison and 
scenario 
Total CGT, estate duty and donations tax as percentage of 
year-end capital before payment of taxes 
Year 30:  
Founder 
dies 
Year 35: 
Trust 
restructured 
Year 40: 
Spouse dies 
Year 50: 
Sale of all 
assets 
Comparison 1 :       
Trust471 
1.47% 11.13% 13.73% 17.30% 
Comparison 1 : 
Personal estate472 
0% 0% 34.77% 33.33% 
Comparison 2:        
Trust473 
1.05% 20.38% 29.59% 36.42% 
Comparison 2:    
Personal estate474 
18.41% 16.94% 47.25% 41.88% 
Comparison 3a:      
Trust475 
2.95% 12.21% 14.59% 17.71% 
Comparison 3a: 
Personal estate476 
19.06% 17.68% 49.76% 44.67% 
Comparison 3b:     
Trust477 
24.02% 33.00% 31.21% 25.54% 
Comparison 3b: 
Personal estate478 
19.06% 17.68% 49.76% 44.67% 
 
Discussion 
All the trust scenarios’ line graphs exhibit a similar pattern of movements for the most 
part. The trust scenarios start with a slightly elevated level in Year 0 due to the CGT paid 
on the transfer of assets to the trust. As the growth in the capital value starts to 
overshadow this upfront CGT payment, the parameter will gradually reduce over time 
until the first major tax event occurs. The trust scenario in Comparison 3a has a higher 
                                                     
471 Refer Table 21in Annexure chapter 9.1.5 
472 Refer Table 26 in Annexure chapter 9.1.6 
473 Refer Table 38 in Annexure chapter 9.2.5 
474 Refer Table 43 in Annexure chapter 9.2.6 
475 Refer Table 55 in Annexure chapter 9.3.5 
476 Refer Table 60 in Annexure chapter 9.3.6 
477 Refer Table 72 in Annexure chapter 9.4.5 
478 Refer Table 77 in Annexure chapter 9.4.6 
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starting value due to the inclusion of both CGT and the upfront donations tax paid. 
Subsequently, the same gradual reduction due to the capital growth of the asset is seen in 
this line graph. 
The first major tax event occurring in most of the trust scenarios is the first restructuring 
of the trust in Year 35. The trust scenario in Comparison 3b will also have a major tax 
event in the year of the death of the founder (Year 30) due to estate duty paid as a result of 
the trust assets included as deemed property in the estate of the deceased founder. 
Comparison 1 (Trust): In the baseline comparison for trusts, the capital taxes hardly ever 
exceed the 15% benchmark and when this does occur (as a result of the exit event in Year 
50), the benchmark is not materially exceeded (cumulative capital taxes of 17.30% of the 
capital value prior to adjustments479). 
Comparison 3a (Trust): The results for this trust scenario is very similar to that seen in 
the baseline Comparison 1 apart from the effect of the upfront donations tax which sees 
this parameter nearing the 30% level at that time480, although it tapers off to below the 
15% benchmark in under a decade. Relative to the 50-year timeline, this may be seen as 
fairly reasonable overall, however, the forced upfront tax payment and resultant cash 
outflow required may act as a deterrent for some potential trust founders to create an inter 
vivos trust in the first place. 
Comparison 3b (Trust): This trust scenario sees the parameter reaching a level of 
24.02%481 in the year of the founder’s death due to estate duty, with a maximum level 
reached in Year 35 of 33.00%482 due to CGT paid as a result of the restructuring of the 
trust. The distribution of the remaining assets after the death of the surviving spouse in 
Year 40 also results in a smaller increase and then the value almost recovers to below the 
15% level over the next decade until the time of the exit event in Year 50 where it ends at 
25.54%483.  
The estate duty due on the death of the founder exceeds that which is due for the scenarios 
where the assets are held in the personal estate of the founder as the assets in the trust have 
been allowed to achieve growth at a greater effective rate due to the reduced effective tax 
rate that the trust income will enjoy over a longer period. This is a result of the application 
of the conduit principle to distributed trust income and splitting such income to multiple 
                                                     
479 Refer Table 6 above 
480 This value is unaffected as the donations tax and CGT paid in the Year 0 is not deemed to 
reduce the capital value transferred to the trust. 
481 Refer Table 6 above  
482 Refer Table 6 above 
483 Refer Table 6 above 
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beneficiaries to whom a lower effective tax rate may apply. As such, the estate value on 
which estate duty is calculated at the end of Year 30 in the trust scenario will be greater 
than the estate value held in personal estates at the end of that year (see also Figure 3 in 
this regard) resulting in a higher amount of estate duty payable in the trust scenario. 
Comparison 2 (Trust): As a result of the higher capital gains inclusion rate of trusts 
which will apply in this scenario where the conduit principle has been repealed, the CGT 
in Year 35 and 40 as a result of restructuring the trust or distributing the remainder of the 
trust assets from the original trust (Trust 1) to the beneficiaries, is roughly double that of 
the baseline trust scenario in Comparison 1. The maximum level of this parameter prior to 
the exit event reaches just under 30% in Year 40484, which is less than the maximum value 
seen in the trust scenario of Comparison 3b up to that point485. The exit event in Year 50, 
however, sees this value increase to 36.42%486 which far exceeds the maximum level in 
any of the other trust scenarios. 
Comparison 1 (Personal estate): The baseline personal estate scenario of Comparison 1 
shows that the combined estate duty and CGT paid on the death of the surviving spouse 
equals 34.77% of the asset value at year-end prior to the payment of such taxes from the 
capital value487. This value shoots up to just below 50% in the following year as a result of 
the reduced capital value (see data point in Year 41 of this personal estate scenario’s line 
graph).  
Comparisons 2, 3a and 3b (Personal estate): The maximum level reached for these 
scenarios in the year of the death of the surviving spouse is 47.25% for Comparison 2 and 
49.76% for both Comparisons 3a and 3b.488 The values for Comparisons 3a and 3b are 
slightly higher than for those for Comparison 2 due to the increased estate duty rate of 
25% assumed to apply to so much of the dutiable estate value as exceeds R15 million489. 
Conclusion 
The recommendations tested in Comparisons 2, 3a and 3b which affect the personal estate 
scenarios resulted in cumulative capital taxes as a percentage of the capital value to 
materially exceed the international benchmark of 15%490 with maximum values occurring 
                                                     
484 Refer Table 6 above 
485 For the trust scenario of Comparison 3b, the maximum value occurs in Year 35 which is 
calculated as 33.00%% per Table 6 above. 
486 Refer Table 6 above 
487 Refer Table 6 above 
488 Refer Table 6 above 
489 See case study parameters selected in Table 5 in chapter 5.1.10. 
490 See discussion under chapter 4.3.3 
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in the years of taxable events reaching percentages in the high forties (nearly 50%)491. It is 
therefore likely for the implementation of such recommendations to result in extensive 
planning and significant avoidance and evasion, which may in turn reduce the effective 
yield492. 
The maximum values reached for cumulative capital tax as a percentage of capital 
resulting from the recommendations with regard to trusts in Comparisons 2 and 3b went 
up to percentages in the mid-thirties493 which are still more than double that of the 15% 
benchmark. The recommendations for the tax treatment of trusts tested in Comparison 3a 
only reached a maximum at the end of the scenario of under 20%494. The upfront 
donations tax payable in this scenario, however, resulted in a value of nearly 30% in Year 
0495 although this value decreased below the 15% benchmark in under a decade due the 
capital growth achieved in the trust.  
The results from these case studies with their selected starting parameters and events 
therefore seem to indicate that the bulk of the various recommendations with regard to 
both personal estates and trusts are likely to result in extensive planning and significant 
avoidance and evasion to occur in the case of high-net-worth estates or trusts. This may 
include drastic steps like tax and exchange control emigration which may result in a 
withdrawal of a significant amount of South African-held investments by private 
individuals.  
6.1.6 Difference between personal estate and trust scenarios: Cumulative total tax as 
percentage of capital value 
The following chart represents, per comparison, the cumulative total tax as percentage of 
capital value as presented in Figure 4 for each personal estate scenario less that of the trust 
scenario. A positive result will indicate when more total tax per capital value is paid for 
assets held in a personal estate (that is, a trust would have given better results) whereas a 
negative value indicates when more tax per capital value is paid in a trust (in other words, 
holding assets in a personal estate would have been preferred from a total tax per capital 
value perspective). 
                                                     
491 Refer Table 6 above 
492 See discussion under chapter 4.3.3 
493 Refer Table 6 above 
494 Refer Table 6 above 
495 See Figure 5 above 
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Figure 6 – Difference in cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value between personal estate and trust 
 
Discussion 
In addition to the major tax events indicated in all the previous charts, the above chart also 
shows the years in which the trust scenario first becomes more beneficial, from a total tax 
per capital value point of view, than the personal estate scenario (indicated as crossover 
points). Note that these results will be applicable to high-net-worth trust and personal 
estate situations. Estate values which may be protected by the increased s 4A estate duty 
abatements proposed will display different results than those seen in the chart above. The 
analysis of such estates, however, falls outside the scope of this study. 
Comparison 1: In the baseline comparison, the trust’s total tax per capital value ratio is 
marginally better than that of the personal estate from Year 5 onwards and only the major 
restructuring of trust assets (Year 35) causes the trust scenario’s ratio to be worse than the 
personal estate’s due to the CGT paid on restructuring which would only have been 
payable in the trust scenario. In the year of the death of the surviving spouse, this situation 
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is drastically reversed as a result of the estate duty and CGT paid in the personal estate 
scenario after which the trust scenario remains markedly more beneficial from a total tax 
per capital value point of view, regardless of the exit event in Year 50. 
Comparison 2: In the comparison between trusts and personal estates where the DTC’s 
First Report’s recommendations are applied, the personal estate scenario’s total tax per 
capital value ratio remains marginally more beneficial than that of the trust during the full 
lifetime of the founder due to the repeal of the conduit principle and the flat rate of 41% at 
which all income will be taxed in the trust. Only on the death of the founder (Year 30), as 
a result of the repeal of the s 4(q) deduction, does the personal estate scenario’s total tax 
per capital ratio become significantly more than that of the trust scenario. This is 
temporarily reversed in the year that the trust assets are restructured (Year 35) only to 
swing strongly in favour of the trust once again on the death of the surviving spouse in 
Year 40. This comparison is the only one in which the exit event in Year 50 has a drastic 
effect on difference between the scenarios’ ratios and where the personal estate scenario 
becomes marginally more beneficial. This is due to the high CGT inclusion rate in trusts 
which is applicable to the calculation of the exit tax due in the trust scenario of this 
comparison. 
Comparison 3a: Due to the upfront donations tax paid, the total tax per capital value ratio 
only becomes more beneficial in the trust scenario from Year 16 onwards (compared to 
Year 5 in Comparisons 1 and 3b). After this year, however, the recommendations with 
regard to the repeal of the s 4(q) deductions keep the trust in a better position than the 
personal estate from a total tax per capital value without any exceptions. Even the CGT 
due on the initial restructuring of the trust in Year 35 does not reverse this situation in 
favour of the personal estate (as had happened in Comparisons 1, 2 and 3b). 
Comparison 3b: Even though the trust’s total tax per capital ratio starts to exceed the 
personal estate’s ratio from Year 5 onwards, the estate duty on the death of the founder (as 
a result of the inclusion of all trust assets as deemed property in the estate of the deceased 
founder) will result in the personal estate and trust scenarios to be almost on a par (Year 
30), with the personal estate being more preferential by a very small margin. In the year of 
the trust restructuring (Year 35), the personal estate’s ratio will be better than that of the 
trust in a more pronounced way. The death of the surviving spouse in Year 40, however, 
will swing the difference in ratios decidedly back in favour of the trust again where it is 
likely to remain for several years to follow.  
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Conclusion 
Even though some of the recommendations will result in the total tax per capital ratio for 
high-net-worth assets held in a personal estate to be slightly better than that in a trust for 
short periods of time, the estate duty that will be due on the death of the surviving spouse, 
together with the repeal of the s 4(q) deduction will still make a trust more preferential by 
a large margin in all the comparison case studies. Only the recommendations of the DTC’s 
First Report would have made the exit from a trust extremely costly from a total tax per 
capital value point of view compared to selling all assets held in a personal estate (as seen 
in Year 50).  
6.1.7 Difference between personal estate and trust scenarios: Cumulative CGT, estate duty 
and donations tax as percentage of capital value 
The following chart represents, per comparison, the cumulative total capital taxes (that is, 
all taxes excluding cumulative income taxes) as percentage of capital value as presented in 
Figure 5 for each personal estate scenario less that of the trust scenario. A positive result 
will indicate when more total capital taxes per capital value is paid for assets held in a 
personal estate (that is, a trust would have given better results) whereas a negative value 
indicates when more capital taxes per capital value is paid in a trust (in other words, 
holding assets in a personal estate would have been preferred from a total CGT, estate 
duty and donations tax per capital value perspective).  
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Figure 7 – Difference in cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax as percentage of capital value 
between personal estate and trust 
 
Discussion 
This comparison, using cumulative CGT, estate duty and donations tax per capital value 
only, looks similar to that seen in the previous chart which included all cumulative taxes 
per capital value but due to the absence of cumulative income taxes in the above chart, 
which could make up differences in the tax per capital value ratio over a period of time, 
this chart shows all comparisons as being in favour of the personal estate until a major 
estate duty payment is due, in which case the total tax per capital ratio shifts significantly 
in favour of the trust. 
Comparison 1: The baseline comparison only moves in favour of the trust on the death of 
the surviving spouse in Year 40 and the CGT due as a result of the restructuring in Year 
35 will result in the trust scenario temporarily being markedly worse off than the personal 
estate.  
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Comparison 2: As a result of the proposed repeal of the s 4(q) deduction, this comparison 
will move in favour of the trust scenario in the year of the founder’s death (Year 30) 
already. The high capital gains inclusion rate applicable in the trust as a result of the repeal 
of the conduit principle will result in the trust restructuring in Year 35 turning the 
advantage back to the personal estate but the estate duty and CGT due on the death of the 
surviving spouse in Year 40 will swing the comparison significantly back in favour of the 
trust scenario. The exit event in Year 50 will set the comparison back to a neutral position 
once more due to the high CGT payable in the trust scenario. 
Comparison 3a: Apart from the effect of the initial donations tax paid, this comparison 
will turn in favour of the trust in the year of death of the founder (Year 30) as a result of 
the abovementioned estate duty recommendations and remain as such until the end of the 
case study’s timeline. 
Comparison 3b: Even though the repeal of the s 4(q) deduction will result in estate duty 
payable in the year of death of the founder (Year 30), the trust asset value will be higher 
than the asset value held in the personal estate in that year due to the reduced effective tax 
rate enjoyed in the trust up to that point compared to the higher effective tax rate which 
will be applicable to the asset held in a personal estate. As the trust assets are deemed to 
be included in the founder’s estate, more estate duty will be payable on this higher trust 
asset base than on the lower asset base achieved in the personal estate. Having held the 
assets in a trust will therefore result in the trust scenario being worse off than the personal 
estate scenario in Year 30. The restructuring of the trust in Year 35 will result in a further 
swing in favour of personal estates and only on the death of the surviving spouse in Year 
40 will the trust be preferred. 
Conclusion 
The estate duty recommendations tested in Comparison 2, 3a and 3b will result in most 
comparisons being better off in the trust than in the personal estate in the year in which the 
founder dies with the exception of Comparison 3b where the deemed property inclusion of 
trust assets in the estate of the founder at his or her death in Year 30 will result in the trust 
being worse off in that year. Regardless of the effect of the restructuring of the trust in 
Year 35, from Year 40 onwards, the effect of estate duty and CGT due on the death of the 
surviving spouse will swing all the comparisons back in favour of the trust. Only 
Comparison 2’s trust exit event in Year 50 will have the effect of neutralising all the 
relative tax benefits that have been achieved from the use of a trust up to that year. 
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6.1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the results of the case studies which did comparisons of seven 
different parameters for each of the given case studies, where each case study consisted of 
both a trust and a personal estate scenario. The punitive effect of the repeal of the s 4(q) 
estate duty deduction for inter-spousal bequests was clearly demonstrated in several 
instances (when looking at both the negative effect on the ability to preserve capital as 
well as the successive taxation of essentially the same asset base). Several of the new 
proposals resulted in effective capital tax rates far in excess of the deemed maximum 
capital tax benchmark of 15% which may result in more aggressive estate planning 
strategies being employed should such proposals be enacted. It was also shown that 
transferring assets to a trust will only result in a marginal tax advantage for the largest part 
of the duration of the trust compared to keeping such assets in a personal estate. It is only 
on the death of the founder and the surviving spouse that the trust will become markedly 
more advantageous with regard to the ability to preserve capital for future generations. 
The case studies focused on the effect of the various recommendations by the DTC and 
the changes announced in the 2016 Budget Review on high-net-worth trusts and personal 
estates to analyse the worst-case effect of the different recommendations in such 
scenarios. The effect of the various recommendations on smaller estates, which may enjoy 
the protection of the increased s 4A abatements proposed, was not tested as this falls 
outside the scope of this research report. 
6.2 High-level estimate of CGT payable on death – considering the possible 
double taxation effect of estate duty and CGT on death 
The below paragraphs explain the basis and assumptions used to arrive at a possible high-
level estimate of the CGT payable on death to provide an indication of a possible double 
taxation effect of estate duty and CGT on death. The estimate is calculated using these 
assumptions and is followed by a discussion of the results and possible limitations to the 
methodology used. 
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6.2.1 Assumptions used 
In the DTC’s First Report, reference is made to statistics furnished by SARS that only 4% 
of estates reported to SARS in 2013 were liable for CGT496. This low percentage is a result 
of the fact that most estates are made up of assets that are exempt from CGT due to 
specific exclusions and rollovers such as life insurance proceeds, retirement fund benefits, 
bequests to the surviving spouse497, small business assets498, primary residences499, cash500 
and personal-use assets501 which includes motor vehicles502.  
The DTC’s First Report also includes an analysis conducted by National Treasury of the 
effective tax rate on death503 which makes the assumption, based on the various exclusions 
for CGT available, that the worst-case scenario with regard to CGT is for 50% of the total 
estate being subject to CGT (other scenarios shown in the graphic analysis contained in 
the Report is one where 25% of the estate is subject to CGT and another where no CGT is 
payable by the estate). 
In another section of the DTC’s First Report a high-level breakdown is given of a sample 
of estates and estate duty collected in the 2013 tax year504. The sample covers 70% of 
estate duty collected in 2013505 which contains data related to 659 estates and accounts for 
R794 million estate duty collected506. The Report states that the total estate collected in the 
2013 tax year was R1,13 billion507 in which case the sample covers, if recalculated, 
70.18% of the total estate duty collected508. Per the 2013 Tax Statistics published by 
                                                     
496 Davis Tax Committee 2015:57. No reference is given in the DTC’s First Report to the specific 
data source from SARS therefore the information is assumed to be unpublished SARS statistics and 
it is furthermore assumed that the words ‘in 2013’ used in the Report refer to the 2013 tax year. 
497 Per para 40 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
498 Per para 57 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
499 Per paras 44-50 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
500 Cash or currency is specifically excluded from the definition of ‘asset’ in para 1 of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
501 Per para 53 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
502 Davis Tax Committee 2015:57 
503 Davis Tax Committee 2015:56-58. No reference is given in the Report to the specific data 
source from National Treasury therefore the information is assumed to be unpublished National 
Treasury material. 
504 Davis Tax Committee 2015:31,63 
505 The DTC’s First Report states that the total estate collected in the 2013 tax year was R1,13 
billion (Davis Tax Committee 2015:31) in which case the sample covers, if recalculated, 70.18% of 
the total estate value collected. Per the 2013 Tax Statistics published by National Treasury and 
SARS, however, the total estate duty collections for that tax year were given as R1,013 billion 
(Department of National Treasury & SARS 2013:24). If this is taken as correct, the sample total as 
percentage of total estate duty collections would equal 794 / 1013 = 78.38%. This will affect the 
results marginally. 
506 Davis Tax Committee 2015:31 
507 Davis Tax Committee 2015:31 
508 Calculated as the sample total per Table 7 of R794 million as a percentage of R1,13 billion, that 
is, 794 / 1130 x 100 = 70.18%. 
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National Treasury and SARS, however, the total estate duty collections for that tax year 
were given as R1,013 billion509. If this is taken as correct, the sample total would represent 
78.38% of the total estate duty collections in the 2013 tax year510 and not 70% as stated in 
the Report. The value to be used for the purpose of the assumptions below will therefore 
be 78% (rounded down to simplify calculations). 
The estate duty sample data contained in Table 2511 (and again in Table 6512) of the DTC’s 
First Report is partially replicated in the table below: 
Table 7 – SARS statistics regarding sample of estate duty collected in 2013 tax year covering 70% of estate 
duty collected 
Estate value Estates by number 
Estate duty collected 
(R million) 
Less than R10 million 547 158 
R10 million to R20 million 69 145 
R20 million to R30 million 17 73 
Above R30 million 26 418 
Total 659 794 
 
As the above data is given in a very high-level format only, one approach of determining a 
very rough estimate of CGT collected on death based on the 2013 numbers and estimates 
given by SARS in various parts of the DTC’s First Report could be done based on the 
following set of assumptions: 
1. Firstly it is assumed that the 78% estate duty sample is distributed 
proportionally across the four broad bands of estate values given in the 
Report. 
2. A further assumption following from the first is that both the number of 
estates and the amount of estate duty collected given in the above sample 
equal 78% of the total number of estates which paid estate duty and the 
total amount of estate duty collected respectively513.  
                                                     
509 Department of National Treasury & SARS 2013:24 
510 Calculated as the sample total per Table 7 of R794 million as a percentage of R1,013 billion, 
that is, 794 / 1013 x 100 = 78.38%. 
511 Davis Tax Committee 2015:31 
512 Davis Tax Committee 2015:63 
513 Per the wording used in the DTC’s First Report’s Report, the sample reflects a certain 
percentage of the estate duty collected in the 2013 tax year therefore the sample specifically relates 
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3. A third assumption is that the 4% of estates reported to SARS in 2013 that 
were liable for CGT514 are equally distributed across the four broad bands 
of estate values given in the above tables515.  
4. A fourth assumption is that the average estate values for each of the first 
three estate value bands are calculated as the midpoint of the range of 
estate values516 and for the fourth estate value band (estates above R30 
million in value) an average of R80 million will be selected517.  
5. The fifth assumption is that the net estate value calculated as property and 
deemed property less allowable deductions (which includes liabilities and 
bequests to the surviving spouse) is a good proxy for the total possible 
capital gain of an estate518 and that the three options for the percentage of 
an estate’s value subject to CGT as used in the National Treasury analysis 
in the Report (that is, 0%, 25% and 50%) multiplied by the net estate value 
                                                     
to the amount of estate duty collected and not necessarily to the number of estates from which such 
estate duty was collected. As no additional information is provided in the Report, the assumption 
made for the purpose of calculating the above rough estimate of CGT collected, is that the sample 
was taken proportionally across the four estate value bands and that the number of estates covered 
by the sample is also equal to or nearly equal to 78% of all estates from which estate duty was 
collected in the 2013 tax year. 
514 Davis Tax Committee 2015:57. No reference is given in the Report to the specific data source 
from SARS therefore the information is assumed to be unpublished SARS statistics and it is 
furthermore assumed that the words ‘in 2013’ used in the Report refer to the 2013 tax year. 
515 This assumption is deemed reasonable as the 4% number is a result of the type of assets held in 
the estates (for instance, CGT exempt assets and assets subject to rollovers) and not necessarily a 
function of the value of the estates. Wealthier deceased estates are also more likely to have been 
subject to estate planning where the use of trusts and other mechanisms may be in place in order to 
avoid excessive CGT being due on death. 
516 It may be more likely that the estate values in each of the first three bands, especially the first 
one (less than R10 million) has a different distribution which would affect the average estate value 
but with no detailed information available, the above assumption is deemed to be the only 
reasonable one to make. 
517 Even though the estate duty is calculated as 20% of the dutiable estate, the effective estate duty 
rate for net estate values of R35 million equals about 18.00% (taking a R3.5 million rebate into 
account as follows: [(35 – 3.5) x 20%]/35), for a net estate value of R70 million the effective estate 
duty rate equals about 19.00% and at R140 million the effective estate duty rate equals about 
19.50%. Using the statistics provided in the DTC’s First Report that the 26 estates in the sample 
with values above R30 million contributed R418 million to estate duty in 2013 (Davis Tax 
Committee 2015:31 at Table 2), the average estate duty paid per estate in this band amounted to 
418 / 26 which equals just over R16 million. Assuming an average effective estate duty rate of 
19%, the average estate value equals about R84.6 million (16 x 100 / 19). Making the reasonable 
assumption that the number of higher value estates are likely to be much less than the number of 
lower value estates in this top band, which would tend to lower the average estate value in this 
band, this value is rounded down to the nearest tens of millions to R80 million to be used as the 
average estate value related to this band. 
518 It is therefore assumed that the base cost of assets subject to CGT on death is very low compared 
to the market value on death (for example, a holiday residence purchased several years prior to the 
death of the taxpayer) so that the capital gain, which is calculated as proceeds less base cost, closely 
approximates the net estate value or market value of the asset. 
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is in turn a good proxy for the non-exempt capital gain of each deceased 
estate519. 
6. The final assumption is that the marginal tax rate of taxpayers in their year 
of death was 40%, which is the maximum marginal tax rate applicable in 
the personal income tax tables for the 2013 tax year520. The effective 
capital gains tax rate therefore equals the capital gains inclusion 
percentage for individuals applicable in the 2013 tax year521 times the 
maximum marginal tax rate, that is 33.3% x 40% = 13.32%522. 
6.2.2 Results and discussion 
Based on the above assumptions, the estimated number of estates subject to CGT and total 
estate values in 2013 are calculated as follows: 
Table 8 – Estimated number of estates and estate values per 2013 statistics and based on stated assumptions 
Estate value 
bands 
A: 
 
Extrapolated 
number of estates 
based on 
assumption #2 
Estates in sample times 
100/78 rounded to 
nearest estate 
 
B: 
 
Number of estates 
subject to CGT 
based on 
assumption #3 
Extrapolated number of 
estates times 4% 
rounded to nearest 10th 
of an estate 
C: 
 
Estimated average 
estate value in 
band based on 
assumption #4 
(R million) 
 
 
Less than R10 
million 
701 28.0 5 
R10 million to 
R20 million 
88 3.5 15 
                                                     
519 Assets that are exempt from CGT include life insurance proceeds, retirement fund benefits, 
bequests to the surviving spouse, small business assets, primary residences, cash and personal-use 
assets which includes motor vehicles. Examples of non-exempt assets could therefore be share 
portfolios held personally, second homes or holiday homes and other immovable property, other 
assets not deemed personal-use assets or not subject to any rollovers, among others. 
520 Per para 1 of Appendix I to the Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendment of Revenue Laws 
Act 2012 in respect of any year of assessment commencing on 1 March 2012. 
521 Per s 9(1)(a) of the Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendment of Revenue Laws Act 2012 
which amended para 10 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, deemed to have come into 
operation on 1 March 2012. 
522 The capital gains inclusion rate applicable to individuals in the 2013 tax year was still 33.3%. 
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Estate value 
bands 
A: 
 
Extrapolated 
number of estates 
based on 
assumption #2 
Estates in sample times 
100/78 rounded to 
nearest estate 
 
B: 
 
Number of estates 
subject to CGT 
based on 
assumption #3 
Extrapolated number of 
estates times 4% 
rounded to nearest 10th 
of an estate 
C: 
 
Estimated average 
estate value in 
band based on 
assumption #4 
(R million) 
 
 
R20 million to 
R30 million 
22 0.9 25 
Above R30 million 33 1.3 80 
Total 844 33.7 - 
 
As a reasonability test, the number of reported deaths in South Africa in 2012523 was a 
total of 480 476524 compared to the estimated population size of South Africa in the same 
year of 52,27 million525. Therefore it seems that only an estimated 0.18% of all deaths in 
South Africa526 resulted in any estate duty being payable.  
This may be indicative of the high inequality in South Africa as discussed elsewhere in 
this report527 together with estate planning which often occurs in the case of high-net-
worth individuals thereby further reducing the number of estates where estate duty is due.  
The estimated total CGT payable in the two scenarios where 50% and 25% of an estate 
was subject to CGT is calculated in the table below. 
                                                     
523 As the 2013 tax year runs from 1 March 2012 to 28 February 2013, the number of deaths in the 
2012 calendar year was deemed to be the appropriate period to use in the reasonability test. 
524 Statistics South Africa 2012:13 
525 Statistics South Africa 2013:2.1 (Even though this publication is with regard to the 2013 
calendar year, it contained historical data for the 2012 calendar year which is reflected in the text 
above). 
526 Calculated as the total extrapolated number of estates subject to estate duty in 2013 as estimated 
in Table 8 divided by total number of deaths in the 2012 calendar year, that is 844 / 480 476 x 100. 
527 See discussion under chapter 4.1 
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Table 9 – Estimated total CGT payable by estates in 2013 for the two scenarios where either 50% or 25% of 
the estate was subject to CGT 
Estate value bands 
Total CGT payable 
where 50% of estate 
value is subject to CGT 
based on assumptions #5 
and #6  
(R million) 
Column B of Table 8 x Column 
C of Table 8 x 50% x 13.32% 
Total CGT payable 
where 25% of estate 
value is subject to CGT 
based on assumptions #5 
and #6  
(R million) 
Column B of Table 8 x Column 
C of Table 8 x 25% x 13.32% 
Less than R10 million 9.32 4.66 
R10 million to R20 million 3.50 1.75 
R20 million to R30 million 1.50 0.75 
Above R30 million 6.93 3.46 
Total 21.25 10.62 
 
If the above assumptions are able to provide a reasonable estimate of total CGT paid on 
death by taxpayers amounting to somewhere between R10,62 million and R21,25 million, 
then compared to the total amount of CGT paid by individuals in the 2012/13 tax year of 
just over R2 billion528, CGT due on death only made up a maximum of 0.98% of total 
CGT collected from individuals in that year529. 
Based on the fact that total revenue collected in the 2012/13 tax year amounted to R813,8 
billion530 and accepting that the above assumptions are able to provide a reasonable 
estimate of CGT paid on death then an estimated maximum of only 0.003% of total 
revenue collected in 2012/13 can be ascribed to CGT that was paid on death531.  
As total estate duty collected in 2012/13 was R1,013 billion532 which equals 0.14% of total 
revenue collected533 it seems as if the perceived double taxation effect due to both estate 
duty and CGT being payable on death may not be that excessive in reality. 
                                                     
528 CGT collected from individuals in the 2012/13 tax year came to R2 166 million (Department of 
National Treasury & SARS 2014:224). 
529 Calculated as 21.25 / 2166 x 100. 
530 Department of National Treasury & SARS 2013:5 
531 Calculated as 21.25 / 813 800 x 100. 
532 Department of National Treasury & SARS 2013:24 
533 Calculated as 1.103 / 813.8 x 100. 
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Even with the newly announced increase in the capital gains inclusion rate for individuals 
of 40%534 (up from the previous 33.3% inclusion) which would result in a maximum 
effective CGT rate of 40.0% x 41% = 16.40% (up from the previous 13.65%), the effect 
on the percentage of CGT paid on death of total revenue collected based on the above 
assumptions is likely to be small. 
6.2.3 Possible limitations 
One possible limitation to the assumptions used above may be that there could be a far 
greater number of estates subject to CGT than those subject to estate duty (as recorded in 
Table 2535 and again in Table 6536 of the Report) as only the number of estates exceeding a 
net estate value of R3.5 million (or R7 million in cases where the portable abatement was 
used between spouses) may be reflected in those tables. As only the first R300,000 of 
capital gains are excluded in the year of death537, the number of estates with net values 
exceeding this amount that would be included in the estate value band with estate values 
less than R10 million may result in the total number of estates in this band being 
significantly more. This may have a substantial effect on the extrapolated number of 
estates reflected in column A of Table 8 for this band as well as on the average estate 
value used in column C of that table and therefore the calculation of the CGT attributable 
to this band (which currently makes up about 44% of the total CGT calculated using the 
stated assumptions538) may be substantially underestimated. 
It may, however, be concluded that the perceived double taxation will not occur in estates 
with net estate values of less than either R3.5 million or R7 million (where the portable 
abatement was used between spouses) as these estates would not have been subject to both 
estate duty and CGT but possibly only to CGT on certain assets. The above set of 
assumptions may therefore still be valid in order to indicate whether or not any double 
taxation occurs on estates that are subject to estate duty as well.  
With the proposed increases in the s 4A estate duty abatements (either R6 million or R15 
million539), it is likely that even less of the estates in the lower estate value bands will be 
                                                     
534 Department of National Treasury 2016a:50 
535 Davis Tax Committee 2015:31 
536 Davis Tax Committee 2015:63 
537 Per para 5(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
538 Per Table 9 using the scenario where 50% of the estate value is subject to CGT, the CGT 
payable from estates with values less than R10 million was estimated as R9.32 million whereas the 
total CGT for all estates was calculated as R21.25 million. Therefore 9.32 / 21.25 = 44% of the 
CGT calculated using the stated assumptions can be ascribed to estates with values less than R10 
million. 
539 See discussion under chapter 1.2 
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subject to both estate duty and CGT but possibly only to CGT (if the total capital gain 
exceeds the R300 000 exclusion in the year of death).  
6.2.4 Conclusion 
Certain high-level statistical information provided in the DTC’s First Report regarding 
estate duty collections together with assumptions used in a National Treasury analysis of 
the effective tax rate on death contained in the same Report was employed together with 
other high-level assumptions to reach an estimate of total CGT collected on death for the 
2012/13 tax year as this number is not separately available in the annual Tax Statistics. 
If the above assumptions hold then it seems as if the actual overall double taxation as a 
result of both CGT and estate duty being due on death with regard to a large sample of 
estates may be insignificant on average due to various roll-over relief and other exclusions 
that exist with regard to CGT. Any individual high-value estate may however experience 
some form of double taxation if it contains significant assets to which none of the CGT 
exemptions or rollovers apply which is why a case study approach may not have provided 
a satisfactory result in this case. 
The latest suggested increase in the estate duty abatement to R15 million540 may further 
reduce the incidence of perceived and actual double taxation as a result of both estate duty 
and CGT being due on the same assets.  
  
                                                     
540 Davis 2015 
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of research report content 
This research report set out to conduct case studies to compare the effect of various 
proposals by the Davis Tax Committee and the 2016 Budget Review with regard to estate 
duty and the taxation of trusts. In addition, a brief investigation was made to attempt to 
perform a high-level estimate of the possible double taxation due to CGT and estate duty 
on death based on high-level statistics and other data provided by the DTC in their First 
Interim Report on Estate Duty. This was done in the light of the DTC’s view in their First 
Report that CGT on death is not regarded as a wealth tax as well as the effect of the newly 
increased capital gains inclusion rates announced in the 2016 Budget Speech. 
The literature study section contained a review of inequality in South Africa by means of 
various indicators and a review of the Margo and Katz Commissions’ views on using a 
wealth tax to address inequality which was compared to the Davis Tax Committee’s 
submissions in this regard. The section continued with a review of benchmarks for estate 
duty as percentage of total tax collections, for estate duty rates and for a combined 
effective tax rate on death which concluded that a relevant benchmark for capital taxes is 
for such taxes to not materially exceed 15% in order to avoid significant avoidance and 
evasion and a resultant reduced effective tax yield. The possible double taxation effect of 
both estate duty and CGT levied on death was also considered. 
This section was followed by high-level summaries of the relevant aspects of estate duty, 
trust law and trust taxation and a discussion of the tax consequences of certain manners of 
taxpayers’ interactions with trusts. The literature study was concluded with a review of 
commentaries on the DTC’s First Report submitted by four professional bodies, namely 
FISA, SAIT, STEP and the LSSA. 
The methodology section set out the approach to be followed with the case studies and 
scenarios and contained an explanation of all starting parameters and assumptions used. 
The approach to be followed regarding the high-level estimate of total CGT paid on death 
based on data made available in the DTC’s First Interim Report on Estate Duty was also 
explained. 
The results section discussed the results of the case studies which did comparisons of 
seven different parameters in chart format for each of the given case studies, each case 
study consisting of both a trust and a personal estate scenario. The punitive effect of the 
repeal of the s 4(q) estate duty deduction for inter-spousal bequests was clearly 
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demonstrated in several instances (showing both the negative effect on the ability to 
preserve capital as well as the successive taxation of essentially the same asset base). 
Several of the new proposals resulted in effective capital tax rates far in excess of the 
deemed maximum capital tax benchmark of 15% which may result in more aggressive 
estate planning strategies being employed should such proposals be enacted. The case 
studies focused on the effect of the various estate duty and trust taxation recommendations 
on high-net-worth trusts and personal estates. The effect of the various recommendations 
on smaller estates, which may enjoy the protection of the increased s 4A estate duty 
abatements proposed, was not tested as this falls outside the scope of this research report. 
Such an analysis may possibly form the object of a follow-up study. 
The results for the high-level estimate of CGT paid on death was also discussed and it was 
concluded that, if the stated assumptions hold, that it seems as if the actual overall double 
taxation as a result of both CGT and estate duty being due on death with regard to a large 
sample of estates may be insignificant on average due to various roll-over relief and other 
exclusions that exist with regard to CGT. Any individual high-value estate may however 
experience some form of double taxation if it contains significant assets to which none of 
the CGT exemptions or rollovers apply which is why a case study approach may not have 
provided a satisfactory result in this case. 
The latest suggested increase in the estate duty abatement may further reduce the 
incidence of perceived and actual double taxation as a result of both estate duty and CGT 
being due on the same assets. 
7.2 Closing thoughts 
Even though a major limitation of this research report is the fact that the final 
recommendations of the Davis Tax Committee with regard to Estate Duty and other 
wealth taxes have not yet been published at the hand-in date of this report, the case study 
framework that was created can easily be reused to test the effect of the Committee’s final 
recommendations once they are announced. Once the final recommendations are made 
available, case studies at various levels of estate and trust values could also be performed 
to analyse the effect of the recommendations on smaller estates as well.  
The conclusion reached from the case studies performed in this report is that the various 
recommendations, as they currently stand, may not result in a reduction of aggressive 
estate planning strategies but that it may rather have the opposite effect, especially if high-
net-worth estates are involved. If, however, the intention is also to reduce excessive capital 
growth in order to help reduce the persistent high levels of overall inequality in South 
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Africa, as advocated by Thomas Piketty, then these recommendations may well help to 
achieve this. Taxpayers may, however, not take such an aggressive reduction of their 
capital wealth lying down. It will also be interesting to see how the final recommendations 
will affect resident beneficiaries of non-resident trusts. Although the use of non-resident 
trusts by South Africans fell outside the scope of this study, the case studies may also be 
expanded to test the effect of the recommendations on such scenarios. 
With regard to the contentious issue of possible double taxation on death as a result of 
both CGT and estate duty being due, it is hoped that SARS and the National Treasury will 
be able to provide a more detailed breakdown of the CGT collected in the annual Tax 
Statistics publications in future years which includes a breakdown of CGT paid on death 
as well. Based on the high-level statistical information provided in the DTC’s First Interim 
Report on Estate Duty and the study performed by National Treasury regarding the 
combined effective tax rate on death also included in this report it does seem as if some 
detailed information may already be available in this regard. If far-reaching changes to 
estate duty legislation and the taxation of trusts are going to be enacted in the future, then 
such statistical information will be useful to have for comparative purposes and to see if 
the enacted legislation does in fact succeed in increasing estate duty collections and in 
clamping down on excessive use of trust structures.  
Given the detail required to be provided in the new trust tax return forms (ITR12T) SARS 
may also already be in a position to integrate and analyse all the information collected in 
those forms in order to clamp down on trusts where clear abuses may be taking place or 
where not all distributed taxable income is given up in the tax returns of beneficiaries. 
There remains a number of legitimate non-tax reasons for the use of trusts and it is hoped 
that the eventual legislation enacted with regard to the tax treatment of trusts will not 
make it overly costly from a tax point of view to enter into such a structure where it is 
genuinely required to do so. 
Collections of estate duty is and will remain a very small component of overall revenue 
collections and as can be seen from the recently enacted increase in the capital gains 
inclusion rate for all entities, the Receiver may well opt for other means to increase their 
revenue collections from the wealthy which are easier to implement than an overhaul of 
long-established trust taxation and estate duty legislation.  
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9 Annexures 
The detailed data sets per trust and personal estate comparison case study will be set out in 
the annexures to follow. In order to ease the use of the detailed data sets, the same colour 
formatting as was used in the Results section will be followed for each comparison in this 
section (refer chapter 6.1). 
Each comparison’s chapter will start with the charts for each of the parameters, containing 
only the trust and personal estate scenario pertaining to that particular comparison case 
study. 
The charts will be followed by the detailed data sets, the summaries per scenario and all 
supporting schedules specific to the comparison’s trust and personal estate scenarios. The 
source of each data column or the manner of calculation thereof will be explained in the 
header fields of each schedule. Detailed explanations are given in the ‘Other taxes’ 
schedules for all assumptions made and the origin of values used in the calculation of 
CGT, donations tax (where applicable) and estate duty in a particular year. Each column in 
a schedule or data set is numbered alphabetically and this numbering is referred to in other 
schedules. 
Also refer the detail provided in the Methodology chapter (chapter 5) for explanations of 
certain starting parameter values selected and other assumptions made. 
Following the data sets related to each comparison’s set of scenarios, two schedules used 
by all scenarios in all comparisons will be provided, namely the Post-retirement 
withdrawal schedule and the Effective tax rate lookup tables.  
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9.1 Comparison 1 
9.1.1 Comparison 1 – Charts 
Figure 8 – Comparison 1 – Chart 1: Cumulative total taxation 
 
 
Figure 9 – Comparison 1 – Chart 2: Capital value 
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Figure 10 – Comparison 1 – Chart 3: Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value 
 
 
Figure 11 – Comparison 1 – Chart 4: Cumulative CGT and estate duty 
 
 
150 
Figure 12 – Comparison 1 – Chart 5: Cumulative CGT and estate duty as percentage of capital value 
 
 
Figure 13 – Comparison 1 – Chart 6: Difference: Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value 
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Figure 14 – Comparison 1 – Chart 7: Difference: Cumulative CGT and estate duty as percentage of capital 
value 
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9.1.2 Comparison 1 – Comparative data between trust and personal estate scenarios including difference data used in charts 
Table 10 – Comparison 1: Comparative and difference data sets 
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Table 10 (continued) 
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9.1.3 Comparison 1 – Trust scenario summary 
Table 11 – Comparison 1: Trust scenario summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155 
Table 11 (continued) 
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9.1.4 Comparison 1 – Personal estate scenario summary 
Table 12 – Comparison 1: Personal estate scenario summary 
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Table 12 (continued) 
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9.1.5 Comparison 1 – Trust scenario supporting schedules 
Table 13 – Comparison 1 (Trust scenario): Trust 1 capital value 
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Table 13 (continued) 
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Table 14 – Comparison 1 (Trust scenario): Trust 2a and 2b combined capital value 
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Table 14 (continued) 
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Table 15 – Comparison 1 (Trust scenario): Trust 1 income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
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Table 15 (continued) 
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Table 16 – Comparison 1 (Trust scenario): Trust 2a and 2b combined income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
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Table 16 (continued) 
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Table 17 – Comparison 1 (Trust scenario): Other taxes – CGT on transfers and disposals 
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Table 18 – Comparison 1 (Trust scenario): Other taxes – Taxes on death 
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Table 19 – Comparison 1 (Trust scenario): Trust 1 loan account – founder  
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Table 19 (continued) 
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Table 20 – Comparison 1 (Trust scenario): Trust 1 loan account – spouse 
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Table 20 (continued) 
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Table 21 – Comparison 1 (Trust scenario): Trust summary calculated using capital year-end values BEFORE year-end adjustments 
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Table 21 (continued) 
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9.1.6 Comparison 1 – Personal estate scenario supporting schedules 
Table 22 – Comparison 1 (Personal estate scenario): Capital value 
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Table 22 (continued) 
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Table 23 – Comparison 1 (Personal estate scenario): Income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
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Table 23 (continued) 
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Table 24 – Comparison 1 (Personal estate scenario): Other taxes – CGT on transfers and disposals 
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Table 25 – Comparison 1 (Personal estate scenario): Other taxes – Taxes on death 
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Table 26 – Comparison 1 (Personal estate scenario): Personal estate summary calculated using capital year-end values BEFORE year-end adjustments 
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Table 26 (continued) 
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9.2 Comparison 2 
9.2.1 Comparison 2 – Charts 
Figure 15 – Comparison 2 – Chart 1: Cumulative total taxation 
 
 
Figure 16 – Comparison 2 – Chart 2: Capital value 
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Figure 17 – Comparison 2 – Chart 3: Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value 
 
 
Figure 18 – Comparison 2 – Chart 4: Cumulative CGT and estate duty 
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Figure 19 – Comparison 2 – Chart 5: Cumulative CGT and estate duty as percentage of capital value 
 
 
Figure 20 – Comparison 2 – Chart 6: Difference: Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value 
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Figure 21 – Comparison 2 – Chart 7: Difference: Cumulative CGT and estate duty as percentage of capital 
value 
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9.2.2 Comparison 2 – Comparative data between trust and personal estate scenarios including difference data used in charts 
Table 27 – Comparison 2: Comparative and difference data sets 
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Table 27 (continued) 
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9.2.3 Comparison 2 – Trust scenario summary 
Table 28 – Comparison 2: Trust scenario summary 
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Table 28 (continued) 
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9.2.4 Comparison 2 – Personal estate scenario summary 
Table 29 – Comparison 2: Personal estate scenario summary 
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Table 29 (continued) 
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9.2.5 Comparison 2 – Trust scenario supporting schedules 
Table 30 – Comparison 2 (Trust scenario): Trust 1 capital value 
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Table 30 (continued) 
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Table 31 – Comparison 2: (Trust scenario): Trust 2a and 2b combined capital value 
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Table 31 (continued) 
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Table 32 – Comparison 2 (Trust scenario): Trust 1 income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
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Table 32 (continued) 
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Table 33 – Comparison 2 (Trust scenario): Trust 2a and 2b combined income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
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Table 33 (continued) 
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Table 34 – Comparison 2 (Trust scenario): Other taxes – CGT on transfers and disposals 
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Table 35 – Comparison 2 (Trust scenario): Other taxes – Taxes on death 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
202 
Table 36 – Comparison 2 (Trust scenario): Trust 1 loan account – founder 
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Table 36 (continued) 
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Table 37 – Comparison 2 (Trust scenario): Trust 1 loan account – spouse 
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Table 37 (continued) 
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Table 38 – Comparison 2 (Trust scenario): Trust summary calculated using capital year-end values BEFORE year-end adjustments 
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Table 38 (continued) 
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9.2.6 Comparison 2 – Personal estate scenario summary 
Table 39 – Comparison 2 (Personal estate scenario): Capital value 
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Table 39 (continued) 
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Table 40 – Comparison 2 (Personal estate scenario): Income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
211 
Table 40 (continued) 
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Table 41 – Comparison 2 (Personal estate scenario): Other taxes – CGT on transfers and disposals 
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Table 42 – Comparison 2 (Personal estate scenario): Other taxes – Taxes on death 
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Table 43 – Comparison 2 (Personal estate scenario): Personal estate summary calculated using capital year-end values BEFORE year-end adjustments 
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Table 43 (continued) 
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9.3 Comparison 3a 
9.3.1 Comparison 3a – Charts 
Figure 22 – Comparison 3a – Chart 1: Cumulative total taxation 
 
Figure 23 – Comparison 3a – Chart 2: Capital value 
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Figure 24 – Comparison 3a – Chart 3: Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value 
 
 
Figure 25 – Comparison 3a – Chart 4: Cumulative CGT, donations tax and estate duty 
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Figure 26 – Comparison 3a – Chart 5: Cumulative CGT, donations tax and estate duty as percentage of 
capital value 
 
 
Figure 27 – Comparison 3a – Chart 6: Difference: Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value 
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Figure 28 – Comparison 3a – Chart 7: Difference: Cumulative CGT, donations tax and estate duty as 
percentage of capital value 
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9.3.2 Comparison 3a – Comparative data between trust and personal estate scenarios including difference data used in charts 
Table 44 – Comparison 3a: Comparative and difference data sets 
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Table 44 (continued) 
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9.3.3 Comparison 3a – Trust scenario summary 
Table 45 – Comparison 3a: Trust scenario summary 
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Table 45 (continued) 
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9.3.4 Comparison 3a – Personal estate scenario summary 
Table 46 – Comparison 3a: Personal estate scenario summary 
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Table 46 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
226 
9.3.5 Comparison 3a – Trust scenario supporting schedules 
Table 47 – Comparison 3a (Trust scenario): Trust 1 capital value 
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Table 47 (continued) 
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Table 48 – Comparison 3a (Trust scenario): Trust 2a and 2b combined capital value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
229 
Table 48 (continued) 
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Table 49 – Comparison 3a (Trust scenario): Trust 1 income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
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Table 49 (continued) 
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Table 50 – Comparison 3a (Trust scenario): Trust 2a and 2b combined income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
233 
Table 50 (continued) 
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Table 51 – Comparison 3a (Trust scenario): Other taxes – CGT and donations tax on transfers and disposals 
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Table 52 – Comparison 3a (Trust scenario): Other taxes – Taxes on death 
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Table 53 – Comparison 3a (Trust scenario): Trust 1 loan account – founder 
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Table 53 (continued) 
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Table 54 – Comparison 3a (Trust scenario): Trust 1 loan account – spouse 
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Table 54 (continued) 
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Table 55 – Comparison 3a (Trust scenario): Trust summary calculated using capital year-end values BEFORE year-end adjustments 
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Table 55 (continued) 
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9.3.6 Comparison 3a – Personal estate scenario supporting schedules 
Table 56 – Comparison 3a (Personal estate scenario): Capital value 
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Table 56 (continued) 
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Table 57 – Comparison 3a (Personal estate scenario): Income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
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Table 57 (continued) 
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Table 58 – Comparison 3a (Personal estate scenario): Other taxes – CGT on transfers and disposals 
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Table 59 – Comparison 3a (Personal estate scenario): Other taxes – Taxes on death 
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Table 60 – Comparison 3a (Personal estate scenario): Personal estate summary calculated using capital year-end values BEFORE year-end adjustments 
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Table 60 (continued) 
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9.4 Comparison 3b 
9.4.1 Comparison 3b – Charts 
Figure 29 – Comparison 3b – Chart 1: Cumulative total taxation 
 
Figure 30 – Comparison 3b – Chart 2: Capital value 
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Figure 31 – Comparison 3b – Chart 3: Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value 
 
 
Figure 32 – Comparison 3b – Chart 4: Cumulative CGT and estate duty 
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Figure 33 – Comparison 3b – Chart 5: Cumulative CGT and estate duty as percentage of capital value 
 
 
Figure 34 – Comparison 3b – Chart 6: Difference: Cumulative total tax as percentage of capital value 
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Figure 35 – Comparison 3b – Chart 7: Difference: Cumulative CGT and estate duty as percentage of capital 
value 
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9.4.2 Comparison 3b – Comparative data between trust and personal estate scenarios including difference data used in charts 
Table 61 – Comparison 3b: Comparative and difference data sets 
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Table 61 (continued) 
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9.4.3 Comparison 3b – Trust scenario summary 
Table 62 – Comparison 3b: Trust scenario summary 
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Table 62 (continued) 
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9.4.4 Comparison 3b – Personal estate scenario summary 
Table 63 – Comparison 3b: Personal estate scenario summary 
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Table 63 (continued) 
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9.4.5 Comparison 3b – Trust scenario supporting schedules 
Table 64 – Comparison 3b (Trust scenario): Trust 1 capital value 
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Table 64 (continued) 
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Table 65 – Comparison 3b (Trust scenario): Trust 2a and 2b combined capital value 
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Table 65 (continued) 
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Table 66 – Comparison 3b (Trust scenario): Trust 1 income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
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Table 66 (continued) 
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Table 67 – Comparison 3b (Trust scenario): Trust 2a and 2b combined income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
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Table 67 (continued) 
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Table 68 – Comparison 3b (Trust scenario): Other taxes – CGT on transfers and disposals 
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Table 69 – Comparison 3b (Trust scenario): Other taxes – Taxes on death 
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Table 70 – Comparison 3b (Trust scenario): Trust 1 loan account – founder 
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Table 70 (continued) 
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Table 71 – Comparison 3b (Trust scenario): Trust 1 loan account – spouse 
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Table 71 (continued) 
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Table 72 – Comparison 3b: Trust summary calculated using capital year-end values BEFORE year-end adjustments 
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Table 72 (continued) 
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9.4.6 Comparison 3b – Personal estate scenario supporting schedules 
Note that the personal estate scenarios for Comparison 3a and 3b are identical. The schedules are repeated with the colour-coding of Comparison 
3b for the sake of completeness and ease of reference. 
Table 73 – Comparison 3b (Personal estate scenario): Capital value 
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Table 73 (continued) 
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Table 74 – Comparison 3b (Personal estate scenario): Income and income tax (excluding CGT) 
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Table 74 (continued) 
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Table 75 – Comparison 3b (Personal estate scenario): Other taxes – CGT on transfers and disposals 
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Table 76 – Comparison 3b (Personal estate scenario): Other taxes – Taxes on death 
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Table 77 – Comparison 3b (Personal estate scenario): Personal estate summary calculated using capital year-end values BEFORE year-end adjustments 
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Table 77 (continued) 
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9.5 All scenarios in all comparisons 
9.5.1 All scenarios: Post-retirement withdrawal schedule (from Yr 21 to Yr 40) 
Table 78 – Post-retirement withdrawal schedule (from Yr 21 to Yr 40) 
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9.5.2 All scenarios: Effective personal income tax rate (2016/2017) lookup table 
The below effective tax rate lookup table was created using the latest marginal tax rates 
applicable to natural persons announced in the 2016 Budget541 together with the primary 
rebate applicable to the 2017 tax year of R13,500542 for natural persons under the age of 
65. 
Table 79 – Rates of normal tax for natural persons for years of assessment ending 28 February 2017 
Taxable income  Rate of tax  
Not exceeding R188 000  18 per cent of taxable income  
Exceeding R188 000 but not exceeding 
R293 000  
R33 840 plus 26 per cent of amount by 
which taxable income exceeds R188 000  
Exceeding R293 000 but not exceeding 
R406 400  
R61 269 plus 31 per cent of amount by 
which taxable income exceeds R293 600  
Exceeding R406 400 but not exceeding 
R550 100  
R96 264 plus 36 per cent of amount by 
which taxable income exceeds R406 400  
Exceeding R550 100 but not exceeding 
R701 300  
R147 996 plus 39 per cent of amount by 
which taxable income exceeds R550 100  
Exceeds R701 300  
R206 964 plus 41 per cent of amount by 
which taxable income exceeds R701 300  
 
In the income tax calculations performed in subsequent data sets, the taxable income value 
was used to perform a lookup in the table listed below and the nearest taxable income 
value was used to look up the applicable effective tax rate for the purpose of calculating 
the income tax due on such income. This table and lookup process was created to simplify 
the tax calculations in cases where the assumptions stated that the effective tax rate was 
deemed to vary from year to year for beneficiaries (and not set at a fixed rate as a result of 
other income earned outside of the trust or outside of income from an investment asset 
held in a personal estate). 
                                                     
541 Per para 1 of Schedule 1 to the Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendments of Revenue 
Laws Bill (Draft) 2016 
542 Per s 4(1)(a) of the Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendments of Revenue Laws Bill 
(Draft) 2016 
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The following is an example of how the effective tax rates were calculated using the 
information above (the example below is highlighted in yellow in the tables to follow): 
Example (effective personal income tax rate calculation): 
 Taxable income: R1 000 000 
 Tax thereon (before deduction of tax rebates): 
R206 964 + 41% x (R1 000 000 – R701 300) = R206 964 + R122 467 = R329 431 
 Tax payable after deduction of primary tax rebate: 
R329 431– R13 500 = R315 931 
 Effective tax rate: 
(R315 931 / R1 000 000) x 100 = 31.59% 
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Table 80 – Effective personal income tax lookup table for persons under the age of 65 
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Table 11 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
